ETHICS OF SPINOZA

SPINOZA

A HANDBOOK TO THE ETHICS

BY

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TO THE BRIGHT MEMORY OF

HERBERT AND ALICE MAUD RIX

NOW AND ALWAYS ONE IN THE ETERNAL LIFE

THIS BOOK IS INSCRIBED

PREFACE

THE aim of this work is practical; that is to say, I have endeavoured to avoid discussing the philosophy of Spinoza more than is absolutely necessary to an understanding of his moral code. For ever since I became a humble student of his works I have had a growing impression that a rich vein of common-sense and sound morality runs through all his speculations, though it has often to be digged for as hidden treasure. But the fashion of his writing was determined in large measure by the customs of seventeenth-century philosophy, and he addressed himself only to those who were familiar with them. The result is that in our time, when the decay of old traditions makes a clearer view of the foundation of morals a matter of supreme importance, we lose the immense benefit of his moral and religious teaching because we are perplexed both by his use of familiar words, such as 'God' and 'eternity' and 'mind' and 'body,' in senses to which we are not accustomed; and we are also repelled by his artificial method of so-called 'mathematical proof.' I have endeavoured to relieve these difficulties by a plain

exposition which always keeps in view the moral and religious, rather than the intellectual value of the great Master's teaching. And to make the exposition clearer I have not hesitated to introduce 'modern instances' to show the concrete significance of apparently abstract principles.

My indebtedness to the great and exhaustive treatise of Sir Frederick Pollock on *Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy*, can hardly be sufficiently acknowledged. But I trust it is evident in the following pages. Still my own experience suggests that, for those who are specially interested in the religious evolution of our own day, there is needed a 'Handbook to the Ethics' which shall keep that evolution specially in view. This I have endeavoured to supply, measuring the wants of others by my own needs.

As will be evident, I have continually compared my own translations of Spinoza's Latin—(edition of Van Vloten et Land)—with the admirable work of W. Hale White and Amelia H. Stirling. I have ventured often to differ from their rendering, and sometimes I have preferred to paraphrase the original. But my debt of obligation is the same.

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PART I

CONCERNING GOD

Difficulties in reading Spinoza occasioned by bringing to the study incongruous habits of thought.

READERS of Spinoza often experience much greater difficulty than they ought to find in making out his meaning, because they bring with them to the study of his writings habits of thought entirely incongruous with his system. And this is especially the case with his 'Ethics.' For in his various tractates on somewhat more popular subjects, particularly in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, one of the very few of his writings printed during his lifetime, he so far condescended to the mental condition of his contemporaries as to use no small amount of conventional language. Thus readers who find him discussing prophecy and its confirmation by signs, or revelation and inspiration, feel at first quite at home, and only gradually discover that these terms must to him have had a very different meaning from that familiar in ecclesiastical circles. But with his *opus magnum*, the Ethics, the case is entirely different. That he wrote for posterity is clear from the fact that he withheld the work from publication during his lifetime, though probably even he had no idea of the remoteness of the posterity for whom he was writing. Perhaps it can hardly be said to have arrived yet, notwithstanding the increasing interest shown during the past half-century both in the man and his ideas. At

Not so apparent in the Tractatus as in the Ethics.

Reasons for this.

The Ethics was for posterity.

any rate in this work he quite abjured any such concessions to contemporary conventions of thought as are found in his other writings, and gave uncompromising utterance to the results of his solitary contemplations of man and the universe.

Influence of precedent and tradition on the Ethics confined mainly to matters of form.

Not that even here he was wholly uninfluenced by his times or their traditions. For no such miracle as an entirely new man in this sense has ever appeared—no, not even in the ages of transition from anthropoids to anthropopithecus and anthropos. But the traces of tradition and convention in Spinoza's greatest work are seen mainly in matters of form. Thus the idea of compressing the whole philosophy of the universe into five books of definitions, postulates, axioms, propositions and demonstrations, arranged after the manner of Euclid, seems utterly incongruous both with the physics and the metaphysics of the twentieth century. In the seventeenth century, however, though the plan was a little startling to less daring minds, it did not seem impossible.

E.g. the adoption of the Euclidean form of proposition and demonstration.

Reasons for its adoption.

And the reason for this was two-fold. Firstly, the vastness of the universe was not adequately felt; and next, the difference in precision between doctrines of ideal space, on the one hand, and expressions of concrete experience on the other, was not sufficiently apprehended. Now if the universe, or at least a definite portion of the universe, including man, is completely commensurable with the human intellect, and if every impression received by that intellect from the accessible universe is capable of as precise statement as our ideal notions of space—such as point, line, superficies, square, circle, and so on—there would seem to be no reason why a man of

very exceptional philosophic genius might not reduce all our relations with the world of being to a set of Euclidean propositions. But such a notion of existence has become impossible to us. And we are compelled to recognise, in the form into which the Ethics was cast, the influence of an age in which the general outlook on the world was, in some important respects, entirely incongruous with that of our own time.

Other instances of seventeenth-century convention deferred.

There are other seventeenth-century conventions of form which add to the difficulties of an average twentieth-century reader. But the instance now given will sufficiently illustrate my meaning for the present; and other cases will be better considered in their proper places. All the more so, because we shall sometimes have to consider whether the difficulty of form does not also involve a difficulty of substance. And here it may be well to anticipate so far as to say that, while I regard Spinoza's doctrine of God, Nature, and Man as in its essence permanent and inexpugnable, I must admit that some details incidental to his treatment of that doctrine would have been felt by him to be not only intolerable but impossible, had he lived in the present age. These details however, now generally recognised as impossible, do not occur in his moral system, which is singularly noble and complete, but rather in the attempt to work out an intellectual system of the universe from two alleged 'attributes' of the Infinite, said to be the only ones known to us out of an absolutely unlimited number.

Spinoza's religion eternal, though details of his philosophy may have been temporary.

The present essay an endeavour to meet these difficulties, by

From the above preliminary remarks it will be seen that I regard the average reader's difficulty in understanding Spinoza's Ethics as arising partly from our in-

veterate habit of assuming that such terms as God, Eternity, Good, Evil, and many others are used by him in the sense which we have learned in Church or Sunday-school to attach to them. But partly also the difficulty is caused by the admittedly unfortunate form in which the great work is cast, and also by the comparative remoteness of seventeenth-century mental habits from our own. I propose, so far as I can, to meet these difficulties by giving a *précis* of the Ethics dissociated from the Euclidean form and set forth in language which, if not metaphysically exact, may at least enable readers of ordinary intelligence to grasp the common-sense convictions forming the basis and main structure of Spinoza's religion. Here then is the title-page rendered from the edition of Van Vloten and Land: 'Ethics, Proved on the Geometrical Method, and divided into Five Parts; wherein is treated—I. Of God; II. Of Nature and the Origin of Mind; III. Of the Origin and Nature of the Passions; IV. Of Human Bondage, or of the Power of the Passions; V. Of the Might of the Intellect, or of Human Freedom.'

dispensing with the Euclidean form, omitting refinements of proof, and keeping to the common-sense substance.

Title-page.

Meaning of 'Ethics.'

And first it may be observed that by 'Ethics' Spinoza meant much more than is usually understood by that word. For whereas we generally mean by it the principles of social duty as between man and man, individual or collective, Spinoza included in it the whole relations of the individual to the universe of which he forms part. It was therefore necessary for him to set forth, not only his ideas of right and wrong as between members of the human family, but also the eternal nature and constitution of the universe as conceived by him. Therefore he

begins with a book or section 'concerning God.' And here occurs the first and one of the chief difficulties of the Ethics. For no one brought up on Paley, Clarke, or their successors and imitators, can make out what Spinoza is driving at in his Eleventh Proposition of Book I., which reads as follows: '*God, or substance* (*involving*)[1] *infinite attributes of which every one expresses an eternal and infinite essence, of necessity exists.*' And the main demonstration does not help us, referring as it does to a previous axiom and proposition belonging entirely to the realms of abstract thought, and not of experience. But one of the alternative demonstrations does help us a little, because it rests in part at least on experience of our own existence. Thus, 'either nothing exists, or a Being absolutely infinite exists of necessity. But' (as a matter of fact) 'we exist, either in and by[2] ourselves, or in and by something else, which exists of necessity.' Here the meaning flashes upon us. For Spinoza is not trying to prove the existence of a personal Creator who called the worlds out of nothing, and is now only the greatest Being among innumerable others. What the Master means is that the fact of our present existence necessarily involves previous Being[3] in and by which we are what we are. The inference that this previous Being must be absolutely infinite and of necessary existence may appear subtle. But

Assumption of the being of God.

Apparent obscurity of the argument arriving from a misimpression of what he desires to prove.

By 'God' he means the 'Universe.'

[1] *Constans* in the original. But the literal rendering 'consisting of,' or 'consisting in,' scarcely expresses the real meaning.

[2] The two prepositions seem needed to express the full sense of Spinoza's *in nobis, in alio.*

[3] The use of the words previous, past, future, etc., is practically necessary in speaking of human experience. But such use must always be understood subject to Spinoza's doctrine of eternity, as will afterwards appear.

it has common-sense at the back of it. 'The capacity for non-existence is weakness, and, on the other hand, the capacity for existence is power. If therefore what now of necessity exists is nothing but finite beings, the finite beings must be mightier than absolutely infinite Being. But this is absurd.' Let us try to translate it into contemporary modes of thought. The Infinite of which Spinoza is thinking is not a divine Person, enthroned somewhere in space or in thought, apart from the Universe, but the Universe itself. It is of this that he alleges absolute infinity and necessary existence—that is, existence uncaused, and without beginning or end.

A modernised paraphrase of the argument.

Surely we may now feel some force in the argument, at least if we drop the subtleties about 'capacity for existence or non-existence.' For it is mere commonsense to assume that a limited number of finite creatures —men, beasts, birds, trees, planets, suns, and galaxies—could not independently exist side by side in infinite space from eternity to eternity. For if once the notion of *finite* independent existence be allowed, no limit can be drawn beneath which such existence becomes unthinkable. Thus if the independent and eternal existence of a group of galaxies, measuring say a billion or a trillion cubic miles in extent, be conceivable, then no reason can be given why the independent and eternal existence of a group of galaxies measuring only a million cubic miles should be unthinkable. Nor, so far as conceivability is concerned, can we stop there. But there would be no reason why a universe measuring only a hundred cubic miles should not be conceivable as having independent

The independent and eternal existence of anything finite is unthinkable.

and external existence. And so we might come down to a single stone, and reasonably maintain that, if a finite universe on any scale be thinkable as having uncaused, independent existence from eternity to eternity, then a single stone might be capable of it.

For if it were, a single stone might have such existence.

According to ordinary, or, using the word in no offensive sense, vulgar modes of thought, the difficulty is removed by making the finite universe to depend on an Infinite Cause. But this of course admits Spinoza's argument, that finite existence implies Infinite Being. It is only the application that is different; and as I am merely trying to expound Spinoza, I do not see that I have, in this place at any rate, anything to do with that application. It is enough just now to recognise that by common consent our philosopher's argument is endorsed, that 'either nothing exists or else absolutely infinite Being exists of necessity.' This last phrase 'of necessity' (*necessario*) must of course not be taken to mean any compelling cause, in the usual sense of the word. Spinoza quite agrees with the humblest Christian that God is uncaused, or, as he sometimes puts it, His own cause. In other words, God is because He is, and there, so far as we are concerned, is an end of the matter.

The argument practically admitted in ordinary modes of thought.

Meaning of 'necessity' here.

Now having noted the common consent of humanity to Spinoza's argument, when rightly understood, and having disowned any obligation to criticise here the application usually made by theologians, I go on to deal with Spinoza's own application of it. How should we think of this 'absolutely infinite Being' who is because He is? The late Herbert Spencer was content to regard

Spinoza's application of the common conviction.

Him as unknowable, and in this I have elsewhere[1] maintained he was quite right, if we confine ourselves to Spencer's phrase 'in the strict sense of knowing.' But Spinoza thought otherwise; and undoubtedly he was a transcendently greater man than Spencer. Let us learn then what that mighty seer of the seventeenth century thought we could know; and hereafter let us note in what respects his thought must be inevitably modified by the age of enormously developed telescopes, microscopes, and transcendental mathematics in which Spencer lived.

Difference of his age and Spencer's.

Spinoza, then, was sure that as our own finite existence implies Infinite and Eternal Being, we must think of this latter as substance involving infinite attributes, of which each several attribute expresses His infinite and essential nature. 'Substance' he has already defined as 'that which is in (and by) itself, and is conceived through itself alone; otherwise, that of which the conception does not need any other conception from which it has to be shaped.' Now at first sight there might appear to be a difficulty here. For, at least to common-sense, a simple colour such as blue or red does not need the help of anything else to clear up or define our sense of it. In fact, it cannot be defined except by methods of optical science which have no bearing whatever on our conscious impression. There is no relation realisable in consciousness between the alleged scientific fact that blue light means some seven hundred billion etherial vibrations in a second, and our perception of blue. No; but at the same time we all recognise blue as a *quality* of something,

Infinite attributes and modes.

Spinoza's idea of 'substance.'

Apparent difficulties.

[1] *Religion of the Universe*, Macmillan and Co.

though that something may, as in the case of the blue sky or Mediterranean water, remain unknown to the majority of those on whom the impression of colour is made. Still, though the observer may not know to *what* the quality belongs, he is sure that it *is* a quality, and not a substance. Whether the colour be in the observer himself (subjective) or in the external world (objective), in any case it is a quality and not a substance.

Really equivalent to Spencer's Unknowable.

Returning to Spinoza's definition of substance, I find it much more akin to Spencer's idea of the Unknowable than orthodox Spinozists would be prepared to allow. For after all, the definition is and must be reached, in the case of ordinary people, by a process of larger and larger generalisations, such as Spencer gives us in his *First Principles*.[1] These generalisations are thus summed up in the concluding words of the chapter on the relativity of all knowledge (p. 83): 'On watching our thoughts we have seen how impossible it is to get rid of the consciousness of an Actuality lying behind Appearances; and how from this impossibility results our indestructible belief in that Actuality.' Happily, Spinoza does not speak of God as lying *behind* appearances. Otherwise Spencer's 'Actuality' and Spinoza's 'Substance' are obviously the same thing under different names. Nor is this identity in the least disproved by the different methods of the two philosophers in approaching the ultimate reality. For though Spinoza, in his abstract way, thinks it enough to say curtly that Substance—or ultimate Actuality—is that which is in (and by) itself, and is conceived through itself, or does

The differences formal and not real.

[1] P. 81, sixth edition.

not need the conception of any other thing from which it has to be shaped; yet, as I have said, by ordinary mortals who have not the brains of a Spinoza, such a conception—so far as it is a conception at all—can only be reached by increasing circles of generalisation that widen out to infinity. Thus all things that make sensible impressions on us are summed up as 'matter.' But this matter is not thought or conceived without the help of something else not classed as matter, as for instance consciousness, or thought of weight and mass. Similarly, consciousness or thought as a general expression is the last expanding circle of a series of generalisations from individual acts of thought. But the finally generalised conception of thought or consciousness does not and cannot answer to Spinoza's definition of Substance as that the concception of which does not need to be helped by the conception of anything else. For it could not be conceived at all except by the help of the innumerable impressions from without, which have evolved the individual mind and suggested the generalisation supposed to include the experience of all other minds. Neither matter then, nor mind—however we may interpret the words—is Substance, according to the definition of Spinoza.

Spinoza's definition is the insight of genius; Spencer's generalisations the method of common-sense.

But neither generalised matter nor generalised mind answers to Spinoza's definition of Substance.

But what relation have the two series of material and mental generalisations to each other? Are they utterly distinct, alien, and foreign to each other? There have been philosophers who have thought so. But Spinoza was not of them, neither was Spencer; and each successive generation of thinkers seems on the whole to become more intolerant of so grotesque a doctrine. We

Spinoza's substance is that of which both matter and mind are expressions.

need not therefore dwell upon it. But if these two series of generalised conceptions are not alien to one another, the only conclusion possible is that they merge in some unity of which each is a various expression. Now that final unity is Spencer's ultimate Actuality, and it is also Spinoza's Substance.

But there is a very marked difference between the greater philosopher and the less as to the intelligibility of this ultimate 'Actuality.' For while Spinoza, in the serene confidence of his cloudless contemplations, is perfectly certain that he has an adequate idea of Substance, Spencer's ultimate Actuality is, for the later philosopher, identical with that Unknowable, which 'no man hath seen nor can see.' Surely here is an absolute contradiction entailing the consequence that either these great thinkers must both be wrong, or one of them right and the other mistaken.

Apparent contradiction

Yet the contradiction is not so absolute, nor is the consequence so inevitable as it looks. For in the ideal world, with which Spinoza mostly deals until he comes to treat of human nature, his definition of Substance is quite as clear as Euclid's definition of a point, a line, or a circle. Modern innovators are needlessly officious in assuring us that neither point nor line, according to Euclid's definition, has any existence in the external or finite world, and that to the circle only a rough approximation can be obtained. But for all that Euclid's conceptions of ideal space remain certain and impregnable. Moreover, they remain the spiritual principles which are 'clothed upon' by more materialistic geometry and mensuration.

not so real as it looks.

Spinoza finds the real in the ideal,

as Euclid.

Somewhat in the same way, Spinoza, contemplating Eternal Being, of which space or extension seemed to him only one attribute out of innumerable others, gives a definition of Substance which in the world of ideas is obviously true, though when we grope after it in the world of sense we never find it. Yet though we never find it so as to grasp it with the hands or behold it with the eyes or realise it with the practical understanding, still amongst the spiritual principles which evolve an intelligible universe, Spinoza's definition of substance must ever remain impregnable. For substance is surely that beyond which we cannot go in thought, which can be referred to no wider genus, which requires the help of no other conception to frame our thought of it, because it is in and by itself, and includes everything by which we would explain it. Intellectually, ideally, it is perfectly plain. Only when we ask where it is in the work-a-day world do we get no answer except this, that it is everywhere and nowhere. Not that by the last word we need admit any unreality. But obviously that which is all in all cannot be in a particular spot. It is the whole Universe.

The definition of Substance is true in the sense that Euclid's definitions are true.

Wc need not therefore admit any real contradiction between Spencer's ultimate Actuality and Spinoza's Substance. At the same time we are bound to acknowledge some obvious differences, and these are not in favour of the more modern philosopher. For while Spencer perpetually speaks of the ultimate Actuality as being 'behind' the things we see and feel, Spinoza treats his Substance as an infinite Whole, of which the seen and felt Universe presents us with an infinite number of

No real contradiction.

finite aspects. Again, the special purpose of Spencer to deal only with phenomenal evolution compelled him to clear out of his course at the outset certain ultimate questions with which he did not intend to concern himself, thus giving the unfortunate and unjust[1] impression that for him the Unknowable was something outside the practical world and, in fact, negligible. For Spinoza, on the contrary, Eternal Substance was the beginning, middle, and end of his whole religion and morality. It was never absent from his thoughts, contemplations, aspirations, or moral struggles. It gave meaning, reality, order, and peace to life. It could not, indeed, solve the enigmas that have baffled saint and seer alike. But it could impose upon him a humble sense of the 'inadequate ideas' which perplex any man who takes a part for the whole, or judges a picture by some obscure spot in it on which his inquisitive eyeglass is fixed.

Spencer misunderstood.

Spinoza the plainer in dealing with eternal things.

We approach more popular notions of reality when we turn to consider Spinoza's doctrine of Attributes. For, as we have seen, in Spinoza's view God is absolute Substance, that is, Substance endowed with infinite Attributes of which each one expresses eternal and infinite being (*essentiam*). Now it is precisely here that both Spencer's ultimate Actuality and Spinoza's Substance come within our ken by presenting phenomena. 'By an attribute,' says the latter, 'I understand that which the understanding perceives as constituting its essence' (*i.e.* of substance).

Attributes of Substance.

In what sense they express reality

[1] Unjust to himself, because he thought nothing of the kind; as is abundantly shown in his chapter on 'Reconciliation,' and also in every case where he has to deal with the notion that man can ever dispense with religion, or that any object of religion can be substituted for that which is 'behind humanity and behind all other things.'

There is a difficulty in these last words; but I do not think I can be far wrong in suggesting that what Spinoza means by 'constituting its essence' or being, is practically equivalent to constituting its reality as apprehended by us. Now by 'reality' is not meant here that beyond which we cannot go in thought, but that which remains through all phenomenal changes, and of which our careful observations with their legitimate inferences are always verifiable.

illustrated by extension.

For instance, Spinoza regards extension as an attribute of the divine Substance.[1] That is to say, it expresses or makes cognisable to us His eternal and infinite essence. On this ground many have hastily accused Spinoza of gross materialism. But, as Sir Frederick Pollock has shown, his error, say rather his difference from the inevitable tendency of opinion in later days, is of a very different character, as we shall presently see. Meantime let us only note that Extension expresses for us the infinite essence or reality of God because it remains amid all phenomenal changes; and our careful observations of it, whether to our experience subjective or objective, together with our legitimate inferences from those careful observations, are always verifiable. Thus the triangulation of a country by an accurate surveyor can always be verified again though the superficies (phenomena) of the country may have greatly changed. Rivers may have altered their course, volcanoes may have subsided, and lakes may have been dried up. But nevertheless a suffi-

Measurements of extension always verifiable.

[1] A good deal of what immediately follows is an anticipation of Book II., *Of the Nature and Origin of Mind*. But the transposition seems needful for the purpose I have in view.

ciently skilled person will have little or no difficulty in verifying the measurements and area found by the previous accurate survey. For though modifications of extension, such as heights and depths and shapes, may have changed, the extension itself is still there—it is a reality. Similarly of ideal space we may say that careful mental observations and the legitimate inferences therefrom are always verifiable. The skilled surveyor's measurements by triangulation assume always that the three angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles. And any one who wants verification can have it, either roughly and imperfectly by the use of instruments applied to visible and tangible triangles, or purely and perfectly by mathematical demonstration dealing with ideal space.

And the truths of ideal space can always be verified.

Such is the 'Extension' which Spinoza treats as one of the infinite attributes of God. But being infinite, it is not measurable[1] in miles or feet or inches. And if it occurs to the reader that we have just now been illustrating its reality by the possibility of verification through measurement, the reply is that Spinoza regards the infinite attributes of God as subject to an infinity of finite *modes* or modifications. It is only these finite modifications that can be measured. But still the unfailing possibility of verification proves reality. And if it be asked, then why call extension infinite? I might be content with replying that I am but expounding Spinoza; though not always as a 'Spinozist.' Yet on this point it may be urged that if once the idea of extension arises, the non-existence of any possible limit follows as a matter of course. For however a man may try to think

Infinity of extension

[1] *I.e.* in itself. It is only its finite *modes* that are measurable.

of space as bounded, the question what is outside the bound necessarily arises, and the inevitable answer is space.

subject to an infinity of modifications;

But it is only in its finite modes or modifications that extension is an object of experience. And though this fact does not in the least degree invalidate the connection of the idea of extension with unlimited (or infinite) space, it forms practically the whole content of our cognition of God's attribute of extension. For everything that we see

form,

or feel, whether on earth or in the heavens, is a finite mode or modification of that divine attribute of extension.

motion,

So likewise is motion, as it is a transference of something through extension or space. It is only by this inclusion of motion in the 'modes' of extension that we can conceive how Spinoza brought the whole so-called 'material'

colour, sound,

universe within the attribute of extension. For colour and sound and scent and feeling are not obviously modes of extension. But conceive them as modes of motion, which is the general theory in our day, and their inclu-

weight.

sion becomes simple. Nay, even weight, whether realised as a pull or as a pressure, may be conceived as motion striving to realise itself, and so falls under the same attribute of extension. I am not urging the importance of such subtleties, because it will be seen presently they vanish in the more spiritual air of Spinoza's higher philosophy. But there is some profit in trying to see the 'material' world as he saw it.[1] For to his contemplative

[1] Tennyson, in his Higher Pantheism, has to a certain extent set forth this vision for us, as only a poet can. But Spinoza did not insist upon illusion as Tennyson, in this poem, does. The former thought that he saw the world as it is, and not as 'a straight staff bent in a pool.'

spirit everything in what we call the external world, including our own bodies, was a mode of God's attribute of extension. Sun, moon and stars, mountain and plain, river and ocean, forest and flower, bird and beast, storm and thunder, as well as rainbow, all were modes of the one aspect or attribute of eternal God. They were always changing because finite modes are necessarily variable at least to finite apprehension. But however they might be transformed and interchanged, they remained for ever in all their apparently successive forms, the finite modes of one eternal attribute of God.

Spinoza's mode of conceiving the visible and tangible world.

According to our teacher, this infinite attribute of extension is only one out of innumerable Attributes, all of them expressing some aspect of God's eternal and infinite essence, or reality. But of these Attributes, only two are cognisable by the human intellect. With one of these we have already dealt, that of Extension, and the one remaining to be considered is that of Thought (*cogitatio*). It is clear that by this he cannot mean discursive thought. For one of the fundamental elements of his system is the superiority of God to time or duration, and consequently to succession in thought. He seems to have used the word in Descartes' sense of what we may call 'awareness.' Of everything that passes within our conscious selves we have a perception. But whether the object of the perception be a sense-impression, a train of reasoning, an imagination, or a passion, it is included by Descartes under *cogitatio*, or thought; and Spinoza followed him.

The Attributes innumerable, but only two cognisable by us.

The second is Thought.

Its significance here

Perhaps it might occur to beginners in Spinoza-study that 'consciousness' would be a better word. But, to

more than 'consciousness.'

say nothing of the difficulty of finding in Latin an exact equivalent for what Spinoza meant, or what we now mean by consciousness, such a word is too finite in its connotation to have served the purpose. For undoubtedly consciousness means the feeling by which a creature, aware of itself, recognises a practical (or phenomenal) difference between itself and its sustaining medium, as even an oyster in some sort must, when it opens its shell for the inflow of nutriment and closes it against attack. But such consciousness as this cannot thinkably be an attribute of God, because, according to Pantheism, there can be nothing outside Himself, and we cannot therefore legitimately conceive Him as distinguishing Himself from other being. The same objection is not applicable to the word 'thought' (*cogitatio*) in the sense given it by Descartes. For all that it necessarily signifies is that, just as the infinite Substance, God, has an infinite Attribute of Extension, so He has an infinite Attribute or aspect of Thought, which we may venture to describe as self-awareness. And of course this self-awareness includes in an infinite unity everything in existence, from the Milky Way to man, beast, plant and bacterium.

because God *is* all that He thinks.

This attribute of Thought equally with Extension expresses the eternal and infinite essence (or reality) of God. And, as in the case of the other Attribute, the essence or reality it expresses means to us the possibility of verifying the results of careful observation. This is not Spinoza's teaching. For to him direct intuition of eternal truth is the only verification worth having. But different generations have their different forms of

Thought as expressing the divine reality.

thought. And though I am a devout believer in the Master's doctrine of intuition, yet, as he allows other methods of approaching reality,[1] it helps and does not hinder our understanding of him if we take a test of reality applicable to all modes of knowledge. For the intuition taught by him need not form any exception; because it is its own verification. In the case of Thought, then, as in that of Extension, the reality it expresses can always be verified. As to the finite mode of infinite Thought constituting our own mind, indeed, intuition is the only possible verification; but it is manifestly sufficient. *Cogito, ergo sum.* It is the prime fact of experience, and, whenever we choose to reflect, it is always there.

Verifiable by intuition.

But it may well be said that only the fact of finite thought is verified thus, and not that of infinite Thought. Yet this is not conclusive. For according to a line of argument adopted in recent times by an increasing number of high authorities, and likely to be permanent, the intuition of finite Thought necessarily involves infinite and eternal Thought. Thus, by no effort of any faculty we possess, nor by any method, whether of 'victorious analysis,' induction or deduction, can we make thinkable the existence of finite Thought except as a 'mode' of Eternal Thought. It was this impossibility which forced the brilliant and candid Professor Clifford to suggest that every ultimate 'atom' of matter was endowed with elementary consciousness or 'mind-stuff.'[2] For he frankly recognised that if such

Not necessarily confined to finite thought.

Professor Clifford on 'mind-stuff.'

[1] *Ethices*, Pars. ii., Prop. xl., Schol. 2.

[2] I do not mean that Clifford made the same application of his suggestion that I am doing.

an attribute, as distinct from what we call 'physical' qualities, were not inherent in 'matter,' no conceivable combination, arrangement, or interplay of 'molecular vibrations' could ever have evolved consciousness. Excluding then the hypothesis of creation out of nothing, the unthinkableness of which is here assumed throughout, surely this inference of universal 'mind-stuff' from the present existence of consciousness endorses what has been said above, that the intuition of finite thought necessarily involves infinite and eternal Thought. But if the two ideas are inseparable, the verification of the one carries with it the verification of the other. And thus every time that we assure ourselves of our own conscious existence, we assure ourselves also of an infinite Thought, of which we are 'modes,' or as Coleridge had it, 'parts and proportions.'

The finite mode involves the infinite attribute.

It ought not to be necessary to guard against misunderstanding here. For, of course, I do not mean that the consciousness of manhood involves an infinite manhood. For the whole development of manhood in its conventional divisions into 'body' and 'soul' can now be traced with a fair approximation to completeness. And we know that mankind have been evolved out of some sort of anthropoid ape through stages suggested by the imperfect skeleton of the 'anthropopithecus' of Java. But that there ever was a time when there was no 'mind-stuff' is not only unproved, but, as Professor Clifford saw, unthinkable. While, therefore, I am far from reckoning that distinguished man as a 'Spinozist,' I do maintain that he confirmed Spinoza's view of Thought as an attribute of the Universe. Of course the

Not that the human consciousness involves the being of an infinite human consciousness.

word used is imperfect, an expression, as Matthew Arnold used to say, 'thrown out' at an idea too vast for expression. But at least we may say this much: Clifford's 'mind-stuff' was diffused and omnipresent throughout a universe to which, so far as I know, he assigned no bounds. Summing up, then, that omnipresent and infinite 'mind-stuff,' we have practically Spinoza's infinite eternal Thought as an attribute of the divine Substance or God. In other words, the Universe must be somehow aware of itself.

But the omnipresence of 'mind-stuff' suggests that the Universe is aware of itself.

Another prevalent conviction of modern thinkers may be adduced as giving some confirmation to the foregoing. For the notion that there can be anywhere an object without a subject to be aware of it is, so far as my reading goes, entirely repudiated by all thinkers outside the rapidly diminishing school of molecular mechanists. By which latter description I mean those who still cling to the theory that the whole Universe, with its life and feeling, can be explained by a chance-begotten arrangement of dead atoms. Outside this ancient and dying sect, there is a general recognition that when we look at anything such as sun or moon or tree or flower, we—or the God in us—in some measure make what we see. And what would be left of the object, if we could deduct what we do not make, no one has yet been wise enough to tell us.

Modern insistence that there can be no object without subject.

Common-sense, in its rough way, endorses the maxim that 'we see in things what we bring to them.' But to what extent this is true neither common-sense nor philosophy has been able to decide. That to a man colour-blind, to a short-sighted man, and to a man of

Seeing in things what we bring to them.

normal vision, a tree must needs be a very different object, every one owns. But how much its greenery, its grace, the interest of its tracery, and the music of its murmur owe to the subjectivity, or—sacrificing accuracy to plainness, let us say—to the mental constitution of the normal man, we really do not know. But this at least is certain, that his view of the tree includes a good deal that is not in the tree but in himself, as for instance, colour, grace, and interest. Doubtless there must be something which stimulates such perceptions in the observer, but that this something is anything like what he perceives is not only improbable but impossible. I must not be misunderstood as insinuating that the observer is the subject of illusion. Not at all. He is the subject of reality and sees reality. But then the reality is not something outside and separate from him; it is the relation between the mode of divine Thought constituting his mind and the mode of divine Extension constituting the tree. Take away the mode of thought, and the mode of extension would be—we know not what, but certainly not a tree as we conceive it.

Still further no object without thinking subject.

But modern metaphysicians go farther than this, and with much reason. They are not content with divesting the thing seen of all that we manifestly bring to it. They say that the residual object is still a thing thought of, and except as a thing thought of can have no existence. This of course does not mean that the object has no existence except as *we* think of it. But it does mean that a thing which is an object of no thought at all, has no existence. And whether we agree with them or not,

it is surely very difficult to draw the line between those qualities which, as common-sense allows, are brought to an observed object by thought, and those which may be supposed to have an independent existence. For, put it how we may, the residual, uncoloured, unscented, unsentimental thing is still realised only in thought. Take thought away altogether, and is there anything left? A permanent possibility of stimulating thought perhaps? But is not that something *thought of*? And what becomes of it if not thought of at all by any thinking being?

I need not labour the point farther. Its only bearing on my purpose is the illustration it affords of a certain tendency among thinking people to recur to Spinoza's philosophy, not indeed in the letter but in the spirit. From the letter, as we shall presently see, we are compelled to diverge widely. But in the recognition that there can be no object without subject, or, in other words, that the existence of finite thought implies infinite thought as an eternal attribute to the Universe or God, there is a very marked recurrence to the spirit of the 'Ethics.' This does not mean that the finite thought is the *object* of the Infinite thought, but that the finite thought is a *mode* of Infinite Thought.

Sole importance here as an illustration of recurrence to Spinoza.

But against one error in interpretation we must very carefully guard if we would understand Spinoza. We are not to suppose that God has any other Self than the Universe; for that would be to imagine Him as having a self other than Himself. I am well aware that many who are partly attracted by Spinoza desire to reconcile his teaching with theological tradition by insisting on a

No idea of 'transcendence' in Spinoza.

transcendence as well as an immanence of God. This is not the place to argue the question; all I say here is that, if we are to understand the Master at all, we must not carry that notion with us into the study of his works.

The attribute of Thought co-ordinate with that of extension and infinite others.

The infinite attribute of Thought then, or self-awareness, equally with the attribute of Extension, expresses the eternal and infinite being (*essentia*) or reality of God. And here again we must be on our guard against the insidious intrusion of notions about phenomena distinguishable from 'things in themselves,' notions against which Herbert Spencer—though I cannot believe he held them himself—did not sufficiently guard his readers.

But none are to be separated from the divine Substance,

Spinoza cherished no such superstition. The 'Attributes,' according to him, are not to be regarded as distinct from the substance any more than the various aspects of a flashing diamond can be separated from the diamond itself. They *are* the diamond and express its reality, though doubtless there are other aspects of crystallised carbon incognisable to our senses, yet equally expressing its reality. Just so in the view of Spinoza Extension is one aspect of the divine Substance, and Thought is another. But they are not qualities or powers added on to its essence. They *are* its essence as seen by contemplation in one or the other aspect. And as they are not qualities added on to the divine Substance, so neither

nor from each other.

are they to be regarded as independent of each other, or as distinct entities or as entities at all. They are inseparable as they are infinite. For wherever there is Extension there is divine Thought, and wherever there is divine Thought there is Extension. Thus if the

Universe, in one aspect of it, is a measureless network of flaming orbs and planets, it is so because God so thinks it. And if the thought of the glorious vision implies illimitable space, it is so because Extension is an inseparable concomitant of the divine Thought.

Innumerable other attributes incognisable to man.

Further, Spinoza teaches that besides these Attributes there are innumerable others, each of them infinite, each subject to innumerable modes, and each expressing the infinite reality of God. But they express that reality for God Himself, or for creatures other than ourselves, because they are incognisable to us. What then is their place in a rational system? Confining ourselves to Spinoza, there can be no difficulty in answering this question. For the assumption is necessary to a very important article in his creed, and that is the fundamental, incommensurable difference between eternity and time. For him eternity is not infinite duration, and in fact has nothing whatever to do with duration. Eternity is, if we may so speak, an infinite moment, the lifetime of infinite Thought, without past or future. And if in our view the manifestations of the Eternal 'change from glory to glory,' that is because of our finiteness which cannot at one glance comprehend Him as He is. But in His essence He is now all that can be. There can be no addition and no diminution. Now if that is so, it is obvious that the essence of the Eternal must be expressible in an infinite variety of ways. Thus, for Spinoza it was impossible to suppose the Attributes expressive of the reality of the divine Substance to be confined to two. On the contrary, those Attributes must be innumerable, that is, if the expression be allowed,

Need for this in Spinoza's system.

God is now all that can be.

This necessitates the hypothesis of innumerable attributes.

infinite in number. Further, every one of such incognisable attributes must be, like Extension and Thought, not something separable in any sense from the divine Substance, but, to adopt Sir Frederick Pollock's word, an aspect of it. And like Extension and Thought they must be all so correlated that, if it were possible to bring within our cognisance fifty or a hundred or a thousand of them, the multiplication would only deepen our sense of the divine unity, beside which unity there is indeed no other that is real.

Sir Frederick Pollock's criticism.

It is necessary now to pay particular attention[1] to the very important and incisive criticism made by Sir Frederick Pollock on Spinoza's treatment of the attributes of Extension and Thought. 'It is to be observed that inasmuch as Attribute is defined by reference to intellect,[2] and Thought itself is an Attribute, Thought appears to be in a manner counted twice over.' That is to say, Thought is treated in the definition as necessary to the very existence of extension, because Extension is what is 'perceived.' But then again Thought is regarded as an Attribute entirely distinct and independent. In making Extension the object of a perceiving subject Spinoza was in accord with the modern tendencies of thought mentioned above. But it is difficult to understand why he should think it necessary to give a separate and independent existence to the Attribute of Extension when, by his definition of Attribute, he makes Extension necessarily something perceived, or, in other words, a

Thought counted twice over.

Superfluity of any other Attributes beside Thought.

[1] See p. 14 *ante*, and Pollock's *Spinoza*, pp. 153 and 164.

[2] *Ethices*, Pars. i., Def. iv. 'By an attribute I understand that which the intellect (thought) perceives concerning Substance, as constituting the essence (reality) of the latter.'

mode of thought. 'Hence,' says Sir Frederick Pollock, 'all Attributes except Thought are really superfluous: and Spinoza's doctrine when thus reduced to its simplest terms is that nothing exists but thought and its modifications.'

Some objections to the criticism.

Nevertheless, with all the deference due to so high an authority, I think the criticism is here carried too far. Sir Frederick says indeed that 'it does not affect the substantial and working value of Spinoza's metaphysic.' Yet it is an essential article in Spinoza's creed that everything within the infinite possibilities of existence does actually exist. It is so essential that—as I hope will be seen farther on—without it the whole system collapses like St. Mark's Campanile through disharmony of internal strains. But if everything that can exist does exist, it is surely venturesome to say that all possibilities of existence are limited to forms of thought. We do not indeed know what else there can be. But it would be presumptuous to limit possibilities of existence[1] to *our* capacity of conception. The more consistent course would seem to be to allow that Spinoza does appear to have set up two Attributes where only one was necessary, but at the same time to allow that God may have infinite other Attributes incognisable to us. Whether it is worth while to follow that great master in such a

The infinity of existence involves the infinity of Attributes.

[1] Sir Frederick Pollock having been good enough to read the few lines here referring to his comment on this part of Spinoza's system, makes on the above sentence the following remark, which with his permission I quote: 'Otherwise, whatever exists, exists because and so far as it can. The current use of "can" and "possible" means that we don't know all the conditions. But the question remains, what do we mean by existence?'

fashion is a point that cannot fairly be decided until we have completed our study of him, and have seen how on this foundation rests the heaven-high tower of contemplation and peace and purity which he built for all the ages.

Meantime it is sufficient to define the position we assume. We accept his doctrine of Substance. We regard it as Being. It is knowable to us through one Attribute of Thought. This is not something added to or distinguishable from Being. But it expresses to our intellect the essence or reality of substance or God. At the same time we provisionally follow the Master in holding that the divine Substance, Being, or God has infinite other Attributes or aspects which remain incognisable [1] to us.

Reasons for abbreviation.

Of the rest of the First Book of the *Ethica* my purpose does not require me to give any detailed account. Of course, for those who wish to attain an approximately complete comprehension of Spinoza's philosophy of the Universe, a minute and careful study of every word is needful. For of him perhaps more truly than of any man who ever wrote, except perhaps Tacitus, it may be said that he never used an unnecessary word. But as

[1] "Yes, but not to all capacity or intelligence. The idealist position is that unknowable reality (not merely unknowable to any particular kind of finite perception and intelligence) is a contradiction in terms. I have always disclaimed believing in systems as distinct from method, and should disclaim it more strongly now than twenty-five years ago." For this comment I am also indebted to Sir Frederick Pollock under the circumstances mentioned above. I am content; for the method of Spinoza is more important to me than his system. And I am sure that his method leads inevitably to that identity of God and the Universe which is the ultimate goal, as it was, in a sense, the starting-point of religion.

my object is simply to bring within reach of ordinary people like myself the religious peace and joy that result from his identification of God with the Universe, all I need to do is to note such ideas of the earlier books as are essential to the moral and spiritual appreciation of the final book.

Religious aims predominant.

We have noted above how, according to the Master, the infinite divine substance is one, and there can no more be two substances than there can be two Gods. It follows—but the proofs need not detain us—that the one divine Substance is indivisible. I may quote certain pregnant sentences of explanation:—

Substance indivisible.

'If, however, any one should ask why we are by nature so inclined to the division of quantity,[1] I reply to him that quantity is conceived by us in two different modes, that is to say, abstractly[2]—apart from reality—or superficially, just as we fancy it; or else as substance, a conception grasped only by the intellect.'—Part I., Prop. xv., Schol.

To a critical reader it may naturally occur that, if we surrender extension as a distinct Attribute, and regard it only as a mode of Thought, this part of Spinoza's teaching can have no interest for us. But I am not so sure of that. For the majority of people have an inveterate habit of regarding each finite personality as so intensely one and distinct from everything else, that it may be taken as the very type of unity. Now this belief is certainly opposed to Spinoza's doctrine of the indivisibility of Substance. Because, though we are dealing immediately with an Attribute (Thought) and not with the divine Substance, yet, as we

Even if extension be regarded as a mode of Thought this doctrine is not superfluous.

Ordinary notions of personality inconsistent with it.

[1] *I.e.* by measurement in yards, feet, inches, etc.

[2] See farther on, p. 30.

have seen, Spinoza regards the Attribute not as something distinct from Substance, but as one aspect of it expressing its infinite reality. If, then, we regard the Attribute or aspect as divided down to the very core of Being, so that finite personality becomes the type of separate and distinct unity, we necessarily imply a division of the divine Substance, and thus contravene one of Spinoza's essential principles. But on this question no more need be said than is sufficient to show that even if we merge Extension in Thought, the doctrine of Substance is unaffected. Or, as Sir Frederick Pollock says of his own luminous observations on this point, 'the process of criticism we have just gone through, supposing it to be legitimate, does not affect the substantial and working value of Spinoza's metaphysic.'

The doctrine of Substance unaffected.

Returning then to the Master's defence of his teaching on the indivisibility of substance, we note that his mode of regarding the 'abstract' and the 'substantial' is precisely the opposite of that sanctioned by ordinary custom. For the latter treats apparently separate existences, such as stones, trees, and persons, as real, while the mental effort to merge them all in a higher unity as modes of the infinite Thought is regarded as an exercise in abstraction. But Spinoza, being convinced that the Universe, or God, is one substance and essentially indivisible, regards all our impressions of separate finite things as abstractions from reality;[1] while the infinite

Spinoza's notion of the 'abstract' and the 'substantial'

[1] This has nothing to do with Spinoza's treatment of the idea of species. He quite rightly taught that the idea of species is only a blurred image of the individuals comprised, when they become too numerous to be retained separately in memory. But this has no bearing upon his theory that neither the 'individuals' nor the species imply any division of the divine Substance.

truth is cognisable only by the intellect, or, as Kant afterwards preferred to call it, the 'pure reason.'

But this does not at all imply that our ordinary impressions are false. For though they are not absolutely true, they are relatively true. Let me try if I can illustrate what I mean. I have already admitted that all analogies between the finite and the infinite must needs be inexact. Still sometimes they help us a little. Think, then, of a number of observers, north, south, east and west, contemplating a great mountain whose form has been carved and moulded and riven by the vicissitudes of geological time. Needless to say that the contour is so different, as seen from various points, that if two or three observers compared their own personal impressions alone, the only escape from the mutual imputation of falsehood would seem to be that they had not been looking at the same mountain. Yet not one of their impressions is false. It is true relatively to the position of the observer, but it is not a true account of the whole mass. Thus one observer may see an *aiguille* apparently quite detached from the great mountain and placed as the chief feature of a symmetrical arrangement of harmonious curves and wooded slopes around its base, so that it at once appears to demand a distinct name, and to be a thing of beauty by itself. To another every feeling is centred in a magnificent waterfall which rushes into view from untrodden heights above, and, both by its might and its grace and its commanding voice, so subordinates to itself every other feature of the visible landscape that, to this observer, the vision of the mountain is the vision of the waterfall, nothing more. To a

not an imputation of falsehood to our impressions,

but their truth is relative, not absolute.

Illustration by different views of a mountain:

aiguille,

waterfall,

forest and precipice;

third, aspiring forests barred by naked precipices above, and the gleam of snow-fields over all, are for ever associated with the mountain's name. And all these aspects are true, relatively to the positions of the observers. But

view of the whole from the sky.

to the daring aeronaut who sails through the sky over the summit, the great mountain is seen to merge all these particular aspects in a general form which, though it convict none of the observers of falsehood, yet cannot be identified with what is seen by any. The painter's picture of the *aiguille* and its surrounding beauties, the poet's vision of the waterfall and his interpretation of its chant, the rapture of Ruskin's disciple before forest perspectives and precipice and snow, are all the result of abstraction from the whole, and concentration of thought and emotion on a part which cannot, except relatively to contemplative thought and sense, be detached therefrom.

Thus Spinoza treats the idea of separate things or persons.

So Spinoza regarded all our impressions of separate and detached things or persons as abstractions from reality, yet not on that account false. For they are true relatively to our finite mode of the infinite Thought. And this truth can always be verified so long as our finite mode of thought remains what it is. For as the artistically conceived landscape abstracted from the mountain mass will always be there again if the painter goes away and returns to it, so the abstractions formed from the infinite Whole by finite modes of thought can always be perceived again so long as the exercise of our senses and conception are normal, that is, in accordance with the nature of things.

The Proposition (I., xxviii.) and Scholium in which his

doctrine of finite things is set forth are attended by all the inconveniences of the inappropriate Euclidean form, which to many readers—and indeed to all of us at first sight—quite obscures the plain common-sense at the basis of his theory. For really it all amounts to this, that, while nothing can be separated from and still less independent of God, the infinite Attributes are subject to an infinite variety of finite modes, so that the plenum of the divine Life—if we may so speak—must be conceived by us as an infinite series of finite changes, so balanced as to constitute a Whole of eternal rest and peace. I know that this is not the form taken by his quasi-mathematical proposition and proof. But that this is what it means when translated into the thought of the plain man I cannot doubt. Here is the Proposition in English:—

His endless series of finite causes and effects.

'Every individual (thing) or any finite thing having a limited (mode of) existence, would be unable to exist or be actuated to work, unless it were determined in its existence and working by some other cause which also is finite and has a limited (mode of) existence, and again this cause also cannot exist nor be determined in its operation unless it is actuated in its existence and work by another which is also finite and has a limited (mode of) existence, and so on without end.'

This may sound very obscure and dry. But it is only the Philosopher's way of expressing the truth of the Poet's vision:—

Rendered in poetic form.

'There rolls the deep where grew the tree.
O earth, what changes hast thou seen!
There where the long street roars, hath been
The stillness of the central sea.

'The hills are shadows, and they flow
From form to form and nothing stands;
They melt like mists, the solid lands,
Like clouds they shape themselves and go.'

Or as a much older philosopher, with an occasional gleam of melancholy poetry in his view of life, wrote long ago:—

A precedent in Scripture.

'One generation passeth away and another generation cometh; but the earth abideth for ever. The sun also ariseth and the sun goeth down, and hasteth to his place where he arose. The wind goeth toward the south and turneth about unto the north: it whirleth about continually, and the wind returneth again according to his circuits. All the rivers run into the sea; yet the sea is not full; unto the place from whence the rivers come, thither they return again.'

Of course, neither the Hebrew cynic nor the late poet had the same philosophy as Spinoza. But their description of the interplay of finite causes which keeps perpetual movement within the bosom of eternal peace is really a sort of 'kinetogram' of the principles laid down by the Master.[1]

Approximate anticipation of modern doctrine of 'cause.'

Further, Spinoza seems here to anticipate, though distantly, the modern doctrines of cause as equivalent to the infinite sum of all conditions, and therefore identical with the effect. I say 'distantly,' for his approximation consists only in the perception that there can be no

[1] The fact that Spinoza speaks of a static interdependence of all finite things on one another, while the Poet and the Hebrew sage referred to their perpetual movement, is of no consequence. For Spinoza knew as well as Heraclitus that 'πάντα ῥεῖ,' all things flow: and the static interdependence is simply the aspect presented to momentary consciousness, as when we glance at a rushing waterfall, which seems still, but, as we know, is in violent motion.

isolated 'cause,' that everything is dependent on everything else. Thus the movements within the Universe are an infinite number of unbeginning and endless series through which the determination to existence and action[1] runs. Still his language about 'causes' belongs to his own and preceding times, and would scarcely be adopted at the present time except by way of convenient convention; just as evolutionists talk of the 'purpose' of 'natural selection,' though the word means for them only the result attained, without any implication of intention.

An insoluble problem remaining.

Still there remains insoluble for us or for any finite creature, even an archangel, if such a being exists, the relation of what we call 'time' to eternity, or the coincidence, nay, identity, of the peaceful realisation of all possible existence on the infinite scale, with the innumerable, unbeginning and endless series of movements which constitute our impressions of life and the universe. All we can say is that the very fact of our finite existence, though it be not the hard, distinct, and separate thing

[1] But the determination to existence and action is really of God alone, and the impression of intermediate 'causes' and successions is due simply to our relative view of modes or modifications of the Attributes of the divine Substance. Spinoza's apparent recognition of secondary causes must surely be interpreted consistently with his Scholium to Proposition xxv., Pt. i., where he explains that God is the cause of all things in the same sense in which He is the cause of Himself, *i.e.* all things are expressions of His self-existence. Or, as he puts it in the Corollary following, 'Individual things are nothing but affections or modes of the Attributes of God by which His attributes are expressed in a definite and limited manner.' *E.g.* a triangle or circle is an affection or mode of the Attribute of Extension expressing it in a definite, limited manner. And a man's thought about the world is a similarly limited mode of the divine Attribute of Thought.

which some have thought, makes contemplation from the height of infinity impossible. Relatively our impressions are true. Past, present, and future are real, just as partial views of one enormous mountain are real to beholders in different positions. But all the same, it is true as Spinoza teaches, therein agreeing with many of the greatest philosophers and divines, that Eternity is not unlimited duration, but the always present consummation of all possible existence.

Natura Naturans and *Natura Naturata.*

This seems the best place in which to refer to a distinction treated as important by Spinoza, though it seems to me to have little bearing on the practical issues of religion which I have in view. Still, though I am making no pretence to give a complete, detailed statement of the Master's philosophy, this is a point too characteristic to be omitted even in a sketch. For the distinction between *Natura Naturans* or Nature Active, and *Natura Naturata,* or Nature Passive, gave profound satisfaction to the great Pantheist,[1] and it is possible that even now it may afford relief to those who are attracted by his vision of the Universe, but who, owing to the inveteracy of ancient habit, cannot dispense with the antithesis of Creator and Creation. Now by *Natura Naturans* we are to understand 'what exists in and by itself, and is conceived by itself, or such Attributes of Substance as express its eternal and infinite essence (or reality), that is, God, so for as He is contemplated as a free cause.'[2] By *Natura Naturata,* on the other hand, we are to understand

Nature Active and Nature Passive.

[1] The distinction, of course was not invented by him, as it was familiar to theological and scholarly writers of the Middle Ages. But I do not think any one ever before explained the distinction in the same way.

[2] I., xxix., Schol.

'all that follows necessarily from the nature of God, or from any and every one of the Attributes of God, that is, all the modes of God's Attributes, in so far as they are contemplated as 'things' (*res*), which are in God, and which cannot either exist or be conceived apart from God.' In a word, as suggested above, the one is Nature Active, while the other is Nature Passive, but they differ only in aspect. For they are in essence absolutely identical, and each is only a mode of conceiving God. It should be noted, however, that thought, will, desire, love, and all affections belong to *Natura Naturata* and not to *Natura Naturans*. But this is not inconsistent with my rendering of the former phrase as Nature Passive, because the thought, will, desire and the like here in view are only modes of attributes even were they on an infinite scale, and are referred to God as their free cause.

Prop. xxix., Pt. I., Schol.

Intellect and emotion belong to *Natura Naturata*.

And here, before leaving this First Book 'Concerning God,' it is needful to say a word on Spinoza's use of the word 'freedom.' For, ever since Milton's Fallen Angels endeavoured to alleviate their catastrophe by debatings on 'free will' and 'fate,' every one who surveyed Nature and Man has been compelled to face a problem which, like the equally ancient one of motion, *solvitur ambulando* and in no other way. We have already seen that when the Master speaks of a divine 'free cause,' he means a cause subject to no external compulsion, and acting only in accordance with the eternal laws of Its own nature.[1] While, however, this freedom excludes external con-

By Free Cause is not meant a capricious or variable Will.

[1] Of course, the phrase 'laws of His own nature' is insufficient. But however we think of natural law, it suggests to most of us an absolutely certain regularity, and that is enough here.

straint, it also excludes caprice. That is, God does not act now in this way and now in that from unreasoning choice. But the divine action is always in accordance with the laws of His own nature, and these laws, being of His eternal substance, could not be otherwise than they are. It is only our finiteness which prevents our seeing that they could no more be otherwise than the three angles of a plane triangle could be less or more than two right angles. There is no need to dwell on this. It is an indefeasible principle of the system I am expounding. And though I have known the time when I was repelled by the idea of accepting such a Free Cause, and preferred the imagined spectre of a biggest Person among all other persons, acting as smaller persons do, only better, I have come myself to recognise that the God of Spinoza is much more exalted above the God of Calvin than the Jahweh of Isaiah was above the Baal of King Manasseh. Perhaps, however, for the justification of this experience, it is better to wait till we deal with the Fifth Book 'Concerning the Freedom of Man.'

A question of experience.

APPENDIX TO PART I

THE following is a substantially accurate but verbally free rendering of the Appendix with which the Master concludes his First Part 'Concerning God.'

'Thus I have expounded the nature of God and its properties. I have shown that He exists of necessity, that He is the one and only God; that He is and acts from the sole necessity of His own nature; that He is the free cause of all things, and how He is so; that all things are in God and so depend upon Him, that without Himself they can neither be nor be conceived; and finally that all things have been predetermined by God, not indeed in the exercise of freedom of will[1] or by despotic decree, but by reason of His absolute nature or infinite (unconditioned) power. Farther, as occasion arose, I have taken some pains to remove any prejudices which might interfere with an understanding of my proofs. But since not a few prejudices still remain which also were formerly, and are still, an enormous hindrance to men's adoption of the system of the universe[2] which I have expounded, I think it worth while here to subject those prejudices to the test of reason. And since all the prejudices which I here undertake to expose depend on the one ordinary assumption of men that all things in Nature act like men

Summary of Spinoza's theology.

Prejudices to be brought to the test of reason.

[1] There is no contradiction between this and the former assertion that God is the 'free cause of all things.' The latter means simply the spontaneous cause, *i.e.* acting from within and not by external compulsion. But this does not in the least involve what is commonly understood by 'free will.' I have, however, often to acknowledge that Spinoza's whole doctrine of 'cause' is obsolete.

[2] *Rerum concatenationem.*

themselves with a view to an end, nay, even regard it as a matter of course that God Himself is guiding all things toward some definite end[1]—for they say that God made all things on account of man, but man that he might worship God—I shall consider this point first, at the outset examining the reason why the generality of men agree in this prejudice while all are by nature inclined to embrace it. Next I shall show the falsehood of this prejudice, and finally how out of it have sprung prejudices concerning *good and evil, merit and crime, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and ugliness*, and others of the like nature.

The universe not made for man.

Plan of the exposition.

'But this is not the place to deduce all this from the nature of the human mind. It will be enough here if I take for a main principle the fact which all must surely acknowledge, that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, and that all have a conscious impulse to seek what is beneficial to themselves. From this it follows that men suppose themselves to be free whenever they have a consciousness of their own wishes and desires, while they never dream of the causes by which they are inclined to desire and will, because they are unaware of any such causes. It follows, secondly, that men do all things with a view to some end, that is, with a view to something beneficial which they desire. Hence it is that they always seek so much to know the final causes (purpose) of anything done, and when they have heard this they are satisfied; because indeed they have no reason for further doubt. But if they cannot learn those final causes from another person, there is nothing for it but to look into themselves and to reflect on those ends with a view to which they themselves usually determine on analogous actions, and thus of necessity they judge the intention of another being by their own. Farther, since they find by experience both in themselves and in the outer world many means of securing no small advantage to themselves, as for instance the eyes

(1) The superficial idea of free will arises from desire, coupled with ignorance of its cause.

(2) As men themselves act for a purpose, they are led to ask the purpose of everything.

The purpose of what is useful to them must —they think— have been their own welfare.

[1] Compare the last lines of 'In Memoriam':

'And one far off divine event
To which the whole creation moves.'

for sight, the teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for nourishment, the sun for light, the sea for nourishing fishes, and so forth, thus they are led to consider all natural objects as means for serving their welfare. And inasmuch as they know that these means have been found, but not made, by themselves, hence they have assumed a reason for believing that there is some other (being) who has prepared those means for their use. For when once they regarded (natural) things as means (to an end), they could not possibly believe that these things had made themselves. But from the analogy of the means (instruments) which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they plausibly concluded [1] that there existed some being, or some rulers of Nature, endowed with human freedom of will (*libertate*), who had contrived all these things for man, and had constituted all things for the advantage of men. And since men had never heard anything about the disposition (mind, intention) of those Rulers of Nature, that disposition was inevitably estimated by the standard of human nature. Hence men adopted the idea that the gods order everything with a view to the advantage of men, in order that they may bind men to themselves, and be held by men in supreme honour. Thus it came to pass that every one invented for himself, out of his own head, different forms of worshipping God, all seeking that God should love them more than the rest of men, and should order Nature so as to serve their blind greed and insatiable avarice. And so it was that this prejudice [2] was turned into superstition and thrust deep roots into the minds of men, which superstition is accountable for the universal straining of desire to know and explain the final causes of things. But while men sought to show that Nature does nothing in vain—that is, nothing which may not serve man—they seem to have succeeded in proving nothing except that Nature and the gods are as mad as men.

If they did not make such things themselves, some other being or beings must have done so.

These supernatural beings were inevitably imagined as animated by human motives.

This accounts for the diversity of gods and cults.

The search for final causes ends in proving universal ineptitude.

[1] *Concludere debuerunt;* say, 'could hardly help concluding.'

[2] *I.e.* of anthropomorphism—the attribution of final causes to Nature.

The other side of the shield; the apparent cruelty of Nature.

'Mark, I pray you, the issue. Amid so many blessings of nature, there were necessarily many things unpleasant, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases and such like. And men held the opinion that these things happened because the gods were angry on account of wrongs done to them by mankind, or on account of errors committed in the form of worship. And although experience from day to day insisted and proved by innumerable instances that advantage and disadvantage befell equally and without any distinction both the pious and the impious, not in the least on that account did they relinquish their ingrained prejudice. For to count this among other unknown things of which they did not know the final purpose or advantage, was easier to them than to cancel that whole system of thought, and to think out a new one. Hence they laid it down as a certain axiom that the judgments of the gods far surpass human understanding; which indeed by itself would have been amply sufficient to hide truth for ever from the human race, had not Mathematics, which does not deal with ends (or purposes) but only with the essential nature and properties of figures, discovered to men another standard of truth.[1] And in addition to Mathematics other causes might be mentioned—though it is needless to recount them here—enabling men to take note of these universal prejudices, and to become susceptible of guidance to a true understanding of things.

Theological solutions contrary to fact.

The Unknowable no refuge here.

Mathematics teaches a different standard of truth by which to measure the world.

'I have thus explained sufficiently what I undertook to deal with first.[2] And now in order to show that Nature has set herself no fixed purpose, and that all final causes are but human fictions, there is no need of many words. For I believe this to be sufficiently established both by my demonstration of the origins and causes in which this prejudice has had its birth, and also by the propositions and corollaries[3]

Final causes only an anthropomorphic pretence.

[1] The suggestion is (1) that no purpose (or final cause) can be assigned to the truths about space, figure, and quantity. They are because they are. (2) That such truths are judged by reason, or intuition.

[2] Viz. the reason why the generality of men assume as a matter of course the reality of final causes.

[3] Props. xvi., xxxii., and Corollaries.

and all those arguments by which I have shown that all things arise in supreme perfection by a sort of eternal necessity of Nature. This, however, I will add here; that the above doctrine of a purpose entirely overturns Nature. For that which in very deed is a cause, it considers as an effect, and the reverse. Secondly, that which in Nature is first it puts last. And, lastly, that which is supreme and absolutely perfect it represents as most imperfect.

Contradictions involved in the doctrine.

'For, omitting the first two points as self-evident,[1] that effect is most perfect which is produced immediately by God;[2] and in proportion as everything requires a greater number of intermediate causes for its production, it is more imperfect. But if things immediately produced by God had been made in order that God might thereby achieve His (farther) purpose, then necessarily the last things, for the sake of which the first were made, would be the most excellent of all.

The doctrine of final causes makes remoter effects of divine action better than immediate effects.

'Then again this doctrine does away with the perfection of God. For if God acts with a view to an end, necessarily He desires something that is lacking to Him. And although Theologians and Metaphysicians distinguish between an end sought because of need and an end sought by way of assimilation, nevertheless they acknowledge that God has done all

It also denies God's infinite perfection.

[1] We are referred to Props. xxi.-xxiii., all going to show that all finite forms or events being modes of the Attributes, are necessarily involved in the Essence or Being of God and cannot be conceived otherwise. This being granted, a final cause is a contradiction in terms, for it is really an effect involved in the Infinite Cause. But these subtleties perhaps confuse more than they explain. The common-sense underlying these subtleties comes out more clearly as we proceed with the Appendix.

[2] It is impossible to avoid the impression that there is something of the *argumentum ad hominem* here. To Spinoza, who identified God with the Universe, everything must have been—though even this is inaccurate—an 'immediate effect' of God. He is truer to himself when he tells us that we and everything else are finite modes of God's infinite Attributes. But, apparently for the purpose of making himself more comprehensible, he here argues in a manner that seems to assume a chain of causes, some nearer to and some remoter from God, a mode of thought fundamentally inconsistent with his philosophy.

things for His own sake and not for the sake of the things to be created; because before creation they cannot suggest anything other than God for the sake of which God might act. Thus they are inevitably forced to confess that God lacked and desired those things with a view to which He willed to prepare the (necessary) means—as is self-evident.

'But we must not omit to notice that the adherents of this doctrine, while desiring to show their ingenuity in finding purposes for all things, have brought to the proof of this their doctrine a novel method of argument, I mean the appeal not to impossibility (the unthinkable) but to ignorance; which shows that for this doctrine no other method of argument was available. For if, by way of example, from any roof a stone has fallen on some one's head and has killed him, they will prove after the above method that the stone fell for the purpose of killing the man. For unless it had fallen in accordance with the divine will for that purpose, how could so many circumstances—for often there are many concurrent—have co-operated by accident? You will reply perhaps that this happened because the wind blew and because the man was going that way. But they will insist upon asking why did the wind blow at that time? Why was the man going that way at the same time? If again you answer that the wind rose then because the sea on the preceding day after a time of calm had begun to be stirred, and that the man had been invited by a friend, they will insist on asking again—because there is no end to such questions—but why was the sea stirred up? Why was the man invited for that particular time? And still continuing, they will not cease to inquire the causes of causes until you betake yourself to the will of God which is the refuge of ignorance.[1]

The argument of ignorance.

[1] This is not for a moment to be confounded with Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable. The theological plea of ignorance is a capricious choice of a particular limit imposed by piety or authority on human knowledge. Spencer's Unknowable—or, for that matter, Spinoza's infinite Being, endowed with infinite Attributes subject to infinite modes—is what is reached after the freest use of all the powers of human intellect totally regardless of any authority but that of experience.

'So likewise when they see the structure of the human body they are astounded, and, because they do not know the causes of art so great, they infer that it was not constructed by molecular force,[1] but by divine or supernatural art, and has been formed in such a way that one part will not injure the other. And thus it happens that any man who searches into the true causes of miracles and who endeavours to understand natural order as a man of culture, and not merely to gape at it as a fool, is everywhere taken for a heretic, and irreligious, and is banned by those whom the mob adore as the interpreters of Nature and the gods. For such interpreters know that if ignorance be removed, stolid amazement—the solitary means they possess of conviction and defence of their authority—is abolished. But I pass from such matters and hasten onward to that which I undertook to treat in the third place.

The wonders of nature referred to supernatural origins.

The fate of the thoughtful.

'After men have persuaded themselves that all created things were made for their benefit, they have inevitably considered that quality in each thing to be most important which is most useful to themselves, and have regarded as most excellent all those things by which they were best served. In this way they must needs have formed the notions by which they expressed the nature of things, such as *Good*, *Evil*, *Order*, *Confusion*, *Warm*, *Cold*, *Beauty*, and *Ugliness*. And because they think themselves free, other notions have been formed, such as *Praise* and *Reproach*, *Crime* (sin) and *Merit*.[2] But these latter I defer till after I have

Origin of the categories of good, evil, etc.

[1] Of course this is not Spinoza's word, which is '*mechanica*.' But 'molecular' represents Spinoza's idea transposed into modern modes of thought.

[2] The patient student will find that both praise and reproach and the notions of sin and merit have a full and adequate place in Spinoza's own doctrine. That is, they are essential elements in the universal order. *E.g.* it is false to regard praise or reproach as operating on a separate faculty called Will, that is subject to no order. But it is true that praise and reproach are part of the forces acting on the individual microcosm which is just as invariable in its order as the macrocosm.

treated of Human Nature. The former, however, I will here briefly explain.

'Everything that makes for human welfare and for the service of God they have called *Good*, but whatever is opposed to these they have called *Evil*. And because those who do not understand the nature of things have no explanation to give of things,[1] but only have fancies about them and take their fancies for understanding, therefore in their ignorance both of the outer world and of their own nature they firmly believe that there is a (conceivable)[2] scheme (or system) of things. For when things are so arranged that, being presented to us through the senses, we can readily picture them, and consequently remember them easily, we say that they are well arranged; while if they are the reverse we say that they are confused. And since those things which we can easily conceive are more accordant with our pleasure than others, therefore men prefer system (*ordinem*) to confusion—as though system in Nature were anything more than relative to our imagination. Then they say that God has created everything on a system, and thus in their ignorance they attribute imagination to God.[3] Unless perchance they mean that God, with a design to humour the imagination of man, has arranged all things on a plan by which they may be most easily pictured in the mind. Nor perhaps would they see the least difficulty in the fact that innumerable things are found which far surpass our imagination, and very many which absolutely stagger its weakness. But enough of this.

The notion of design or plan in creation an illusion.

'There are other notions also which are nothing at all but modes in which the imagination is variously affected; and

[1] *Nihil de rebus affirmant.*

[2] I insert this word to bring out what I believe to have been in the mind of Spinoza. After reading his doctrine of the Attributes and their Modes and their eternally fixed relations, it would be absurd to suppose that he denied universal order (*Ordo*). But what he did deny was the fancied scheme of any theologian such as 'the plan of salvation,' etc.

[3] As though He were an architect who conceives a plan and works up to it.

yet by the ignorant they are regarded as being conspicuous attributes of things; because, as we have just said, they believe that everything was made for them. And they call the nature of any particular thing, good or evil, sound or rotten and corrupt, according as they themselves are affected by it. For instance, if the vibration[1] which the nerves receive from objects presented by means of the eyes conduce to satisfaction, the objects by which it is caused are called beautiful; but those which excite an opposite sort of vibration, ugly. Objects again which stimulate perception through the nostrils men call fragrant or fetid, those (that act) through the tongue, sweet or bitter, tasty or unsavoury, and so on. Those objects which affect touch they call hard or soft, rough or smooth, and so forth. And, lastly, those which affect the ears are said to give forth noise, tone, or harmony; and this last has befooled men to the extent of supposing that God takes pleasure in harmonious sound. Nor are there wanting Philosophers who have got the notion that there is such a thing as the music of the spheres.[2] Now all these facts show plainly how every one has formed his estimate of (outward) things according to the disposition of his brain, or rather how he has taken the affections of his imagination for actualities. No wonder therefore—as we may observe in passing—that the multitudinous controversies of our experience have arisen among mankind, and from these controversies, in the last result, Scepticism.[3] For although the bodies of men agree in many things they differ in very many, and therefore what seems good to one seems evil to another; what is systematic to one is to another confused. What is pleasant to one is displeasing to another; and so of other things which I here pass by, partly because this is not the

Epithets such as good and evil are relative to man only.

Differences of perception and taste show that there is nothing absolute in the qualities perceived.

[1] *Motus*—I do not attribute to Spinoza any modern theory, but vibration is as good as movement.

[2] '*Sibi persuaserint motus celestes harmonium componere.*'

[3] Spinoza means by this something worse than Agnosticism—unnamed in his day. He refers to the Pyrrhonism—a name probably quite unjust to Pyrrho—which held that there was no means of knowing anything, and perhaps nothing to know.

place to deal with them in order, and partly because the fact is one which everybody knows by experience. For every one keeps saying "so many heads, so many ways of thinking," "every one is satisfied by his own way of thinking"; "the differences of brains are not fewer than the differences of palates." Such proverbs show plainly that men judge of things by the disposition of the brain, and imagine things rather than understand them. For if they understood things, all men, if not attracted (by the truth), would be at least convinced.

'Thus we see that all the methods by which ordinary people are accustomed to explain Nature are only modes of picturing things; nor do those methods reveal the nature of any object, but only the constitution of the imagination. And because those modes of imagination have names, as though of entities existing independently, I call them entities not of reason, but of fancy. And in this way all arguments brought against us by means of such notions can easily be repelled. For many are in the habit of arguing thus: If all things follow by necessity from the absolutely perfect nature of God, whence have come so many imperfections in Nature? For instance, the putrescence of things, with disgusting odour, ugliness of things exciting nausea, confusion, evil, crime and the rest? But as I have just said, they are easily confuted. For the perfection of things and their value (valency) is to be measured by their own nature solely; and things are not more or less perfect on account of the delight or the offence they cause to men—because they are favourable to human nature or repel it. To those, however, who inquire why God did not create all men so that they should be governed only by the guidance of reason, I reply only that there was no lack to Him of material for the creation of all sorts of things, from the highest to the lowest grade of perfection; or, to speak more correctly, because the laws of His own nature were so resourceful (ample) that they sufficed for the production of all things that can be conceived by any infinite intellect, as I have shown.[1] These are the prejudices

Entities of the imagination

supposed imperfections in Nature are all perfect as parts and proportions of the whole.

[1] Prop. xvi.

which I undertook here to notice. If any others of the same grain still survive they can be corrected by any one with a moderate amount of consideration.'

A caution against hasty conclusions.

If it stood by itself this Appendix might seem to justify those who have accused Spinoza of nullifying not only the sanctions but the very possibility of morals. But it does not stand by itself. It is organically related to all the other parts. And when these are grasped in their entirety—but especially their culmination in Part v. — it will be found that Spinoza leaves the practical facts and issues of morality precisely as they have always been, and as they are now held by practical men uncommitted to any theory. What he does is to offer an explanation different from that most generally accepted, but more consistent with itself because more accordant with things as they are. All the usual sanctions of morality—God, Eternity—in the true sense—reward and punishment, repentance, remorse, aspiration, brotherly love, Love to God, aspiration after ideal goodness—have as much a place in Spinoza's system as in any other. But he gives them a profounder security, by showing that they are no mere ordinations of any Will, but the eternally necessary results of that divine Nature, which, in its Infinity, is absolutely perfect and good, though the mutual relations of finite modifications of its attributes are not always accommodated to our pleasure.

PART II

THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND

Problem of the Second Book to find a place for finite being within the Infinite God.

OUR study of the First Book of the Ethics has shown us that, according to Spinoza, there is absolutely nothing in being but God, His Attributes and their Modes. That is to say, if the term 'Atheism' or 'No-God-ism' could ever be accurately used to describe any actual form of human belief, or unbelief, then Spinoza's position was the precise contrary of this, inasmuch as he maintained that in all eternity and infinity there has not been and cannot ever be anything other than God Such a position necessarily raises the question, What then do we mean by 'creation,' by finite existence, and, above all, by individual consciousness ?

Creation and finite things.

So far as concerns what we call 'creation,' we have already learned that according to Spinoza there was never a beginning and cannot be an end to the Universe as revealed by our senses. In his view, the impressions we have of an external world constitute our inadequate idea of the infinite number of things which eternally follow in endless variety from the necessity of the divine nature. Of the things thus involved in the necessity of the divine nature, individual things, or things which are finite and have a determinate existence—such as stars, planets,

trees, animals, and all the various objects of our senses—cannot exist nor be determined to action unless by means of another cause which is also finite, and again this ulterior cause depends on a farther finite cause, and so on *ad infinitum*.[1] I have already suggested that this merely amounts to the assertion of an innumerable and endless series of successions such as we partially picture in evolution, and devolution, growth and decay, the whole of the innumerable and endless series being comprehended within the divine unity of substance.

Innumerable and endless series of changes within unity.

Now, amongst the finite things thus constituted is men. I do not mean man as a race; for Spinoza was so far a 'Nominalist' that he would not tolerate any idea of species except such as results from the compound image formed by the mind when trying to recall a group or series of individuals having marked points of resemblance, too numerous to be retained separately in the memory. It is then the personal man—myself, yourself, himself, that is Spinoza's subject when he discourses of the Origin and Nature of Mind. Of course, he has in view the endless varieties of individual character, and is perfectly aware that to large numbers he must be unintelligible. But he is inspired by a faith that truth must in the end prevail; and so far as he is teaching the truth he knows that his word cannot die.

Humanity: mind and body.

For the purpose I have in view it will not be necessary to do more than give briefly Spinoza's theory of the relations of body and mind with a very few of the results

Scope of the present chapter.

[1] See Props. xvi. and xxviii., Pt. I. It is true that nothing is said there about our 'inadequate idea' of the Universe of finite things; but it is clearly involved.

thereof as set forth in his Part II. If the word 'Origin' stands in the title, we must not be misled by it. For he certainly had not before him the same problem as Darwin and Haeckel; though their conclusions, could he have foreseen them, would not in the least have disturbed his serene contemplations of the eternal life. Because such conclusions do not touch his doctrine of Substance, Attributes, and Modes. However, what he means by the word Origin here is, clearly, the immediate cause or causes[1] of the finite mind, that is, of any personal mind now in being.

Spinoza does not touch evolutional origins.

Man a finite mode of Extension and Thought.

It will be remembered that, according to the Master, Extension and Thought are each infinite Attributes of the divine Substance or God, and each subject to an infinite variety of Modes, or modifications, which Modes again may be either finite or infinite. Of the finite Modes of Extension and Thought man is an instance. For his body is a finite Mode of the Attribute of Extension, while his mind is a finite Mode of the Attribute of Thought. But this does not mean that mind and body are two essentially different things. On the contrary, as Extension is one aspect of the divine Substance, and Thought is another, it follows that mind and body are both finite expressions or manifestations of the one ultimate reality. Therefore, if we would follow this teacher accurately, we are not to think of a 'soul' or 'body' in the ordinary sense, but of God manifested under finite modes of Extension and Thought. Thus

[1] The reader may need to be reminded that Spinoza's notion of 'cause' is certainly one of the points on which later thought tends irrevocably to diverge from him.

Spinoza's theory is at least free from the difficulties felt by previous philosophers as to the interaction of spirit and flesh. For there is no interaction; because they are the same thing in different aspects.

Objection suggested by Sir F. Pollock's criticism

It may perhaps be suggested that any practical exposition of Spinoza on these lines must be inconsistent with my adoption above of Sir Frederick Pollock's criticism on the double appearance of Thought in the system. For, if the critic is right, as I have acknowledged, then Extension (or at least consciousness of Extension) is only a Mode of Thought, and therefore only one Attribute, that of Thought, is cognisable in man. I do not, however, agree that any inconsistency arises. For Sir Frederick Pollock himself says that his criticism leaves the practical issues of Spinoza's philosophy untouched;[1] and it is with these I am mainly concerned. Indeed, even while allowing that Extension is a Mode of Thought, we feel it to be so different a mode from feelings of pain or pleasure, of desire or dislike, of ratiocination, induction or deduction, that it is easily and naturally kept apart as a group of forms of consciousness clearly distinguishable from those that do not involve the notion of extension or space. In this sense, while fully recognising that Extension itself is a Mode of Thought, we may still attach significance to Spinoza's theory of mind and body as the same thing under different aspects. We pursue the exposition, adhering to Spinoza's method, but always with the reservation above stated.

does not touch the practical issues.

Extension as a Mode of Thought sharply distinguishable from other modes.

As Spinoza puts it then, the body is the 'object' of

The body as 'object' of the mind.

[1] Of course, what I say here is only my interpretation of Sir Frederick Pollock's criticism.

which the mind is the 'idea.' But we must mark the difference between Spinoza's notion of 'object' and that (xiii., Pt. II.) of many other thinkers. For he does not mean that the body is something outside, at which the mind looks as through a window. He means rather that the body is a finite mode of Extension, whose definiteness is otherwise realised in the other aspect of the same thing, that is, a finite mode of Thought. The two aspects are absolutely inseparable, because they are finite modes of co-existence and essentially related Attributes of the divine Substance, or God.[1]

How the mind knows the body, inconsistent with materialism.

The next point we should notice is that the mind has no knowledge of the body except through mental ideas of bodily affections.[2] This might seem a truism, were it not that it used to be in effect denied by 'materialists.' For in assuming that the mind is nothing but an undefined order of molecular vibrations in the brain, they excluded altogether, except as modes of motion, any 'ideas' of bodily affections. Nor is the question merely one of words, at least in the view of Spinoza. For according to him every finite expression of the Attribute of Extension has a corresponding finite expression under the Attribute

[1] The inseparableness is even more apparent on Pollock's view, because both body and soul are different finite modes of the same Attribute of Thought. (Pt. II., Prop. xix.)

[2] This word is to be understood as including all sense impressions or internal feelings. Mr. Hale White and Miss Stirling in their excellent translation prefer the word 'affect.' This is marked as obsolete in the *New English Dictionary*; but that is of course no reason why it should not be used for a special purpose. But since explanation is needed, it seems just as convenient to use a familiar word with the understanding that it includes all possible mental impressions or feelings or efforts whether usually classed as perceptions, emotions, thought or will. In an analogous sense we use the word 'affections' as applied to the body. We include under the word all possible effects wrought on brain, nerve, muscle, or other tissue.

of Thought, and also innumerable other finite expressions under the other countless Attributes of God unknown to us. What may be the finite expression of a tree or a mountain or a stone under the Attribute of Thought apart from man he does not expressly say, though it is everywhere implied that their ideas exist in God. But if Professor Clifford's suggestion of the inseparability of matter and thought be adopted, we are able to apply to all creation Spinoza's theory of body and mind. For he holds in effect that the human mind is God thinking of the human body; and if so, the elementary thought of 'mind-stuff' which Clifford assumed to be in all matter, is God thinking of that matter; or to use language more in accordance with Spinoza's phraseology, it is the finite mode of the Attribute of Thought corresponding to the finite mode of the Attribute of Extension in the tree, mountain, or stone. It is well therefore to remember that though Spinoza regarded mind and body as different aspects of the same thing, the mind was to him the more easily realisable aspect.

Correlation of Extension and Thought with infinite other Attributes.

Bearing of Clifford's 'mind-stuff' on the theory.

All 'mind-stuff' is a finite mode of the Attribute of Thought.

At the same time he teaches (Prop. xxiii., Pt. II.) that the mind does not know itself unless in as far as it is aware of the ideas of bodily affections. This is a doctrine familiar both to metaphysicians and poets. Thus Tennyson sings of the babe's progress:—

How the mind knows itself.

'The baby new to earth and sky,
What time his tender palm is prest
Against the circle of the breast
Has never thought that "this is I":

'But as he grows he gathers much
And learns the use of "I" and "me,"
And finds "I am not what I see,
And other than the things I touch."'

Tennyson's metaphysic

not to be identified with Spinoza's.

That is, the mind does not know itself unless in as far as it has the ideas of bodily affections. But we must beware of thinking that such poetry or the metaphysic underlying it is exactly the philosophy of Spinoza. For, as we have seen, the latter would not tolerate the notion of any other Substance than God; and both body and mind were to him merely two finite modes of divine Attributes so intimately correlated, that whatever of the Being of God was expressed by one of them was also expressed in another way by the second.

The mind not necessarily cognisant of all bodily movements.

Here, however, we must pause for a moment to guard against other misunderstandings. For it might be asked, Does Spinoza mean that the mind, being the body in another aspect, has cognisance of all that goes on in the body? Have we any introspection of the action of the arteries and veins, or of the cerebellum, or of the grey matter and white matter of the brain? Of course, it never occurred to him that such an interpretation could be put upon his theory. In explaining why it did not occur to him, some reiteration is inevitable and may well be excused. For though the Master held that both body and mind were finite modes of infinite Attributes of God, he also held that they could not be isolated, but were links in an endless series of causes and effects, all summed up in God. Now, as we have already acknowledged, his doctrine of 'cause' is obsolete. But we must bear it in mind in order to do him justice. For (Prop. ix., Pt. II.) he does not look upon the Infinite as, so to speak, the immediate cause of the individual creature, but rather as the cause of an infinite series of things following each

other or connected with each other in eternal succession. Thus, the idea of the individual creature in actual existence has God for its cause, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He is affected (moved) by some other idea of an individual thing actually existing, of which God also is the cause in as far as He is affected by a third idea of an individual thing; and so on for ever. The language may seem needlessly technical, though, of course, it is not so. But it just amounts to this, that individual things are not separate creations, but 'parts and proportions' of an unbeginning and endless series, every member of which is dependent on every other, while the sum is God.

Restatement of Spinoza's doctrine of individual things.

But how does this bear upon the relation of body and mind? It bears upon it in this way—that the body is not an isolated group of phenomena whose career is rounded off by its own apparent inception and termination. It is connected in both directions with an unbeginning and interminable series of what we call physical events, that is, successive modes of the Attribute of Extension. Such also is the case with the mind under the Attribute of Thought and that Attribute's finite Modes. But it does not follow that the two are so related that every molecular movement in the body corresponds to a definite wave of consciousness, —or, to put it in the Master's way, calls up an idea in the mind.[1] The protozoa from which by a long course

Bearing upon the relations of mind and body.

Does not involve the representation in the finite mind of absolutely every movement in the body.

[1] Here I might pray in aid recent doctrines of sub-consciousness, to the effect that there is a considerable field of mental life which calls up no idea in the mind unless in exceptional circumstances. If that be so—and I strongly incline to agree with the doctrine—Spinoza may well have been more fully right than he could know in his day, when he treated the body as 'the object' of the mind; though it is not everything in the body that becomes an object idea in the mind.

of evolution the tissues of the human body have been evolved, had indeed 'mind-stuff' in Clifford's sense, and therefore the rudiments of Spinoza's conception of the relation between body and mind. But by slow evolution the mental faculties have acquired a concentration and intensity within, as it were, a particular area, outside of and untouched by which lie the merely organic processes which are forms of the Attribute of Extension. Thus while it remains true that the body is a finite mode of Extension whose definiteness is otherwise realised in the finite mode of Thought constituting the mind, the obscure processes of the body, links in an endless chain of previous and succeeding processes, are not necessarily represented by ideas in the mind—that is, are not normally a part of consciousness. At the same time, they form no exception to Spinoza's principle that every Mode of Extension is correlated to a Mode of Thought. Because to the Infinite Mind every process occurring within the Attribute of Extension is eternally present. 'The ideas of the affections of the human body in so far as they are related only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused.' (Prop. xxviii., Part II.) The reason given is that 'an adequate knowledge of external bodies and of the parts composing the human body does not exist in God in so far as He is considered as affected by the human mind, but in so far as He is affected by other ideas.' That is, external bodies and our own organism are links in an endless series which cannot be present to a finite mode of Thought, but only to the infinite Thought.

Because such movements are incomprehensible except as links in an endless series,

and such an endless series can only be present to Infinite Thought.

It is, of course, obvious that the same argument is

applicable to the mind's knowledge of itself, a knowledge which it owes to the body. And this Spinoza fully allows. But at the same time he holds that we have a faculty for 'seeing Him who is invisible'; and that when this faculty is freely and fully exercised we can see ourselves not as isolated links in an endless series, but as essential components of an Eternal Life. When that is achieved he dares to think that we know ourselves as perfectly as we know God. We may not all of us be able to adopt this confident tone. Yet I hope, when we have finished our study of the Ethics, we shall feel that even for far humbler mortals than the great Seer, there is 'a vision and a faculty divine' by which we can realise and triumph in the Eternal Life that breathes through us.

The argument equally applies to mind.

Corol., Prop. xxix.

But there is a knowledge that passeth knowledge.

Should any one still think this clarity of religious contemplation to be contrary to Herbert Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable as affording the true reconciliation of Science and Religion, I can only ask him to have patience, if possible, until the completion of the exposition. Here I may only reiterate the remark that the aims of the greater and the lesser philosopher are entirely different. For Spencer thought it necessary to raise the question of an ultimate 'Actuality' only so far as to clear it out of the way before proceeding with his synthetic doctrine of phenomenal evolution.[1] To

Herbert Spencer again.

Difference of his aims from those of Spinoza.

[1] This is made abundantly clear in the last two paragraphs of the Postscript to Part I. of *First Principles* (Revised Edition, 1900). Though he there insists emphatically that no agreement with his doctrine of the Unknowable is in the least necessary to an appreciation of his 'orderly presentation of facts,' or treatment of phenomena, he does not in any wise withdraw his proposed 'Reconciliation' of religion and science.

Spinoza, on the other hand, the supreme object of contemplation was that very reality which Spencer regarded as outside the scope of his main work. But the contradiction is more apparent than real. For Spinoza nowhere treats human faculty as competent to understand how one infinite Reality is constituted by the apparent Many. He never supposes that the finite mind can see, as God sees, all at once the innumerable and endless series in which both mind and body are infinitesimal elements.[1] For Spinoza, therefore, the reconciliation between religion and the science of his day lay also in a recognition of the Unknowable. His sense of the unity of things is spiritual. For though in his strains of prophetic fervour he dwells on 'the intellectual love of God,' it is clear to the sympathetic reader that this intellectual love is the apotheosis, as it were, of all purified faculties concentrated into an intuition of the ultimate one Being, which our life in God enables us to feel, but which our understanding can never grasp. It remains true, therefore, that the ultimate constitution of things, as an infinite number of unbeginning and endless series, is unknowable. But it is also true that we may have an intuition of a Unity which is God.

But the Unknowable remains with Spinoza no less than with Spencer.

The digression may be excused as an effort to keep constantly in view the ulterior aim of the earlier books of the Ethics. The next point to be noted is that the human mind is fitted for many perceptions (*ad plurima*

Need for the multiplication of perceptions and dependence of this on variety of bodily movements.

[1] See Pt. II., Prop. xxx. In this and the following proposition Spinoza speaks of our ignorance of the 'duration' of finite things including our own bodies. But the proofs seem to indicate that existence in a particular mode is meant; and what I have said in the text is clearly implied.

percipiendum, II., xiv.), and becomes the more fitted for perception in proportion to the number of modes in which the body can be disposed, If there is any obscurity at all here it is caused by the technical mode of stating a truth obvious to common-sense. For without discussing the probability or otherwise of the once notorious Kaspar Hauser's relation of his early experiences, it is certain that an infant recumbent in a fixed position with no object to gaze upon but the roof of a shed, would, if he were so treated for eighteen or twenty years, be an infant still. But the child of natural growth, who runs and leaps and climbs, who listens and looks eagerly, who practises innumerable movements of feet and fingers, all such actions being correlated with vibrations of brain cells, must rapidly multiply perceptions, and constantly increase their clearness. And this is practically what Spinoza means in the proposition quoted.[1]

Case of Kaspar Hauser, and of a normal child.

To this theory of the connection of bodily mobility with activity of mind, Spinoza leads up by a series of interpolated 'lemmata,' or premisses, which, however, in this case are not taken as granted, but proved after his method—together with certain axioms. Both the axioms and the lemmata curiously foreshadow Spencer's fundamental principles of biology. But the Master excuses himself from labouring the subject any farther

The 'Lemmata' on biology.

[1] If the case of intelligent cripples or paralytics be thought inconsistent with the above, it should be remembered that these have, for the most part, had their time of mobility ; and besides, under movements of the body, Spinoza includes all tactile and visual impressions of the social world, and likewise all molecular movements of the brain, so far as these are correlated with thought.

than is absolutely necessary for his moral and religious aim. For a similar reason, I pass on with the remark that this dependence of the mind upon the multiplex modifications of the body becomes ultimately the key to Spinoza's theory of salvation as unfolded in his concluding book.

Prop. xvii. Impression made by external things only to be removed by some new affection of the body shutting out the former.

An interesting but curious rather than convincing use of the lemmata is made in discussing the persistence of impressions made through the senses, and their transference to imagination. With the interworking of the fluid and soft parts of the bodily tissues we need not in the present state of physiology trouble ourselves. But the point is, that an impression once made may recur, though the thing that made the impression is no longer present. For example, a boy who has fraudulently enjoyed the luscious fruit of a forbidden orchard, may find his mouth water with desire for a repetition of the feast a week afterwards when he is no longer in view of the trees. Nor is there any remedy except some obvious penalty, or, far better, some new and higher ideal of honourable enjoyment, which shall eclipse and exclude the idea of the fruit in the boy's mind. The application of this principle to many other forms of temptation through persistence of ideas is obvious. And whatever form of religion we prefer, it remains equally true that the covetous, the lustful, or the revengeful man is liable to be haunted by fixed ideas, originally conveyed through the senses and perpetually recurrent until some stronger idea intervenes to exclude and cancel the evil thought. Whether that stronger idea be an alleged revelation from God, or the wrath of Allah, or the love of Christ, or the

entrancement of Nirvana, the principle remains the same.

The influence of impressions, whether for good or evil, is enormously increased by the association of ideas, according to which if the body has received two or more impressions simultaneously at one period, one of these impressions will at another period call up ideas correlated with the whole group. Thus, a slave of drink, trying to regain his liberty, if he happens to hear in another room the popping of a cork, may have the memories of jovial carousal so strongly revived that in the absence of any stronger idea nothing will prevent his relapse. And equally it is true that a young man away from home and hesitating on the verge of vice, may be arrested and recalled to virtue by a strain of music from a church door, as the melody recalls the religious ideals cherished in a home of purity and love.

Association of ideas.

Prop. xviii.

The part assigned to it in the government of the passions and the realisation of eternal life, compels us to pay particular attention to Spinoza's doctrine of knowledge. And for the practical purpose we have in view it is better to discard the order of his propositions, and have more regard to the needs of our own ordinary minds than to the scientific precision of the philosopher. According to him, knowledge is of three kinds, viz.: 1. That of unsystematised experience (*experientia vaga*), including hearsay or unsystematised reading. 2. That of reasoning or logic.[1] 3. That of direct intuition—or what

Function of knowledge and its varieties.

[1] '. . . *ex eo quod notiones communes, rerumque proprietatum ideas adæquatas habemus*,' *i.e.* 'from our progressing common notions' —common to our kind, a current coin of thought—'and adequate ideas of the properties of things.'

we might call knowledge at sight, only it is mental vision, not physical, that is concerned.[1] For illustrations of the different kinds of knowledge we may with advantage refer to the Essay on the Improvement of the Understanding. There we find as instances of knowledge through unsystematised experience, the information received from a man's parents as to the day of his birth, and his conviction that death awaits him like other men. Through unsystematised experience he also knows that oil feeds a flame while water puts it out; that a dog is a barking animal, and man rational—of course in the general sense of possessing the elements of reason. To the second kind of knowledge, which results from reasoning or logic, he refers our conviction of our two-fold nature as body and mind, though what sensation is, and what the union of body and mind, we cannot say with any certainty. We also know by reasoning from the nature of sight and the diminution of apparent size by distance, that the sun must be larger than it looks.

Instances of the different kinds.

These instances are elementary. But it would not be difficult to find many appropriate to the enormously increased range of life and knowledge of which we are conscious at the present day. For we may take it that under the first head of unsystematised experience, Spinoza would have classed the 'rule of thumb' methods so dear to British handicraftsmen and manufacturers, as also the instinct of 'muddling through,' generally recognised as the distinctive glory of our arms. So, too, the

'Rule of thumb.'

'Muddling through.'

[1] In the unfinished essay 'De Intellectus Emendatione,' knowledge by hearsay or reading is kept as a kind separate from the knowledge of unsystematised or unreasoned experience. But in the Ethics, though the two are mentioned, they are classed together.

practical man, who knows his way about in the business world, and who after a very few years turns to gold whatever he touches, has his knowledge through unsystematised experience, of which he can give no intelligible account. It is to be feared also, that the knowledge of most of our politicians is of the same kind, with the result that reforms which reasoned experience might at least hasten, are dragged out through many generations.

'Reasoned experience.'

Of Spinoza's second kind of knowledge, 'reasoned experience,'[1] the whole range of modern science affords an endless array of illustrations. For it is founded on definite conceptions shared with our fellows concerning the properties of things. For instance, if we may take modern examples, the common notions which all educated people possess of weight and mass and direct and inverse proportion enable them to grasp the theory of gravitation and its proofs, though not to say what gravitation is, that is, whether pressure or pull, whether action at a distance or not. So too, the possession of common notions and definite perceptions of chemical combination have through reasoned experience assured scientific men that affinities enable substances to combine only in definite and unvarying proportions. But whether that involves the 'atomic' theory is altogether another question. It will be observed that for this knowledge through reasoned experience two conditions are needed: first, a common fund of ideas (*communes notiones*) about the order of the world—for instance, such facts as weight, or the tendency of various substances to combine; and,

Gravitation.

Proportionate combination.

[1] The term is suggested by Sir F. Pollock's description of the first kind as 'unreasoned experience.'

secondly, careful observation of a sufficient number of particular cases (*rerum proprietatum ideas adæquatas*). Thus theories can be formed according to Spinoza's dictum (Prop. xl., Pt. II.) that 'whatever ideas follow in the mind from its adequate ideas, are themselves adequate.'

Possible objection on account of Spinoza's definition of 'adequate ideas.'

It may possibly be objected that my interpretation of this theory of knowledge as applicable to modern times is unsatisfactory, because Spinoza means by 'adequate ideas' those 'which are in God, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He constitutes the essence of the human mind.' But I must regard such an objection as an instance of the theological misinterpretations of Spinoza, mentioned in the first words of this essay. For the Master is not thinking of a personal Jehovah, or Allah, or Brahma. What He means is that such ideas have their legitimate and proper place in the mind as a finite mode of the infinite Attribute of Thought. Inadequate ideas differ in this, that though they also are, of course, finite Modes of the infinite Attribute of Thought, they are in God, not merely as He constitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in as far as, together with the human mind He has the idea of some other thing (or things). Thus, if we say that the believer in witchcraft had an inadequate idea of the influences which troubled him, we mean, as I interpret the Master, that the idea was in God, not only as He constitutes the essence of the individual mind, but also as He has in view, if we may so speak, the whole course of human evolution through superstition and fear to a participation in the eternal life and freedom of God. Hence confusion of thought on

Answer: that this is a theological misinterpretation.

Witchcraft as an 'inadequate idea.'

the earthly sphere, though in the heavens is unclouded light.

The knowledge obtainable by such methods is necessarily limited In fact, in many respects Spinoza is an Agnostic. But the instances he gives are curious as illustrating his method. He tells us we can have only a very inadequate idea of the duration of our own body, or of any other individual things. This appears sufficiently obvious. But he is not thinking of the uncertainties of life or circumstance, but rather of the constitution of the universe as an innumerable series of successions amongst which we are apt to exaggerate our part. And the eternal process of change, of which we can only have a very inadequate conception, gives rise to the notion of contingency and chance or corruption, neither of which has any existence but in our inadequate ideas. For to the infinite Thought, comprehending the Whole, there is no contingency and no corruption.

Inadequate ideas also suggest notions of contingency and corruption.

But it is time now to turn to the third and highest kind of knowledge, according to the Master's theory. This is the knowledge given by direct vision, as when we look on a rose, and know that it is red, yellow, or white. In the reception also of some moral truths, the process is just as swift and clear; which was surely the experience of the common people of Galilee when they listened to Jesus. For if they 'were astonished at His doctrine,' it was certainly because it was so overwhelmingly plain. Yet, as is too often the case, Spinoza the exact philosopher somewhat obscures Spinoza the brother of Jesus. For the former tells us that 'this kind of knowledge issues from an adequate idea of the real essence of some

Knowledge by intuition.

of the divine Attributes, and results in an adequate knowledge of the essence of things.'[1]

Spinoza's illustration by a self-evident case of proportion.

Before trying to show the practical bearing of this abstract statement, let me add Spinoza's solitary illustration.

'Here are given for example three numbers for the purpose of finding a fourth, which shall be to the third as the second to the first. Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second by the third, and divide the product by the first; of course, because they have not forgotten the rote-lessons they once received without any proof from the schoolmaster; or else because they have tried the operation often on the simplest numbers; or again they do it by virtue of the proof of Euclid, Prop. xix., lib. 7, that is, according to the common property of proportionals. But in the simplest numbers there is no need of anything of the kind. For example, the numbers 1, 2, and 3 being given, no one could fail to see that the fourth proportional number is 6; and this the more clearly because from the ratio itself, which, with one glance we see to be borne by the first to the second, we infer the fourth.'

Probable explanation.

Here the Attribute, of whose real essence we are supposed to have an adequate idea, is Extension. Of Extension motion is an infinite Mode. And from motion are derived the ideas of apparent division, measurement, and number. Thus, according to Spinoza, it is our adequate idea of the essence of Extension which enables us to see at a glance that six is to three as two is to one. It would surely be a waste of time to discuss intuition from such a point of view. For my part, I believe the great thinker to be right. But looking at things as we needs

Needs explaining.

[1] The translation is free, but I think gives the meaning. (Part II., Prop. xl., Schol. 2.)

must, in the mood of the present age, we do not find his illustration carries us very far toward an appreciation of the higher functions of intuition in the spiritual life. What he really means is, that if we see things as God sees them, we see them truly.[1] But then, what is meant by seeing things as God sees them? With inevitable iteration I reply that it means having an idea just as it exists in God so far as He constitutes the essence of the human mind and nothing else. If there be any difficulty here, it is caused by the inveterate tendency of monotheism to think of God as the greatest among beings instead of regarding Him as the only Being. The former view separates Him from the world and man, so that when we talk of seeing things as God sees them, we think of two minds and a parallelism of thought between them. That, however, is not Spinoza's doctrine at all. For him the human mind *is* God, at least in the sense that it is constituted by a Mode of a divine Attribute. And if probably even Spinoza would have regarded it as a harsh expression to say that the human mind is God, it could only be in the same sense in which St. Paul considered it absurd to suppose an eye constituting the whole body. But Spinoza had no notion of an infinite Mind away in heaven thinking things, and of the human mind responding. His idea was that of One infinite and eternal substance, expressing its essence in many ways, of which the human mind is one. Now when this mysterious, finite expression of God keeps, so to speak, to its part and proportion in the universal harmony, it sees things as God sees them, that is, it keeps within

The real meaning is seeing things as God sees them.

Reason for failure to apprehend this.

Man not separate from God, but an incarnation.

Seeing things as God sees them.

[1] See Demonstration of Prop. xxxiv.

the finite Mode proper to it according to the scale of the infinite life. Then it has 'adequate ideas'—not infinite, of course, but exactly fitting its place in the eternal life. And this is the case with us—as afterwards appears in the Fifth Book—so long as we can keep ourselves within the rule of reasoned experience, or by insight have clear ideas of truth, and duty, and right.

Inadequate ideas,

But now let us take a different case. This mysterious finite expression of God, the individual mind of John Smith struggling to exceed its part and proportion in the universal harmony, is vexed that it does not accomplish all its desires or receive its deserts according to its own

their effect on our view of the world.

conceit thereof. It notices also that many others think themselves in the same plight, and thereupon feels strongly inclined to take the bitter advice of Job's wife.

Pessimism and supernaturalism.

Hence pessimistic philosophy, bitterness of soul, and presumptuous or even blasphemous charges against the order of the world. Hence, also, feeble-minded suggestions of pious remedies for God's mistakes, by the supposition of a non-natural annex, outside the known universe, and divided into Heaven and Hell, where God's actual arrangements, as we know them, shall give place to the better ideals of the good creatures whom the Eternal has hitherto wronged.[1] Any such mind has,

[1] The description has no application to the great prophets and apostles who fitted their place in the due order of religious evolution. For they were reverent and submissive to what appeared to them the undeniable work of the Eternal. (Cf. Rom. ix. 19-20.) Those, however, upon whom a new revelation has forced palpable facts, but who, notwithstanding, persist in declaring that they will not have God's universe as it is—while, for certain reasons, they may well claim sympathy—can scarcely be religious in St. Paul's sense.

according to the Master, an inadequate idea, or rather many inadequate ideas, of the relation of self to the Eternal. Because, in exceeding their proper bounds by vain desire, sentiment, or greed, they travesty the idea existing in God, 'not only so far as He constitutes the nature of the human mind, but so far as together with the nature of the human mind he has the idea of another thing'—or of an infinite series of things. That is to say, the infinite series of which the mind of John Smith forms an infinitesimal, though necessary link, is expressed perfectly in the infinite Attribute of Thought, but very inadequately indeed in the finite expression of that Attribute in the mind of John Smith. And when John Smith forgets that, he necessarily has inadequate ideas.

Truth and falsehood,

In the light of such reflections I interpret Spinoza's doctrine of truth and falsehood. Obviously, if we have an idea as God has it—to use human language—then it is true. But that happens only when the idea does not go beyond the finite mode of the infinite Attribute of Thought. For example, the idea of the redness of a certain rose is true because it is the form inevitably taken in the particular finite mind by divine thought, and not extending beyond that mind. But the idea of the nature and cause of colour and the spectrum is a very different thing. There we intrude upon divine thought as thinking colour, and ether and motion and an endless series of linked causes. Here, whatever surprising discoveries we may make, our idea remains and must for ever remain 'inadequate.' In morals again, there are cases in which our judgment is self-evidently true, because it falls precisely within the finite expression of the

in matters of perception,

in theory,

in moral judgment.

infinite Attribute of Thought, and does not exceed. For instance, Nathan's condemnation of David for his sin against Uriah is of this nature. For here the human relations concerned are as clear and as much within the scope of the finite man as the colour of a rose. But if we go farther and accuse the Eternal because such crimes are allowed, and continually occur, then we question an action or procedure of God, not only so far as He constitutes the nature of the human mind—which condemns the crime[1]—but so far as together with the human mind He has an idea of another thing—or many other things; that is, once more, of the whole course of evolution, or of all the infinite series which constitute the totality of Being. Hence our idea is necessarily inadequate and confused.

Falsehood not positive but negative, arising from actual or necessary ignorance of some essential elements.

Our judgment in this latter case—our accusation of God—will be false; but false, not because of any positive affirmation, as, for instance, that David's crime is repugnant within any range of human relations realisable by us. Rather, it is false by defect of knowledge, because we cannot conceive the infinity of the series of interlaced events which make up the Whole of Being, a series in which David's crime finds its place without in the slightest degree marring the harmony of the Whole. To Nathan and the righteous onlookers in Jerusalem, it appears indeed, and rightly, a terrible catastrophe. But on the infinite scale it disappears, or is a link in the

[1] It should be borne in mind that, according to Spinoza, God does not condemn, any more than He hates or grieves. But the phrases, when used in popular language, express, so far as they are accurate, the working of secondary causes, or, as we should say, finite links in an infinite series of events.

completeness of the Whole. The prophet spoke a far profounder truth than he knew, when he said, 'The Lord hath put away thy sin.'

Fallacy of uncaused will.

'Men are deceived,' says Spinoza, 'when they think themselves free; which opinion rests only on the fact that while they are conscious of their actions, they are ignorant of the causes by which those actions are determined. This therefore constitutes their notion of freedom; that they should know no cause of their actions. For when they say that human actions depend on the will, these are (mere) words without significance (*quorum nullam habent ideam*). For what the will may be, and how it may move the body, they none of them can tell. As to those who pretend otherwise and imagine a local habitation for the soul, they usually excite ridicule or repulsion.'[1]

A clear and distinct consciousness of truth is possible,

Having dealt with the negative character of falsehood, Spinoza maintains that he who has a true idea, knows that he has it, and cannot doubt of its truth. Of course, at first sight this is open to much misinterpretation, as it might seem to include the self-confident assertions or negations of ignorance. A pious anti-Romanist is sure that a plague of cholera or smallpox is a visitation of the divine wrath upon ritualism, and proves his case by a plausible concurrence of dates at which the ritualistic practices began and the plague appeared. Surely this man knows—or thinks he knows—that he has a true idea, of which he finds it impossible to doubt. But when it is said such a man finds it impossible to doubt, what is meant is that his prejudice and

distinct from prejudice.

[1] II., xxxv., Schol. The above quotation is given here solely as the Master's illustration of the negative character of falsehood. In its other bearings, as for instance on moral responsibility, I deal with it elsewhere.

self-will hamper him. It cannot be for a moment maintained that even to him the contrary is unthinkable, or that the notion of a coincidence, without any casual connection between the two things, is a contradiction in terms. So that Sir Frederick Pollock, in my view, interprets the Master rightly when he says that Spinoza's test of truth is practically identical with that of Herbert Spencer, which is the unthinkableness of the contrary. But the great Pantheist invests this test with a sanctity wanting to the modern Philosopher. For he says that our mind, inasmuch as it receives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God; and it is just as inevitable that the clear and distinct ideas of the mind should be true, as that the ideas of God should be so. Here again we are not to think of a supernatural Mind away in Heaven, to whose thoughts our true thoughts are parallel. But our minds are—if we may use the phrase—constituent elements of God, and, so far as our thoughts are the finite Modes of the infinite Attribute of Thought constituting our minds and nothing else, they are true.

Coincidence with Spencer's test of truth.

But with a religious sanction.

In entire consistency with his fundamental faith in the identity of God and the Universe, Spinoza concludes the Second Part of his Ethics with propositions concerning Necessity, Eternity, and Will such as in many readers excite a revulsion of feeling only to be removed by his concluding Part, on the Freedom of Man. Nevertheless, notwithstanding my own personal experience of the moral difficulties occasioned by these propositions, I think it better to give my paraphrase of their essential contents, without any attempt to forestall the Fifth Book, but with the hope that any who have read thus far will have the

Necessity and Eternity.

patience to read on. For assuredly the last Part gives the key to the religion of the future.

He tells us then[1] that to the eye of Reason—which alone sees truly—there is no such thing as contingency, or chance; but all individual things or events follow each other in necessary sequence. Of course, 'under the aspect of eternity,' they co-exist. And if we were capable of seeing the whole Universe under that aspect, there would be no room for argument. But we are not capable of such a vision, and are, for the most part, compelled therefore to contemplate things under the finite aspect of time or succession. A scholium is added to explain how the illusion of contingency arises. But this we need only touch upon. For Spinoza's own intellectual vision was so clear that he does not seem to have realised the need of ordinary minds for ample illustration; and when reading page after page of compressed utterances, pregnant with the truths of infinite Being, we cannot repress an occasional irreverent interruption from the humble but immortal Touchstone, who mutters, 'Instance, Shepherd, instance!' In the present case, however, he supposes a boy on one particular day to see Peter in the morning, Paul at noon, and Simeon in the evening. Then, if next morning he sees Peter again, he will by association of ideas expect Paul at noon and Simeon in the evening. This association will be constant in proportion to the regularity with which he sees these men in this order. But if, on some evening, James should

Reason acknowledges no contingency.

How the illusion of contingency arises.

It is caused by our ignorance of causes.

[1] Prop. xliv. Like all students of Spinoza, I am immensely indebted to Sir Frederiek Pollock's luminous monograph, and on this particular point my indebtedness is, if possiblo, greater than usual.

appear in place of Simeon, the boy will, on the next morning, be uncertain whether in the coming evening he should look for James or Simeon. The reasons actuating the men are unchanged, and the order in which they will appear, though variable, is, in itself, as certain as before, but the boy no longer knows that order, and therefore will think it a matter of chance.

Case of rising stars.

But other instances coming more nearly home to the modern mind suggest perhaps more forcibly to us that sequences which reflection teaches us to be indubitably certain are treated as contingent when we do not know their causes. Thus, two people, having noticed the morning and evening stars at various times, but possessing no astronomical knowledge, will dispute, in the absence of an almanac, as to which planets will be morning stars next month; and the dispute will grow so keen that they may even make a bet on the event. I do not forget that each disputant knows the event to be fixed from eternity. But this makes the illustration all the more apt. For it shows clearly how ignorance may create a frame of mind which very vividly simulates contingency, where it is allowed that none exists. So in a horse-race the event is already decided when the horses come to the starting-post. For the speed and endurance of each animal, together with the skill of the rider, are all fixed quantities. And as to the accidents which so frequently deceive the most knowing, a fall for instance or a foul, or temper in a horse, no one can possibly doubt that these all belong to physical sequences—even the horse's temper—which are as sure as the succession of the morning stars. Yet, because the sequences are not

known beforehand, they are treated as contingent, and the excitement of betting-men grows wilder and wilder to the last moment of the uncertainty caused by ignorance.

Election excitement before the declaration of the poll.

One of the most curious cases of this simulation of uncertainty where none exists is perhaps our treatment of already past events. Watch a group of eager politicians waiting in their club for the telegraphic announcement of the poll in an already decided election. In the eager excitement with which they discuss the probabilities, they show almost the agonising suspense of a race-course madman, as he watches the horse that is carrying fortune or ruin for him. Nay, up to the last moments before the fatal click of the tape-machine is heard, the arguments as to the strength of local parties, and the popularity of candidates, will grow hotter; and bets on the result will be offered and accepted. It is impossible to deny that in this case, as in that of the horse-race, all the excitement and even the passions associated with interests staked on what is called 'chance' are present, notwithstanding the concealed certainty of the event. Nay, we may cite as witnesses to a universal subconscious sense of the unreality of contingency the victims of the gaming-table, who so often have a 'plan' that is certain to succeed if only they can hold out long enough. For what is their reliance on the 'plan' but an acknowledgment that even in what are by pre-eminence called 'games of chance,' the sequences are certain? Here again it is only in human ignorance, and not in events themselves that contingency exists. This might be remembered with advantage, when we are told that

the theories of Spinoza would rob life of all its interest.

Eternity and eternal life.

Again, as the eye of Reason discerns this certainty of succession in all things—though, as admitted, it discovers only in exceptional cases the individual links of sequence—it must needs view the Universe under the aspect of eternity. For the certainty of apparent succession is—in human language—a 'law' of the divine nature. That is, since God is identical with the Universe, things are as they are on the scale of the Whole, because God is as He is. Whoever, therefore, realises the successions in his own consciousness as links in an unbeginning and endless series, 'lays hold on eternal life,' because he feels himself part of That which, 'as it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end.' The detachment of such a sense of eternal life from the lower craving for personal immortality is best considered elsewhere.

What is meant by the 'adequate and perfect knowledge of God.'

It seems more difficult to follow the Master when he insists that our knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God, which every idea involves, is 'adequate and perfect.' Spinoza, however, himself relieves us of part of our difficulty, when (Prop. xlvii., Schol.) he explains that we cannot expect our knowledge of God to be as lucid (*clarum*) as our knowledge of finite notions common to all men, such as weight, number, colour, heat, and so on. This is because men are unable to picture God—that is, the totality of Being—as they can finite bodies; and also because they have associated the name 'God' with the forms of things they are accustomed to see. Surely this is obvious. For if men during a hundred generations were in the habit of associating the name 'god'

with thunder or storm, or heavenly bodies, or transfigured men, it is very difficult indeed for the more highly developed generations succeeding them to wrench the name from such narrow associations, and identify it with the infinite Whole. Such a transference is quite irreconcilable with the narrow definiteness of notion which every mere idolator and sectary has associated with his particular god. And it is this inveterate prejudice, assuming God to be outside or inside of the Universe, but never as identical with it, which constitutes still an apparently insuperable obstacle to the spread of more spiritual religion. But I do not think that Spinoza intended to set us the impossible task of knowing the Unknowable 'in the strict sense of knowing.' For, as we have seen, he admits the impossibility of a clear idea of the whole Living Universe. It appears rather that when he insists that in the recognition of the Eternal Life we have an 'adequate and perfect' idea of God, he means that the negation of that Eternal Life is unthinkable. Tennyson, perhaps, sang more wisely than he thought in the words:

> 'My own dim life might teach me this,
> That life shall live for evermore.'

For, as we have seen (p. 7), any existence at all implies infinite Being; and it is in this sense only that we have an adequate and perfect idea of God; that is, His non-existence in Spinoza's sense of the name God, cannot be thought.

No uncaused Will.

It is of course in entire consistency with all the foregoing that the Book concludes with a denial of any such

thing as uncaused Will. For the mind, as the Master says, is a finite mode of the Attribute of Thought, and is therefore a link in an endless series of (so-called) cause and effect. In fact, he denies that there is any such faculty as will, except as a conventional generalisation of individual mental acts. If we like to call the general quality of stones, stoniness, we may do so. But we know very well that there is no such thing apart from separate and individual stones. So also of will; there is no such thing except as a conventional expression for an indefinite number of separate decisions.

Doctrine of the Will as affirmation or negation not necessary for our present purpose.

I do not think it needful to discuss Spinoza's identification of these decisions with affirmation or negation. In fact, it would seem only to express in another form Spinoza's doctrine that an individual act of what we call will is the resultant of all the forces or influences impelling the mind this way or that; and that freedom is realised when all, or the decisive determining influences rise from within, while compulsion is felt when all, or the decisive influences press on us from without.

Spinoza's conclusion of the chapter.

Spinoza concludes his Book on the Origin and Nature of the Mind with a summary of the practical bearing of his teaching on human life.

The practical uses of his doctrine.

'Finally, it remains to show of how much practical value a recognition of this teaching is to daily life, as we shall easily discern if we note the following points. To wit:—

'I. It instructs us that we act entirely at the beck (*nutu*) of God, and are partakers of the divine nature: all the more so [1]

[1] Of course, two difficulties recur: (1) As to the place of responsibility; (2) as to the possibility of 'more' or 'less' in partaking of the divine nature, if God is all in all. For (1) see p. 45 *n*. As to (2) we can only suppose that Spinoza refers to more or less *God-consciousness*. But it is premature to judge of either till we have studied Part v.

in proportion as our doings become more perfect, and we understand God more and more. This doctrine, therefore, in addition to the all-pervading peace it gives to the mind, has also this distinction, that it shows us in what our supreme felicity or blessedness consists, that is, exclusively in the knowledge of God, by which knowledge we are attracted to do only those things which love and piety suggest. Hence we perceive clearly how far they err from a true appreciation of virtue who, for virtue and noble deeds, as though these were utter drudgery, look to be honoured by God with richest rewards. Just as though virtue itself and drudgery for God were not itself felicity and supreme liberty!

It shows wherein blessedness consists,

'II. It shows us how to bear ourselves in regard to matters of fortune which are not within our own control, or events which do not result from our own nature; that is, we are enabled to look for and bear either aspect of fortune with an even mind; and this because all things follow from God's eternal fiat by the same kind of necessity as that by which it follows from the essence of a triangle that its three angles are equal to three right angles.

makes us 'four-square to all the shocks of time.'

'III. This teaching is advantageous to social life, inasmuch as it instructs us to regard none with hatred, to scorn no one, to mock no one, neither to be angry with, nor to envy any. Farther, it teaches that each of us should be content with his own lot, and should be obliging to his neighbour, not from effeminate pity, favouritism, or superstition, but solely under the impulse of Reason, according to the demands of time and occasion, as I will show in Part III.

In social life it teaches tolerance and contentment.

'IV. Lastly, this teaching offers no small benefit to social order, inasmuch as it instructs us on what principle citizens are to be governed and led, not as slaves; but so that they may do freely what is best.

Its political bearing.

'And so I have fulfilled the purpose I had before me in this Scholium, and thus I bring to an end our Second Part: in which I think I have expounded at sufficient length, and with as much clearness as the difficulty of the

matter allows, the nature and powers of the human mind, while I have uttered such principles as enable us to infer many glorious truths of the highest utility, and needful to be known; as will in some measure be made evident by what follows.'

PART III

THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF MENTAL AFFECTIONS

Meaning of 'affections.'

THE English word 'affection,' when used as a rendering of Spinoza's Latin *affectus*, is so liable to be misunderstood, that, as previously noted, Mr. Hale White and Miss Stirling have in their translation revived the obsolete substantive 'affect.' But the addition of the epithet 'mental,' as above, seems a sufficient guarantee for a right understanding, especially if we accept the authority of the *New English Dictionary*, where, with sufficient quotations to justify the view taken, the 'general and literal' meaning of the word 'affection' is given as 'the action of affecting, acting upon or influencing; or (when viewed passively) the fact of being affected.' In reference to the mind, the word means, according to the same authority, 'a mental state brought about by any influence.' This latter seems to me to be precisely equivalent to Spinoza's *affectus*. It is true, indeed, that in regard to appetite and pleasurable excitement, Spinoza joins the body with the mind as the subject of *affectus*. But we should remember that to him body and mind were different aspects of the same thing.[1]

New English Dictionary.

Our understanding not negatived by occasional references to the bodily origin of affections.

[1] Strictly speaking, finite modes of two infinite Attributes expressing the one divine Substance.

Besides, in the cases just now mentioned, the body is brought in because it suggests the origin of the affection. But it is obvious throughout the book that the real topic is *mental* affections. Let it be borne in mind then, that by mental affections we mean any 'mental state brought about by any influence other than Reason.'[1]

Man not outside the order of Nature.

An all-important indication of the purpose of this section of the great work is given in the preface, where a protest is uttered against any attempt to place man outside the order of Nature. Of those who insist on this he says, 'they believe that man disturbs the order of Nature instead of following it, and is determined by no other power than himself.' But prophet though he was, the Master could not possibly have foreseen the curiously perverse application sometimes made of this false doctrine in our time. For it is too common to read in the writings of the expiring sect of materialists, unmeasured abuse of the order of the world, together with eloquent exaltations of the creature man whom this botched world has managed to produce. While that homely Hebrew philosopher, Agur, the son of Jakeh, loved the wonder excited by 'the way of an eagle in the air, the way of a serpent on a rock, and the way of a man with a maid,' these pessimistic critics of Nature and idolators of Man are more fascinated by the way of a cat with a mouse, or of a lion with an antelope, or the way of the whirlwind and the storm. Such morbid ponderers of Nature's riddles cannot, like the foolish king, express a wish that they

Tendency amongst some to a perverted exaltation of man as against the Universe.

[1] For further justification I may refer to the 'General Definition of the Affections' at the close of this Part, where, while the unity of body and mind is strictly preserved, every affection is an *Animi Pathema*.

had been present at the creation of the world to warn the bungling *opifex deus* of the mischiefs he was brewing. For, to do them justice, they do not believe in creation, an unbelief, which, so far as it goes, is certainly a sign of grace. Because it ought to dispose them to a recognition of the certain truth that eternal self-existence implies perfection. But the strange thing is, that looking on the Universe as an infinite muddle endowed with a paradoxical faculty of keeping discordant and mutually destructive parts in co-existence through eternity, they yet believe that this monstrous chimæra has begotten and brought forth a being gifted with faculties of orderly thought, sympathetic feeling, and ideal aspiration, such as erect him into the only god known, and lift him to the judgment-seat from which he can condemn and curse all that has made him what he is.

An illogical position for those who deny creation.

For the absence of creation implies an eternal and therefore perfect self-existence.

Now, since every modern thinker agrees that what used to be called 'chance' is out of the question as a world-forming or world-maintaining principle (*ἀρχή*), it surely follows that, whether without or within the mass of existence, there must have been some energy guiding things along the lines they have taken in the course of evolution.[1] True, the unfolding which we call evolution can only be observed by us in an infinitesimal part of the infinite Whole—infinitesimal even though we include in the sweep of our telescopes galaxies beyond all mortal conceptions of distance. For beyond every bound of our contemplations, the circumference of the 'well-rounded

Incongruity of such a *Weltanschauung*.

For it suggests disorder, whereas evolution involves order.

[1] The argument here is from the point of view of time, or temporal succession. How this point of view is changed by an appreciation of eternity will be seen in Part v.

sphere'[1] to which Xenophanes and Parmenides likened the Whole of Being, is still infinitely distant. Yet if there is a Universe, a unity of things, we may confidently claim, within obvious limits of reverence and common-sense, to judge the Whole on the analogy of a part. At least we may presume congruity, if only we had eyes to see.

Granting this, then if evolution and devolution are proceeding everywhere with the self-consistency which we call order, the eternal process involves, as we have said, some energy compelling things along the lines of change which we see or infer. This energy is either inherent in the Universe itself, that is, in every part of it; or it is something other than the Universe. Which latter view has been and is earnestly maintained by those who think the monotheism of the latest Jewish prophets to be in some transmuted shape essential to morality. That, however, is not the opinion of those materialists who imagine the Universe to have produced in man something better than itself. They sometimes speak of themselves as Agnostics, who do not know whether the energy of evolution is outside the world or within it. But if they allow even the possibility that the driving power of evolution is some outside Being, then their criticism of his works makes him a Devil rather than a God. And how a Devil could produce a creature able to think of him justly and call him by his right name, is a problem which surely belongs not to the unknowable, but to the unthinkable.

If the energy of evolution be a power outside the Universe, Pessimists make it a Devil.

Incongruity of this hypothesis with the fact of man's existence.

[1] *παντόθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ*, line 101 in Karsten's *Fragments of Parmenides*.

On the other hand, if there is no Power of evolution outside the Universe, but the Universe itself is instinct with that energy throughout and in all its parts, is it not just possible that critics of its infinite series of successions judge things too exclusively from their own individual point of view, forgetting the utter unimportance of this on the scale of infinity? In contemplating evolution their eyes are fixed with horror on the darker phases—as they think them—of its line of advance through the 'struggle for existence,' through 'dragons of the prime,' through carnivorous monsters, through fire and earthquake, through battle, murder, and sudden death; and because these phases, irrationally separated from the Whole which they subserve, are repulsive to the individual also irrationally detached from the Whole, such critics are moved to scold at Nature. But do these pessimists attach a like importance to individual creature interests where the security of human society, or their own personal safety, or even 'sport' is concerned? Which of them laments that wolves have been exterminated in this country, or is perturbed by the process by which their destruction was achieved? Which of them when, by an artful cast of a fly, he lures a salmon to its death, feels anything but pleasure in his own skill? Yet vermin, and beasts of prey and creatures of 'sport,' have each one of them individual interests of their own which they strive eagerly to maintain. And if it be said that such lower individual interests ought not to prevail against the higher and wider interests of the superior creature, man, surely it is obvious that on the scale of infinity, the same argument may be applicable to the

If the energy of evolution is everywhere, we are wrong in judging the whole from a part.

View taken by ourselves of 'individual interests' lower than our own.

May be applied to our own on the scale of infinity.

individual interests of the higher creature. I am not suggesting that there are greater personal beings, or one supreme person, to whose higher claims the individual man must subordinate himself. I mean only that by his essential existence as an infinitesimal part of an infinite Whole man is bound not to strive beyond his place, but to take submissively his share of expansion and repression amid the everlasting flow and counterflow of the currents of evolution.

But if it be said that all this is only a re-statement of the evil of the world, a burden to every sympathetic heart watching the struggle for existence and forced to take its part therein, we can only fall back on our fundamental position, that the world does not exist for the individual, but the individual for the world. And he who will not loyally accept this truth must needs fret away his life like Hamlet, under 'a foul and pestilential congregation of vapours.'

The world not for the individual, but the individual for the world.

Spinoza teaches a healthier faith, insisting that—

No vice in Nature.

'Nothing happens in Nature which can be attributed to any vice of Nature. For Nature is always the same, and everywhere and always her efficiency[1] and power of action are the same. That is, the laws and rules of Nature, according to which all things have existence and are changed from one set of forms to another, are everywhere and always the same; and therefore there ought to be one and the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, I mean through the universal laws and rules of Nature. Thus the affections of hatred, anger, envy and so on, when studied in themselves, follow by the same necessity and force of Nature as the rest of single phenomena. And accordingly

[1] *Virtus*, a word scarcely to be rendered by 'virtue' here, nor yet by 'valour.' Efficiency seems to come nearest to the meaning.

they imply certain causes through which they are understood, and they have certain characteristics,[1] just as much worth our study as the characteristics of anything else which delights us by its mere contemplation.'

Rest of Part III. a practical application of the foregoing with a view to ulterior moral results.

The definitions, axioms, and propositions of Part III. form a practical application of the foregoing prefatory observations with a view to the ulterior moral results to be worked out in Part V. But should it occur to any one that moral teaching and exhortation can be of no use if the 'force and necessity of Nature are always and everywhere the same,' let such an one remember that moral teaching and exhortation are also essential elements in that 'force and necessity.' The most stirring and potent 'revivalist' of morals or religion, or of both, does but bring to bear upon the objects of his prophetic work certain forces that range the world of man, whether they be called 'the power of the Holy Ghost' or 'the powers of the world to come,' or 'personal magnetism.' And when these forces so work within the individual hearer that the resultant of all impulses within him is a change from vice to virtue, the subject of these influences realises a freedom that he never knew before, because he is now no longer in bondage to external provocatives of passion. This, as Spinoza insists, is true freedom; but it is given and it is maintained in accordance with 'the force and necessity of Nature.' Surely it ought to be no discouragement to our moral efforts that they must be made in accordance with eternal law, any more than the same consideration deprives of interest a great engineering work. 'No, of course not!' say the advocates of uncaused

Fallacy of the supposed opposition between moral action and orderly antecedents.

[1] *Proprietates.*

volitions, 'but in both cases the beginning of the work is spontaneous.' That is, as I understand, the impulse to begin arises in the originator free of any felt compulsion from without. This is readily granted; for it is precisely Spinoza's doctrine of liberty. But, all the same, though the mind is as unconscious of the fact, as it is of the antecedents of the particles forming its body, that internal impulse has an eternal history developed by the 'force and necessity of Nature.'

Such explanations may be of service in enabling us to abbreviate very considerably our paraphrase of Part III.

Some definitions.

By an 'adequate cause' the Master means a cause of which the effect can be clearly and distinctly grasped without reference to anything but that particular cause.[1] An inadequate or partial cause is one of which the effect cannot be understood through that cause alone. Perhaps one may venture to illustrate this. If I put my hand into a fire and am painfully burned, I need no other explanation than the heat of the fire. Of my feeling—though not of my action—the fire is an 'adequate cause.' But if metal-workers—as we are told that they can do with impunity—dip their hands into molten iron for a second, and experience only a pleasant, 'velvety' warmth, the effect cannot be understood through the molten metal alone. But considerations of skin moisture arise, and the intervention of a protective vapour. Here the molten metal is an 'inadequate cause.'

Adequate and inadequate causes.

[1] It may be necessary to remind the reader that this notion of a particular cause is open to destructive criticism. In each case the 'cause' is the whole of Being, in its eternal energy. Spinoza's 'adequate cause' is really that particular link in the eternal chain which fixes the attention of consciousness because it seems proximate.

The purpose of the above definitions is immediately apparent. 'I say that we act'—or are agents—'when anything is done within us or without, of which we are the adequate cause; that is (by the preceding definition), when from our nature anything follows within us or without, which through that nature alone can be clearly and distinctly understood. On the other hand, I say that we are passive when anything is done within us or anything follows'—or is occasioned by—'our nature, of which we are only in part the cause.' Here again, perhaps, we may venture to illustrate. If a labouring man stops on his way home to buy a bunch of flowers or a present of fruit and takes it home to his wife, he is 'the adequate cause' of his wife's pleasure, and is a free agent, because what happens both within him and at his home follows entirely from his nature. But if instead of going into a flower- and a fruit-shop, he turns into a public-house, and is plied with drink till he is 'not himself,' and if in the sequel he goes home to abuse his wife and assault her, he is not in this case an 'adequate cause.' The evil procedure and actions cannot be clearly and distinctly understood through his nature. For the normal working of his nature is perverted by social custom and alcohol. He is not a free agent therefore. That is, he does not act, but suffers.[1]

As an adequate cause we are active; as inadequate, passive.

The affections or impressions discussed in this Third Part include everything by which the body's power of action is helped or hindered, together with the ideas

Definition of affections.

[1] Once more a warning against illegitimate inferences. It does not follow that because he is not an 'adequate cause,' therefore he is not to be blamed. Blame and punishment are resources of this 'force and necessity of Nature' for turning inadequate into adequate causes.

thereof. Now manifestly the last words here are most important. For though according to the Master, man is a finite mode of two Attributes, Extension and Thought, it is by Thought alone that Extension is realised. And apart from the former—as indeed Sir Frederick Pollock has shown—the latter is nothing. Therefore to us the *ideas* of the bodily affections, or impressions, are more than the affections or impressions themselves. And hence I persist in thinking this Part of the *Ethica* to be concerned with mental affections.

God and Man.

After repeating in the form of a proposition the definition already given of action and passivity Spinoza makes an interesting addition, which requires us to keep closely in mind his doctrine that the human mind is God thinking in a finite form. For he teaches that ideas which in the mind of any man are adequate, are adequate also in God in as far as He constitutes the essence of the human mind. But those ideas which are inadequate in man are nevertheless adequate in God, not in so far as He contains only the essence of the mind, but inasmuch as He contains within Himself also the ideal side—literally 'the minds'[1]—of other things. We may here recur to our illustration above. The poor man who plays the good husband has an adequate idea which enables him to be an adequate cause. And the adequate idea of love and duty simply expresses God as constituting the essence of the man's mind. But when he is overcome by drink and

No inadequate ideas in God.

[1] Mr. Hale White and Miss Stirling regard this word (*mentes*) as a misprint or scribal error for 'ideas.' I am not so sure. Not the human body only, but all individual things are finite expressions of the Attributes of Extension and Thought. In the latter aspect even stones must have their 'mind'—though, of course, incommensurate with the human mind.

violence, he has no longer an adequate idea, nor is he an adequate cause. Yet still the inadequate idea—say, of impossible, selfish isolation in pleasure—is adequate in God, because in the divine mind there is not only the idea of the momentary passion, but at the same time of the long course of moral evolution from worse to better, in which such trials and failures are inevitable steps.

Distinction of action and passion.

The next important doctrine is that the mind is active when it has adequate ideas, and passive—or subject to passion—when it has inadequate ideas. This, of course, does not mean that every man of action, such as Napoleon Bonaparte, has adequate ideas. Far from it. For to Spinoza, the self-centred ambition of such men appeared to be generated by very inadequate ideas indeed, and to be a form of slavish passion. Referring back to the definition previously given of adequate and inadequate ideas, we remember that the former are limited modes of infinite Thought constituting the essence of the human mind concerned, but not including anything else. Whereas inadequate ideas are only fragments of a divine thought which here includes other things besides the particular recipient or reflective human mind.

Prop. iii.

Depends upon the difference between adequate and inadequate ideas.

Socrates and Sargon.

For illustration let us take Socrates on the one hand, as described by Xenophon, and, on the other hand, an Assyrian king, probably Sargon II., as sketched by Isaiah. And of course, the correctness or otherwise of the portrait drawn makes no difference to the purpose for which it is here used. Now Socrates as citizen, moralist, and teacher, thought of himself as a responsible member of an ordered society, stationed where he was by divine power and burdened with a duty to transmit to others such convictions of the relations between true knowledge and the

higher life as involved the salvation both of individuals and the State. This idea of Socrates, concerning himself, seems to correspond very fairly with Spinoza's notion of an 'adequate idea.' That is, it may with reverence be regarded as the thought of God, 'not so far as He is infinite, but so far as He constitutes the essence of the mind' of Socrates. Not that the infallibility of Socrates as a philosopher, moralist, or teacher, follows in the least from this. Indeed it will be found that he had many inadequate ideas according to the definition of Spinoza. But all the same, his idea of himself and his mission is, I think, a very fair illustration of what the Master meant by an adequate idea.

Part II., Prop. xi., Coroll.

Assur or Sargon II.

Now turn to a very different character suggested by a passage in Isaiah :—

'Woe! Assur, the rod of mine anger,
And the staff of my indignation!
Against an impious nation am I wont to send him,
And against the people of my wrath to give him a charge.

But he—not so does he plan,
And his mind, not so does it reckon;
For extirpation is in his mind,
And to cut off nations not a few.

For he has said:
"By the strength of my hand have I done it,
And by my wisdom, for I have discernment;
And I removed the bounds of the peoples,
And their treasures plundered."

Is the axe to vaunt itself over him who hews therewith?
Or is the saw to brag over him who saws therewith?

Sworn has Jahweh Sabaoth:
"Surely as I have planned so shall it be,
And as I have purposed, it shall stand."'[1]

[1] Extracts from translation by Canon Cheyne in the Polychrome Bible.

Now here Sargon II.—if the identification be right, though the name matters not—is so presented by a prophet making no pretence to philosophy, as to afford a very apt illustration of what the great Jew of more than two millenniums later meant by the domination of an inadequate idea. For the Assyrian king is described as carrying out a purpose of God indeed, but a purpose extending far beyond the thought in the mortal mind. To put it in Spinoza's words, the Eternal has a 'certain idea not merely so far as He constitutes the nature of the human mind' of Sargon, 'but so that together with the human mind He has the idea of another thing, and therefore we say that the human mind perceives the matter in part or inadequately.' Application.

And if it be said, as truly it must be said, that no finite mode of infinite thought is isolated, and that God as constituting the essence of each human mind involves at the same time all other minds and everything that is, this is no objection to the Master's distinction. For though the mind of Socrates be only a point in the Infinite, the idea of Socrates concerning himself coincides with that point, and does not go beyond it. He fits into and is content with the infinitesimal place appointed him in the Infinite Whole. But not so Sargon; for in his lust of conquest he strains beyond his due place, and though he fulfils a divine purpose, he has no adequate idea of it. He is thinking of himself while God is thinking of infinite things.

Socrates then, according to Spinoza, has a mind which acts, or is in the sense of past times an adequate cause. Sargon, on the other hand, has a mind which is passive, Socrates active; Sargon passive.

or driven by passion, and is an inadequate cause. The common-sense of this is that Socrates, having an adequate idea, that is, God's idea, concerning himself and his mission, acts purely from an inward impulse that is doubtless the resultant of an infinity and eternity of forces, but which is free from any compulsion outside the conscious Socrates; while Sargon suffers the passions of ambition and greed, and is driven into deeds of violence and blood by motives from without. Thus also, Socrates is in the old-fashioned sense an 'adequate cause' because his work can be clearly and distinctly understood from his own nature alone—that is, of course, his own nature as a limited mode of infinite Thought. But Sargon is an inadequate cause, because his work can be understood only through the interaction between his own passions and a complex of brute force and political cunning. Thus neither the idea nor the life of Sargon has any obvious symmetry as a proportional part of the Infinite, but is merely a ragged fragment, only to be harmonised with the Whole by a far-reaching conception of the relation of all parts thereto.

Because the one has an adequate idea of his place, and is an adequate cause of his work; while the reverse is the case with Sargon.

Abbreviation.

We may now hasten over a number of steps in Spinoza's advance toward his final aim, the true freedom of man. Because, though to the mind of the Master each proposition and proof was essential, they need not be in evidence for our special purpose. Thus Nature in maturing the embryo of a particular organism, does indeed recapitulate all the steps taken by *Natura Naturans* in the evolution of the organic world up to the grade assigned to the new individual life. But the process is abbreviated, so that many of the steps are barely indi-

cated, or even only implied. Yet the general trend is visible enough for ordinary physiological students. If I venture to treat somewhat similarly the elaborate argument of this Part III., it is because my aim is the practical realisation of individual religion on Spinoza's lines of thought.

Self-preservation,

Everything that exists endeavours to continue its existence. With reference to the mind this endeavour is called 'Will' (*voluntas*) and with reference to the body, 'appetite';[1] but in either case 'it is nothing other than the essence itself of the man, from the nature of which essence those things that favour its preservation necessarily follow, and thus the man is impelled to do those things.' Desire, or greed, is appetite come to full consciousness. From this instinct of self-preservation it results that the notion of annihilation either of body or mind is unnatural; and that whatever increases the active—as distinguished from the passive—capacities of the body, increases or diminishes also the mind's capacity for thought.

and results of the instinct.

Joy, Sorrow and Desire.

Here comes in the idea of Joy, which is a transition of the mind from a less to a greater perfection, whereas Grief is the transition of the mind to a lesser perfection. Joy, when it affects both mind and body, may be called pleasurable excitement or merriment (*titillatio vel hilaritas*). But when Grief (or misery) affects mind and body it is called melancholy (depression) or pain. More particularly pleasure or pain is predicated when one part of the man is affected more than the rest of him. We might instance the 'pleasures of the table' on the one

[1] Not to be limited to the desire for food, etc.

hand, or toothache on the other. What desire is has already been indicated. And from these three, Joy, Grief, and Desire, arise or are compounded all affections of the mind.

Prop. xii. General issues from the above premisses.

'So far as it can, the mind inclines to think of these things which increase and help the body's power of action.'[1] On the other hand, when the mind is haunted by the idea of those things which diminish or repress the body's power of action, it endeavours to bethink itself of something else adapted to shut out of view the existence of those unpleasant ideas. And here, according to the Master, we reach the significance of love and hatred. For love is nothing else than joy coincident with the idea of an external cause. And hatred is nothing other than grief—or, say, uneasiness and discomfort[2]—coincident with the idea of an external cause. We see, then, that he who loves will inevitably desire to have the object of his love present, and to preserve it; while, on the other hand, he who hates, must desire to remove and destroy the object of his hate.

Prop. xiii. Nature of love and hate.

Caution against premature conclusions.

And here I venture to interpose a caution against any hasty impulse to condemn such an idea of love and hate as materialistic, shallow, or mercenary. For we are dealing

[1] This is true even if the mind is altogether wrong in its selection, *e.g.* in dram-drinking. The body's power of action is certainly not helped thereby. But the first elation makes the drunkard think so. And then the power of association, as mentioned presently, comes in.

[2] Although Spinoza was always very exact in his use of language, the exactness sometimes consisted in harmony with his own definitions. And his notion of 'joy, grief, and desire' is certainly not precisely equivalent to our conversational sense of these words. Hence if we are to express his meaning it is necessary at times to supplement those words by others.

with thought only. Even when the body is mentioned, it is the body as an idea, and not as a molecular organism. Thus materialism is out of the question. And if we are repelled by the analysis of all the grandeur of human passion into its ultimate elements, it is as though we should be shocked by the fact that the splendours of the autumn woods are but a fantasia on three primary tints. Spinoza, who cheerfully and unostentatiously sacrificed for truth and right all that materialists and mercenary men hold dear, had no temptation to belittle the ideal aspects of human passion. But he knew by intuition that all his sublimest contemplations were as consistent with their simplest elements as the divine Whole is with its humblest parts.

Association of ideas.

In evolving the higher and more complex aspects of Joy, Grief, and Desire, association of ideas plays a large part, and also what are in common speech called 'accidental' causes. Thus, if the body has once realised sensations from two objects, and if the mind at a later time thinks of one of those objects, it will immediately remember the other. It follows that things may become by mere accident the causes of Joy, Grief, or Desire. That is, anything in itself quite neutral, may by association in impression and memory with an effective cause of Joy or Grief become itself a cause of either, because the thought of it calls up its linked idea.[1]

Prop. xiv.

Prop. xv.

[1] The curious antipathy of the late George Borrow to Dr. Martineau affords an apt if somewhat ludicrous illustration. For it is said to have been caused entirely by the accident that the boy Martineau, through no wish of his own, was compelled to hoist the boy Borrow on his shoulders for punishment in their schooldays. Martineau was an accidental and a neutral object in the recollection. But the association with the true cause of woe was fatal.

Vacillation.

We get a more complicated case of association, when an object which usually affects us with grief or annoyance is felt to be similar to another which usually affects us with joy. It seems inevitable that in such a case the object will be regarded both with dislike and with favour, either simultaneously or alternately. Our generation perhaps might find an illustration of this in the double effect produced in the minds of the first Catholic observers of the ritual of the Buddhists. For not only in the monastic institutions of that religion, but in many of its ceremonies there was much that reminded them of their home religion. While therefore they were accustomed to regard all idolatries with grief, they could not deny the similarity to what had from their childhood affected them with joy. There resulted a confusion of feeling according as they were inclined to consider Buddhistic institutions a degraded inheritance from early missions, or as a blasphemous parody produced by the powers of darkness.

Prop. xvii., Schol.

Hope, fear, memory, and experience.

The action of the simple elements—Joy, Grief, and Desire—is farther complicated by man's relations to the past and future. For we are so constituted that we can recall the past and anticipate the future so as to give either of them the influence of a present object. But such memory and anticipation are peculiarly liable to the uncertainty, alternation, or vacillation of effect shown above to belong to some actually present objects. Thus hope is defined as an unsteady joy arising from the thought of something past or future, while we are still in doubt as to the issue. Fear, on the contrary, is an unsteady grief, also arising from the thought of some

Prop. xviii.

uncertain event. Farther, by the removal of uncertainty, hope becomes confidence, or fear may become despair. The Master then proceeds to work out in detail the power of sympathy, the effect of which is inverse in cases of love and hate, the realisation of the pleasure of the loved object giving pleasure to the lover, while realisation of the grief or pain of the hated object pleases the hater. In passing I may remark that such statements are to be accepted like abstract propositions in Political Economy, as true in the absence of modifying influences, which, however, as a matter of fact, are always present. Most significant on this point is the theorem (xxvii.) which declares that if we see any creature similar to ourselves, but otherwise indifferent to us, to be affected in any way, we imagine ourselves to be similarly affected. The doctrine of the 'enthusiasm of humanity' and organisation for the prevention of cruelty to animals afford sufficient illustration. For even in the case of animals, it is just in proportion as we conceive their consciousness to be like our own that we are affected by their sufferings. I suppose no lover of 'sport' would impale a live mouse on a hook, as he impales a worm.

Power of sympathy awakened by likeness to ourselves.

From this follow a number of conclusions so obvious that the Master would scarcely have stated them in detail, had he not set his mind upon carrying out consistently the forms of mathematical demonstration. It is sufficient here to note that every step in the exposition goes to show how very complicated an interplay of feeling, both self-regarding and altruistic, must arise among social beings out of those simple elements, Joy, Grief, and Desire. Thus if any one to whom we are otherwise

Complications of social feeling.

Props. xix. to xxx.

indifferent does good to another being like ourselves, we shall begin to favour the benefactor. But if any one harms another like ourselves, we shall hate the wrongdoer. If we pity anything, the fact that its misery causes us pain will not alienate us. It is clear that we naturally desire to promote everything that causes joy, and to remove or destroy anything that lessens joy. This, of course, involves the enthusiasm of humanity, and the joy we cause is reflected upon ourselves. On the other hand, the evil that we do to others is necessarily also returned on our own heads.

Envy and Jealousy.

At the same time, we are taught that love in some of its forms is anything but altruistic. For if we love any being like ourselves, we want love in return, and the more we get of that love the prouder we shall be. But if we suspect that a third person is interfering with our monopoly, we shall hate the intruder. Our feeling may be that of Envy or Jealousy according to circumstances.

Props. xxxii. to xxxv.

Hate restrained by self-regard.

But if love is often mingled with self-regard, hatred also is restrained thereby. For 'if one hates another he will try to do that other a mischief, unless he fears that thereby he will incur a greater mischief to himself.' Hatred, while redoubled by hate, may be destroyed by love, and so may be transformed into love; a love all the more fervid because of the transformation. The reflex influence of lovable or hateful actions may extend to whole classes or races of men. For, 'if we have been affected with joy or grief by any one who belongs to a class or nation different from our own, and if our joy or grief is accompanied with the idea of this person as its cause, under the common name of his class or nation, we shall not love or hate merely him, but the whole

Props. xliii., xliv.

Love extended by association of ideas.

of the class or nation to which he belongs.'[1] In illustration of this we may note how much the affections of natural kinship between ourselves and the United States have been quickened by the beneficence of the late Mr. Peabody and the living Mr. Carnegie. And though less generally known, the work of the late Rev. Robert M'Call among the poor in Paris, a work so remarkable that on his decease he was honoured with what was practically a public funeral, while men in high office tendered their respectful regrets, was not without its influence in promoting the good feeling of the French people towards us.

Prop. xlvi. Modern instances.

On the other hand, even hatred may be half-neutralised by sympathy. For 'the joy caused to us by the thought that an object of our hate has been destroyed or afflicted with any evil, is not unaffected by mental grief.' Here again a notable illustration may be found in the mourning of the Japanese victors when a Russian admiral was drowned by the sinking of his battleship during the siege of Port Arthur. The order of abstinence from all luxuries for a day was no mere affectation, but evidence of a sorrow really felt.

Hate assuaged by sympathy.

Prop. xlvii.

'Love and Hatred toward any object, for example, toward Peter, are destroyed if the Joy and Grief which they respectively involve be associated with the idea of another cause; and they are respectively diminished in proportion as we imagine that Peter has not been their sole cause.'[1] Of this an example may be found in the revulsion of popular feeling toward the memory of Charles I. when the continuance of the Commonwealth under Richard Cromwell was found to be impracticable.

The simple action of affections may be complicated by interference of causes other than their objects.

Prop. xlviii.

[1] Translation of Hale White and Amelia Stirling.

For succeeding constitutional history showed that in their new mood the English people by no means condoned the illegal acts of the dead king. But they began to associate other causes with their memory of the suffering caused by attempted tyranny. They thought of evil advisers, or exceptional necessity, and just in proportion as they associated the former miseries of the country with such causes instead of Charles, their indignation changed to pity; though they were far other causes which changed that pity into worship.

Interference of freedom and necessity.

It seems at first sight strange to find Spinoza teaching us, as a result of the above, that toward an object conceived as free, our feelings of Love and Hatred are, under an equal incitement, greater than toward a creature of necessity. But his proof dissipates any possibility of mistake. For he shows, in consistency with his definitions, that a thing conceived by us as free is regarded by itself apart from others. Therefore, if it be a cause of joy to us, we trace our indebtedness no farther, and concentrate all our love on the isolated object. But if we think the object to be under necessity we know that it cannot be alone as the cause of our joy, since it is acting together with other compelling causes.[1] We do not

Prop. xlix.

[1] This point in Spinoza's doctrine need not occasion great difficulty to the religious mind. For according to Christianity there is no fundamental contradiction, at least to a religious mind, between a free and an unfree finite cause. An evangelist is a free cause, but at the same time wholly dependent on inspiration or grace. And those who are converted or 'saved' by his preaching thank certainly not him alone but God through him. This looks like a confusion of thought, though it is less so than it seems. But it is really consistent with Spinoza's doctrine of freedom, as I hope will be seen if we persevere as far as Part v. If we master that doctrine we shall be able to sympathise with all religions that tend upwards.

therefore concentrate our whole love upon it. 'Hence it follows that because men think themselves free they are affected with greater love or hatred toward each other than toward other things.'

Origin of superstitions. Props. l. to lii.

Anything may be accidentally, that is, by association, the cause either of Hope or Fear. Thus, if in bygone times a number of men, at however long intervals, had ill-luck after seeing a magpie in a particular direction, the intercommunication of their experience would be enough to establish an association, and the magpie would become thereby a cause of fear. On the other hand, if on various occasions the appearance of a soaring eagle on the right of the chieftain was followed by victory, the perhaps equally numerous cases of an opposite event would not be counted, and a favourable association was established. Thus omens came to be a cause of hope and fear. Optimism is shown by the Master's unqualified assertion that by our natural constitution we easily believe the things we hope for, and believe with difficulty what we fear. That is surely not a universal experience. Nor is it perhaps quite consistent with the tracing of 'superstitions' to such a cause. For most superstitions are dark and bear the taint of fear.

Exceptional objects make the deepest impression.

After showing that there is not necessarily any uniformity in the effect produced on divers men by the same object, and that even the same person may be variously affected by the same object at different times, the Master lays down a proposition which has an obvious bearing on the evolution of religious cults. 'An object which we have previously seen together

with others, or which we think to possess no characteristic beyond what is common to many, will not arrest our attention so long as an object which we think to be exceptional.' In a Scholium Spinoza shows in a few words how, from such an experience, astonishment or consternation may arise, according as the exceptional object excites wonder or fear. This we may illustrate by the awe felt by Arabs for the Kaaba, or black stone at Mecca. Again, if the exceptional object be a human character, action, or passion, the alternative mental affections are veneration and devotion in the case of good, and horror in the case of evil. St. Francis of Assisi or Richard III. naturally occur as opposite illustrations. It is obvious that various forms of religion, such as Fetishism at one extreme, and Babism at another, are quite conceivably traceable to the mental affections caused by strikingly exceptional objects or persons.

Fetishism.

Joy of the mind in its activities.

Amidst the bewildering interplay of variously disguised Joy, Grief, and Desire stimulated by idea, passion, and imagination, one strong impulse is always clear; and that is the joy of the mind in consciousness of its power of action, a joy all the greater in proportion as that power is more clearly realised. For illustration we have only to think of the exultation chanted by Lucretius over his labour, or the triumph in the possession of his supreme gift which throbs through every line of Milton's epic. These are extreme cases, it is true. But they show on a great scale what is felt in various diminishing degrees by every mind that acts out its powers. Here sympathy comes in and enables praise

Prop. liii.

to double the mind's Joy in its own activities by the sense of pleasure given to others.

This being so, the mind naturally tends to think of those things which involve its power of action. This is illustrated in myriads of street conversations, where each interlocutor, whether cabman, commercial traveller, journalist, or lawyer, always seeks occasion to celebrate his own shrewdness, spirit, pluck, or sharpness. For this is not necessarily mere conceit of self. It is prompted by the mind's pleasure in its own activities. On the other hand, if the mind is forced to realise its lack of power, it is grieved, as, for instance, when a student sets out on a career for which he is unfitted by nature, and finds by failure the bitterness of impotence. And as the joy of power is doubled by the pleasure given to others, so the grief of impotence is increased by blame which implies the pain of others.

A proper self-consciousness. Prop. liv.

The concluding four propositions of this Part III. finally establish the immense complexity of the mental affections compounded out of simple elements with the aid of sympathy and association. 'Of Joy, Grief, and Desire, and consequently of every affection which either, like vacillation of mind, is compounded of these, or like Love, Hatred, Hope, and Fear, is derived from them, there are just as many kinds as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected.' Amongst these mental affections some of the most obtrusive, such as 'voluptuousness, drunkenness, lust, avarice, and (selfish) ambition,' cause us all the perplexities associated with inadequate ideas.

Infinite complexity of the mental affections. Props. lvi.-lix.

But besides the joys and griefs that are passions—

The noblest are those of action.

i.e. the pleasant or painful experience of the mind driven by forces outside itself—there are also mental affections belonging to action rather than passion. And these, whether bright or sombre, are of a higher rank than passion. We may illustrate this doctrine by reference to the serenity of Socrates when he drank the hemlock, a serenity in which, however, grief for his bereaved disciples, and also for a misguided State, mingled in the perfect peace with which he followed the right. This was not an attitude of passion, but of action, because it had the spontaneity of freedom. Yet it was attended by joy and grief. And thus the mind, even in the exercise of the freeman's highest prerogatives of action, never escapes Joy, Grief, and Desire.

Conclusion of Part III.

In fact we see already, and I hope we shall see more clearly hereafter, that Spinoza's spiritual ideal was neither that of the Stoic, nor of the Mystic, nor of 'Nirvana.' Never did he countenance the unnatural and impossible attempt to extirpate appetites which are of the essence of man. But, as the solar system keeps its place, subordinating all its attractions and repulsions, its electric currents, its fierce heats, and its congealing cold, to its function as part of an infinite Whole, so the microcosm man, always palpitating with desire, is to keep such an inward harmony that while sure that he is, so to speak, only an atom of God, he is conscious only of the spontaneity of the free.

APPENDIX TO PART III

DEFINITIONS OF THE MENTAL AFFECTIONS [1]

Introductory Remarks

Difficulties as to the Definitions.

It is doubtful whether these Definitions should be included in any mere 'Handbook' to the Ethics. For they form in some respects the most difficult section of the whole, and can scarcely be appreciated until the doctrine of Freedom in Part v. has been mastered. One reason for the difficulty is given us by Spinoza himself in one of his 'Explanations,' Def. xx.

'I am aware,' he says, 'that these words in common use have another signification. But my purpose is to explain the nature of things rather than of words, and to indicate it by words of which the customary meaning is not altogether foreign to the sense in which I desire to use them. It is enough to give notice of this once for all.'

But the notice, though it may set us on our guard, by no means removes the difficulty. When, for instance, we find Love (Def. vi.) defined as 'Joy with the concomitant idea of an external cause' where the external cause may be anything from a plum-pudding up to an artistic or even religious ideal, we feel as if we had lost

[1] For reasons given in the Introductory Remarks I would advise most readers to pass over these definitions until they have read the exposition of Part v.

our bearings and were altogether out of touch with the Author. For though the word Love is of course often used in lower senses, as when a man talks of his love for apples or for bitter beer, yet in a work on philosophy we expect to find it associated with the highest and purest emotion of self-absorption in something greater or better than self. But it is obvious that Spinoza wished to include in his definition all possible, or at least all actual forms of the passion. That he does not endorse thereby any low or carnal idea of Love is sufficiently proved by his inspiring utterances on 'the intellectual Love of God.' And if it be asked how he can transfigure into such glory, mere 'joy with the concomitant idea of an external cause,' I can only hope that an answer may be found in the exposition of Part v. Here it is only needful further to observe that Spinoza traces all the bewildering varieties of human feeling to three fundamental elements —Desire, Joy, and Grief. It will be found that this ultimate analysis is no more inconsistent with the complex refinements of moral evolution than is the analysis of light into three primary colours with the glories of the painter's art.

Definitions

'*Desire* is the very essence of man in so far as that essence is conceived as determined toward any action by any one of his affections.

'*Explanation.*—We have said above (Pt. III., Prop. xi., Schol.) that Desire is appetite with the addition of self-consciousness, while appetite is the very essence of man in so far as the latter is determined to such acts as make for the

man's preservation. But at the same time I have noted in that Scholium that I really do not recognise any difference between human appetite and Desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or not, still appetite remains one and the same thing. And so lest I should appear guilty of tautology I have refrained from explaining Desire by appetite; but I have sought so to define the former that all efforts of human nature to which we give the names of appetite, will, desire, or impulse might be included. For I might have said that desire is the essence itself of the Man so far as the former is determined toward any action; but from this definition it would not follow[1] that the mind may be conscious of its Desire or appetite; therefore in order that I might include the cause of this consciousness it was necessary to add the words "in so far as that essence is conceived as determined toward any action by any one of (the man's) affections." For by an affection of the human essence we understand any disposition of that essence, whether it be innate, whether it be conceived through the attribute of Thought alone or of Extension alone, or whether it be related to both. Here, then, under the name of Desire, I understand every one of those emotions, impulses, appetites, and volitions which vary according to a man's changing mood, and not rarely are so mutually opposed that he is drawn hither and thither and knows not what he would be at.

'II. *Joy* is man's passage from a lesser to a greater perfection. Joy.

'III. *Grief* is man's passage from a greater to a lesser perfection. Grief.

'*Explanation.*—"Passage" I say. For Joy is not the perfection itself. If, for instance, a man were born having that degree of perfection to which (in the definition) he passes, he would possess it without any affection of joy; as will appear more plainly from the affection of Grief, the opposite to the former. For, that Grief consists in the

[1] 'The Mind does not know itself except in so far as it perceives ideas of bodily affections.'—Pt. II., Prop. xxiii.

passage to lesser perfection, and not in the lesser perfection itself, no one can deny, since, in so far as a man shares any perfection, he cannot be sad. Nor can we say that Grief consists in being without[1] a greater perfection; for "being without" is nothing. But the affection of Grief is a movement (*actus*), and can therefore be nothing other than the movement of passing to a lesser perfection, that is, a movement by which a man's power of action is diminished or restrained (Pt. III., Prop. xi., Schol.). As for the definitions of merriment, pleasurable excitement,[2] melancholy and pain, I pass them by because they are related rather to the body[3] than to the mind, and are only different varieties of Joy and Grief.

Astonishment.

'IV. *Astonishment* is the realisation (imagination, *Vorstellung*) of an object on which the Mind remains fixed because this particular realisation has no connection with others.

'*Explanation.*—We have shown (Pt. II., Prop. xviii., Schol.) that what causes the Mind to pass immediately from the contemplation of one thing to the thought of another is that the images of these things are linked one with another and are so arranged that one succeeds to another. Now this is inconceivable when the image of the thing is novel. In such a case the Mind will be fascinated by the contemplation of the (new) object until that Mind is determined by other causes to think of other things. Considered in itself, therefore, the realisation of a novel object is of the same nature as other realisations. And on this account I do not reckon Astonishment among the affections, nor do I see any reason

[1] 'Privation' in English suggests being deprived of, and is therefore not so purely negative since it implies a positive change. Spinoza's idea may be illustrated by the 'blind' fishes of certain American caves. Properly speaking, they are not 'blind' at all, for that would imply deprivation of sight, and therefore passage from a greater to a lesser perfection. They are simply without sight, as stones are.

[2] *E.g.* Tickling. Melancholy here means really 'dumps.'

[3] That is, their immediate occasion is more obviously corporeal. But we must never lose sight of the fundamental unity of mind and body.

why I should do so, since this distraction of the Mind does not arise from any positive cause which draws the Mind away from other things, but simply from the absence of any cause leading the Mind from the contemplation of one object to the thought of other things. I acknowledge therefore (as I have shown in Pt. III., Prop. xi., Schol.) only three radical or primary affections, viz. Joy, Grief, and Desire. And the only reason which has induced me to make any comment on Astonishment is that it has been customary to refer by other names to certain affections derived from the three radical ones, wherever those (secondary) affections refer to things causing astonishment. The same reason induces me to add a definition of Contempt.

'V. *Contempt* is the realisation (imagination) of an object which touches the Mind so little that the Mind itself is moved by the presence of the object to imagine those qualities which are not in it rather than those which are in it.[1] See Pt. III., Prop. lii., Schol. Contempt.

'The definitions of Veneration and Scorn I pass over here, because, so far as I know, none of the affections derive a name from these.[2]

'VI. *Love* is joy with the concomitant idea of an external cause. Love.

'*Explanation.*—This definition explains with sufficient clearness the essence of Love; while that of certain authors who define Love as the will of the Lover to unite himself to the loved object expresses not the essence of Love but a property of it. And because the essence of Love was not sufficiently discerned by such authors, neither could they

[1] We must be careful not to confuse mere contempt with the indignation excited by the forgeries of a Pigott. Contempt touches only at a tangent and glides away. *E.g.* the 'Baconian' theory of Shakespeare's works glides off, leaving only the thought of what is *not* in it and is inexplicable by it.

[2] Reference to Prop. lii., Schol., in Part III., shows the meaning to be that Spinoza regards these as, so to speak, affections of affections. Thus: 'Scorn arises from contempt of folly, as veneration arises from astonishment at wisdom.'

have any distinct perception of its property, and hence it has come to pass that their definition has been generally considered rather obscure. We must observe, however, that when I say that it is characteristic of a lover to unite himself in will (inclination) to the thing loved, I do not by "will" understand a consent or deliberate resolve or a free determination (for this we have shown by Prop. xlviii., Pt. II., to be fictitious); nor yet a desire of the lover to reunite himself with the thing loved when it is absent, nor a desire to continue in its presence when it is at hand; for Love can be conceived without either one or the other of these desires; but by "will" I understand the satisfaction (or acquiescence) which exists in the lover on account of the presence of the thing loved, by which presence the Joy of the lover is reinforced or at least fostered.

Hatred. 'VII. *Hatred* is Grief with the concomitant idea of an external cause.

'*Explanation.*—What should be noted here may easily be gathered from the Explanation of the preceding Definition. See also Scholium to Prop. xiii. of this Part.

Inclination. 'VIII. *Inclination*[1] is Joy with the concomitant idea of some object as being casually the cause of Joy. On this see Scholium to Prop. xv. of this Part.

Aversion. 'IX. *Aversion* is Grief with the accompanying idea of some object which is accidentally the cause of the Grief.

Devotion. 'X. *Devotion* is love towards an object at which we are astonished (or which overwhelms us with wonder).

'*Explanation.*—We have shown by Prop. lii. of this Part that astonishment is excited by the novelty of the object. If therefore it should happen that we often call up the image of that by which we are astonished, our astonishment will cease, and thus we see how the affection of Devotion easily subsides into simple Love.

[1] Or the sense of attraction or impulse towards. It is difficult to give in one English word Spinoza's idea of *propensio*. We have adopted 'propensity' from the Latin. But its connotations are hardly what is required here.

'XI. *Derision* (*irrisio*) is Joy arising from our recognition that something we despise is present in an object of our hatred. Derision.

'*Explanation.*—In as far as we despise the thing we hate, to that extent we deny existence to it (see Schol., Prop. lii., of this Part[1]), and so far we rejoice. But since it is implied that a man holds in hatred the object of his derision, it follows that this Joy is not steadfast.

'XII. *Hope* is uncertain Joy arising from something future or past, about the issue of which we are to any extent doubtful. Hope.

'XIII. *Fear* is uncertain Grief arising from the idea of something future or past about the issue of which we are to any extent doubtful. Fear.

'*Explanation.*—From these Definitions it follows that there can be no Hope without Fear, nor any Fear without Hope. For if any one wavers in Hope and has doubts about the issue of an event, this implies that he conceives of something excluding the realisation of his future object. Thus he is grieved; and consequently, while he wavers in Hope, he fears that things will turn out badly. On the other hand, he who is in Fear, that is, who doubts whether what he hates will not come to pass, also conceives of something which excludes the existence of that same object of his hate; and thus (by Prop. xx. of this Part) he rejoices, and has hope that (his fear) will not be realised.

'XIV. *Confidence* is Joy arising from the idea of a past or future event, concerning which all cause for doubt has been removed. Confidence.

'XV. *Despair* is Grief arising from the idea of a past or future event concerning which all cause for doubt has been removed. Despair.

'*Explanation.*—Thus Confidence arises out of Hope, and Despair out of Fear, when all cause for doubt of an event is

[1] 'The mind remains determined to think rather of those things which are not in it'—*i.e.* the object of contempt—'than of those which are in it, although from the presence of an object the mind is accustomed to think chiefly about what is in the object.'

removed. And this occurs either when a man imagines a thing past or future to be present and regards it as present, or because he conceives of other things which exclude the existence of those circumstances which enabled him to doubt. For although we can never be certain about the outcome of particular circumstances (by Coroll., Prop. xxxi., of Pt. II.), it may nevertheless happen that we have no doubt about it. For we have shown (Schol. to Prop. xlix., Pt. II.) that it is one thing not to doubt about a matter, and another thing to have certainty about it. And so it may happen that by the image of a thing past or future we may be touched with the same affection of Joy or Grief as by the image of the thing actually present. (Prop. xviii. of this Part, and Schol.)

Gladness. 'XVI. *Gladness* is Joy with the concomitant idea of something in the past that has turned out better than was hoped.

Bitterness. 'XVII. *Bitterness* is Grief with the concomitant idea of something in the past that has turned out worse than was hoped.

Commiseration. 'XVIII. *Commiseration* is Grief with the concomitant idea of an evil happening to another whom we picture as resembling ourselves. (Schol. to Prop. xxii., and Schol., Prop. xxvii., of this Part.)

'*Explanation.*—Between Commiseration and Pitifulness there does not seem to be any difference unless perhaps that Commiseration refers rather to a particular affection and Pitifulness to a habit.

Favour. 'XIX. *Favour* is Love to some one who has benefited another.

Indignation. 'XX. *Indignation* is Hatred toward some one who has injured another.

'*Explanation.*—I am aware that these words in common use have another signification. But my purpose is to explain the nature of things rather than of words, and to indicate it by words of which the customary meaning is not altogether foreign to the sense in which I desire to use them. It is enough to give notice of this once for all. But see the cause of these affections in Coroll. 1, Prop. xxvii., and Schol. to Prop. xxii. of this Part.

'XXI. *Over-estimation* consists in thinking too highly of another person on account of our Love for him. (The German *Schwärmerei* perhaps expresses Spinoza's idea.) Over-estimation.

'XXII. *Depreciation* consists in thinking too little of a person on account of our Hatred for him. Depreciation.

'*Explanation.*—Thus over-estimation (*Schwärmerei*) is an affection or property of Love, and Depreciation is an affection or property of Hatred; and therefore Over-estimation may be also defined as Love in so far as it causes a man to think too highly of the beloved object; and on the other hand, Depreciation may be defined as Hatred in so far as it causes a man to think more meanly than is just of the object of his Hate (see Schol. to Prop. xxvii. of this Part).

'XXIII. *Envy* is Hatred in so far as it causes a man to be grieved by the happiness of another, and to be gladdened by another's woe. Envy.

'*Explanation.*—With Envy is commonly contrasted Compassion (*Misericordia*), which accordingly, though somewhat against the usual understanding of the word, may be defined as follows.

'XXIV. *Good-nature*[1] is Love in so far as it causes a man to be gladdened by the good fortune of another and to be grieved by another's woe. Good-nature.

'*Explanation.*—With regard to other properties of Envy, see Schol. to Prop. xxiv. and Schol. to Prop. xxxii. of this Part. These then are the affections of Joy and Grief which are associated with the idea of an external object as cause, either by itself or accidentally. I now pass on to consider other The Author passes from Affections having an external to those having an internal cause.

[1] Spinoza's word is *misericordia*. But I cannot agree that 'compassion' fits its meaning here; for 'compassion' in English is not concerned with another's *good* fortune. It seems to me impossible to maintain substantial accuracy here if we insist on rendering *misericordia* by the same English word as in the Explanation of Def. xviii. In that explanation Spinoza had in mind the habit of pity connoted by the word. Here he has in mind the connotation of kind-heartedness which sympathises with both the good and evil fortune of others. I can find no English word which precisely suits both senses.

affections which have the idea of something within us as cause.

Self-satisfaction.

'XXV. *Self-satisfaction* is Joy arising from a man's contemplation (realisation) of himself and his personal power of action.

Humility.

'XXVI. *Humility* is Grief arising from a man's contemplation (realisation) of his personal impotence and helplessness.

'*Explanation.*—Self-satisfaction finds its opposite in Humility, so far as by the former we understand Joy arising from our contemplation of our power of action. But so far as we understand also by self-satisfaction, Joy with the concomitant idea of something done which we believe we have accomplished by a free[1] resolve of the Mind, then it finds its opposite in Repentance, which is defined by us as follows.

Repentance.

'XXVII. *Repentance* is Grief with the concomitant idea of something done which we believe we have accomplished by a free resolve of the Mind.

'*Explanation.*—Of these affections we have shown the causes in Schol. to Prop. li. and in Props. liii.-lv. of this Part. As to a free resolve of the Mind, see Schol. to Prop. xxxv., Part II. But here I must farther observe that there is no wonder if Grief follow all those actions which by custom are called *wicked*, and if Joy follow those which are called *right*. For that this depends mainly on education we readily understand from what has been said above.[2] For instance, parents, by reprobating the former class of actions and continually scolding their children on account of them, while they urge and praise the latter class of actions, have succeeded in connecting emotions of Grief with the former and of Joy with the latter. Indeed, this is confirmed by experience. For custom and religion are not the same to all (races). On the contrary, things sacred amongst some are profane amongst others; and

Effect of custom and education.

[1] *N.B.*—Spinoza uses the word 'free' here in the vulgar sense of uncaused, and not in the sense assigned to it in the doctrine of God, of adequate ideas and adequate causes.

[2] *I.e.* in the previous parts of the Ethics.

things honourable among some are base among others. It depends therefore on the education that each has received, whether he repents of a deed or glories in it.[1]

'XXVIII. *Pride* is thinking too much of ourselves on account of Self-love. Pride.

'*Explanation.*—Pride therefore differs from Over-estimation inasmuch as the latter refers to an external object, but Pride to the man himself who thinks too much of himself. Farther, as Over-estimation is an affection or property of Love, so Pride is an affection or property of Self-love; and it may therefore be defined as a man's Self-love or Self-satisfaction in so far as it causes him to think of himself more highly than he ought to think[2] (see Schol. to Prop. xxvi. of this Part). To this affection there is no contrary. For no one through hatred of himself thinks of himself less than he ought. Nay, no one thinks too little of himself because he conceives himself unable to do this or that. For whatever a man conceives he cannot do, the conception is of necessity (*i.e.* inevitable); and by that conception he is so affected that he is actually incapable of doing what he conceives he cannot do. For as long as he conceives that he is not able to do this or that, so long there is no determination to action, and of course so long it is impossible that he should do it. And yet, if we pay attention to things dependent on opinion alone, we may conceive it possible that a man may think of himself less than is just. For it may happen that some one, when he sadly considers his own helplessness, may imagine that he is despised by everybody, and this although no one has the slightest idea of despising him. Besides, a man may think too little of himself if he denies concerning his present self something that has relation to a future time about which he doubts. For instance, if he should deny that he can conceive

Pride has no proper contrary.

But indirectly by sub-ordination to the supposed opinion of others, an apparent opposite to Pride may be engendered.

[1] It is obvious that in such passages Spinoza is speaking of mankind without the light of Reason; just as St. Paul in Romans i. and ii. speaks of mankind without the Gospel.

[2] Spinoza does not quote St. Paul, but the parallelism is tempting. '*Plus justo sentiat*' is what Spinoza wrote.

of anything with definite clearness, or that he can either desire nor do anything but what is wicked or base. We may therefore say that a man thinks too little of himself when we observe that through excessive fear of shame he does not dare those things which others his equals dare. This affection, then, we may set over against Pride, and I will call it self-depreciation. For as Pride springs from Self-satisfaction, so from Humility springs Self-depreciation, which accordingly is defined as follows.

This is self-depreciation.

'XXIX. *Self-depreciation* is thinking too little of one's self through depression (*Tristitia*).

'*Explanation.* Still we are often in the habit of contrasting Humility with Pride as its opposite, but only when we fix our attention more on their effects than on their nature. For we are accustomed to call that man proud who boasts too much, who talks only of his own virtues and other people's vices, who desires to take precedence of every one, and who, in fine, marches along with such stateliness and pomp as are the prerogative of others placed far above him. On the other hand, we call that man humble who very often blushes, who confesses his failings and tells of the virtues of others, who gives way to every one, and who, in fine, walks with bent head and neglects to adorn himself. But, indeed, these affections, I mean Humility and Self-depreciation, are very uncommon. For human nature, considered in itself, resists them with all its force (see Props. xiii. and liv. of this Part); and so those who are supposed to be self-depreciatory and humble are very generally most ambitious and full of envy.

Glorying.

'XXX. *Glorying*[1] is Joy with the concomitant idea of some action of ours which we suppose others to praise.

Shame.

'XXXI. *Shame* is Grief with the concomitant idea of some action which we suppose others to reprobate.

[1] The word is justified by the Anglican Version of the Bible (1 Cor. v. 6, etc.), and seems nearer to Spinoza's meaning than 'self-exaltation,' which may be totally regardless of the praise of others.

'On these affections see Schol. to Prop. xxx. of this Part. But here should be noted the difference existing between *Shame* and *Modesty*. For Shame is Grief that follows a deed by which we feel disgraced. But Modesty is that Fear or Dread of Shame by which a man is restrained from doing anything disgraceful. To Modesty is usually opposed *Impudence*, which, properly speaking, is not an affection, as I will show in due course. But the names of affections, as I have already warned my readers, are matters rather of usage than of the nature of the affections.

'I have now discharged the task which I had set myself of explaining the affections of Joy and Grief. I go on now to those which I ascribe to Desire. Affections of Desire.

'XXXII. *Yearning*[1] is the desire or longing to enjoy something when the longing is quickened by the recollection of the object of Desire, but is at the same time hampered by the recollection of other things which exclude the existence of the desired object. Yearning.

'*Explanation.*—Whenever we call to mind any object, as we have often said, we are by the very fact disposed to regard that object with the same mental affection as if it were present. But so long as we are awake, this disposition or effort is very much hampered by the images of things which exclude the existence of the object that we recollect. Thus whenever we recollect an object which affects us with any kind of Joy, we of necessity try to contemplate it as present and (to realise) the same kind of Joy as before. But this effort is instantly hampered by the recollection of things which exclude the existence of that object. So that Yearning is in reality a Grief, the exact opposite of that Joy which arises from the absence of an object that we hate. (On which see Schol. to Prop. xlvii. of this Part.) But because the name Yearning seems related to Desire, I include this affection among those of Desire.

'XXXIII. *Emulation* is the desire which is begotten in us Emulation.

[1] *Desiderium.* Compare the Scottish word 'wearying for.' I cannot agree that the bare word 'regret' renders it.

for an object because we conceive that others have the same Desire.

'*Explanation.*—He who flees because he sees others flee, who fears because he sees others fear; or again, he who snatches his hand back and moves his body as though his hand had been burned, because he sees that some one else has burned his hand, may be said indeed to imitate the affection of another, but we do not call this emulation. Not that we know there is one cause for emulation and another for imitation, but because it is an established custom to call only that man emulous who imitates what we judge to be honourable, useful, or agreeable. But as to the causes of Emulation, see Prop. xxvii. of this Part and the Scholium. And as to the reason why Envy is so often connected with this affection, see Prop. xxxii. of this Part and the Scholium.

Gratitude. 'XXXIV. *Thankfulness* or *Gratitude* is Desire, or a devotion of Love by which we endeavour to benefit him, who, from a similar affection of Love, has done good to us. (Props. xxxix. and xli., Part III.)

Benevolence. 'XXXV. *Benevolence* is the Desire of doing good to any one whom we pity (see Schol. to Prop. xxvii. of this Part).

Anger. 'XXXVI. *Anger* is the Desire by which we are impelled through hatred to injure him whom we hate. (Prop. xxxix., Part III.)

Vengeance. 'XXXVII. *Vengeance* is the Desire by which, through mutual hatred, we are impelled to injure him who, through a similar affection, has injured us. See 2 Coroll., Prop. xl. of this Part, with the Scholium.

Cruelty. 'XXXVIII. *Cruelty* or *Ferocity* is the Desire by which any one is impelled to do harm to one whom we love or whom we pity.[1]

'*Explanation.*—To Cruelty is opposed Mercy, which is not

[1] The definition seems curious; but it is to a certain extent justified by the totally different views taken of inter-racial 'atrocities' by those who commit them and the friends of the sufferers—*e.g.* the Turks and the English sympathisers with Armenian Christians, or the whites in South Africa and the Aborigines Protection Society.

a passion, but a power of the Mind by which a man restrains anger and vengeance.

'XXXIX. *Timidity* is the Desire of avoiding the greater of two dreaded evils by (accepting) the less. (See Schol. to Prop. xxxix. of this Part.) Fear.

'XL. *Boldness* is the Desire inciting a man to do something dangerous which his fellows fear to risk. Boldness.

'XLI. *Cowardice* is ascribed to him whose Desire is checked by dread of a danger which his fellows dare to meet. Cowardice.

'*Explanation.*—Cowardice, therefore, is nothing other than the dread of some evil which most people do not usually fear; wherefore I do not include Cowardice among affections of Desire. Nevertheless I have wished to explain it here, because so long as we keep in view Desire, Cowardice is the exact opposite of Boldness.

'XLII. *Consternation* is affirmed of the man whose desire of avoiding evil is paralysed by astonishment (horror) at the evil he fears. Consternation.

'*Explanation.*—Consternation is therefore a kind of cowardiee. But since Consternation arises from a double Dread, it may be more aptly defined as that Dread which holds a man stupefied or wavering, so that he eannot remove an evil. I say "stupefied," in so far as we understand his desire of removing the evil to be restrained by his astonishment. I say "wavering," in so far as we conceive the same Desire to be hampered by the fear of another evil which equally tortures him; so that he does not know which of the two evils to avoid. (See Scho'., Prop. xxxix., and Schol., Prop. lii., Part III. Farther, as to Cowardiee and Boldness, see Schol., Prop. li., Part III.)

'XLIII. *Courtesy* or *Affability* is the Desire of doing those things whieh please men and omitting those which displease them. Courtesy or Affability.

'XLIV. *Ambition* is the exeessive desire of Glory. Ambition.

'*Explanation.*—Ambition is a Desire by which all the Affections are nourished and strengthened; and on that aecount this partieular Affeetion can hardly be overeome.

For so long as a man is influenced by any Desire at all, he is inevitably influenced by this. "Every noblest man," says Cicero, "is chiefly actuated by glory. Even Philosophers attach their names to the books they write concerning contempt of glory, etc."

Luxury. 'XLV. *Luxuriousness* is the excessive Desire or Love of voluptuous living.

Inebriety. 'XLVI. *Inebriety* is the excessive Desire and Love of drinking.

Avarice. 'XLVII. *Avarice* is the excessive Desire and Love of riches.

Lust. 'XLVIII. *Lust* is the like Love and Desire of sexual intercourse.

'*Explanation.*—Whether this desire of sexual intercourse be held within bounds or not, it is usually called Lust. Moreover, these five last-mentioned affections (as I have noted in the Schol. to Prop. lvi. of this Part) have no contrary affections. For Affability is a sort of Ambition (as to which see Schol. to Prop. xxix. of this Part). And I have already pointed out that Temperance, Sobriety, and Chastity suggest a power of the Mind, and not a passion. And although it may well be that an avaricious, or an ambitious, or a cowardly man may abstain from gluttony or drunkenness or debauchery, still Avarice, Ambition, and Timidity are not therefore the contraries of Luxury, Drunkenness, and Lust. For the avaricious man generally desires to guzzle as much meat and drink as he can at the expense of some one else. Again, the ambitious man, if only he hopes to keep it a secret, will restrain himself in nothing, and if he lives amongst drunkards and libertines will, precisely because he is ambitious, be the more given to the same vices. Lastly, the coward does that which he would rather not. For although to avoid death he may throw his wealth into the sea, yet he remains avaricious.[1] And if the lascivious man is grieved because he cannot act according to his manner, he

[1] The subject of the sentence is evidently a man who is both cowardly and avaricious.

does not on that account cease to be lascivious. Universally, therefore, these affections have regard not so much to the mere actions of eating, drinking, and so on, as to Appetite and Love itself. Nothing therefore can be opposed as a contrary to these affections except nobility of soul and strength of mind, as we shall see afterwards.

'The definitions of Jealousy and other vacillations of mind I pass over in silence, partly because they are compounded of the affections which we have already defined, partly because very many of them have no (specific) names. And this latter fact shows that, for the practical purposes of Life, it is sufficient to recognise only the genus to which they belong. Moreover, it follows from the Definitions of the affections which we have described, that they all spring from Desire, Joy, or Grief, or rather that there are no other affections beside these three, of which each one passes under various names, varying as their relations and external signs vary. If now we give attention to these elementary affections, and to what we have said above as to the nature of the Mind, we shall be able here to define the affections in so far as they relate to the Mind alone. Jealousy, etc.

General Definition of the Affections.

'An affection, called also *animi pathema*, is a confused idea by which the Mind affirms of the Body or of any part of it, a greater or less power of existence than before, and this increase of power being given, the Mind is determined to one particular thought rather than another.

'*Explanation.*—I say first that an Affection, or Passion of the Mind, is a *confused idea*. For we have shown (Prop. iii. of this Part) that the Mind is passive only so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas. I say in the next place *by which the Mind affirms of the Body or of any part of it a greater or less power of existence than before*. For all ideas that we have of bodies indicate the actual constitution of our own body

rather than the nature of an external body (Coroll. 2, Prop. xiv., Part II.). But this idea which constitutes the form of an Affection must indicate or express the condition of the Body or of some part of it; which condition the Body or any part of it possesses from the fact that its power of action or force of existence is increased or diminished, helped or limited. But observe, when I speak of a *greater or less force of existence than before*, I do not mean that the Mind compares the present with the past condition of the Body; but that the idea which constitutes the form of the Affection affirms of the Body something which necessarily implies more or less of reality than before. And since the Essence of the Mind consists in this (Props. xi. and xiii., Part II.), that it affirms the actual existence of its Body, and since we understand by Perfection, the very essence of a thing, it follows therefore that the Mind passes to a greater or less perfection when it happens to it to affirm of its Body or of some part of it what involves a greater or less reality than before. When therefore I have said above that the Mind's power of thought was increased or diminished, I intended nothing other than that the Mind has formed an idea of its Body or of some part of its Body, which idea expresses more or less of reality than the Mind had before affirmed of its Body. For the excellence of ideas and the actual power of thought are estimated by the excellence of the object. Finally, I have added "*which being given the Mind itself is determined to one particular thought rather than another*," that I might also express the nature of Desire in addition to that of Joy and Grief which the first part of the Definition explains.'

PART IV

THE BONDAGE OF MAN

THE Fourth and Fifth Parts of the *Ethica* contain the practical application of the principles laboriously detailed in the three previous Parts. And this practical application consists in an exposition of the alternative effects or consequences to man of the truths propounded. That is to say, those truths make either for the moral bondage of man or else for his moral freedom. And the question as to which of these two alternative results is to be realised in our own case will be decided by the attitude we adopt toward the truths already proved. Thus if we are content to have only inadequate ideas, and always to be inadequate causes, we must remain in bondage. But if, on the other hand, we achieve a serviceable stock of adequate ideas, and—at least in the chief affairs of life—those of conduct—can be ourselves adequate causes, then we attain the only freedom possible to active life whether in body or mind, the consciousness of spontaneity, of acting as we would, and not as we are compelled.

Scope of the Fourth and Fifth Parts.

A practical application of principles laid down.

'Human impotence in the discipline and control of the mental and bodily affections I call bondage (*servitutem*). For a man subordinated to his affections is not under his

Idea of moral bondage.

own dominion but under that of fortune. And under that power it often befalls that although he may see what is better for himself, he is compelled to follow what is worse. The reason for this, and what else of good or evil the affections possess, I purpose to show in this Part. But before I begin this, I think well to make a few prefatory remarks on perfection and imperfection and on good and evil.'

The idea of perfection purely anthropomorphic,

Those prefatory words I proceed as usual to paraphrase with here and there a free translation. The idea of Perfection, says the Master, that is, finishing, or completion, originates in the experience of a finite maker, for instance, of a house. Such an one, when he has got the roof on and has put the last touch to everything inside, says, 'There, that is finished—perfected.' And of any such mortal work, whether house, or carriage, or boat, of which we know by experience the intended final shape, the purpose of the maker, we can say whether it is finished, that is, perfect, or only part finished and imperfect. 'But if any man sees a product, the like of which he never saw before and does not know the intention of the maker, that man certainly cannot say whether the thing is perfect (finished) or not.' To put a case unknown in the Master's days; suppose we come upon a 'find' of pre-palæolithic, or 'eolithic' weapons. It is quite possible there may be many unfinished among them. Yet it would be difficult, if not impossible, in the present state of our knowledge to say confidently which they are. For whatever knowledge we may have, even of the oldest palæolithic weapons hitherto observed, it does not avail us much here. Because a very much rougher article served the purpose of the earlier race, and what to the eolithic

measured by the intention of maker,

and the latter being unknown, no judgment is possible.

Case of eolithic implements.

man was a perfect weapon or tool, his successors would regard as unfinished. Thus the modern collector whose ideas have been formed by relics of a more advanced stone age, may have often thrown away, as mere flakes or cases of abrasion by natural forces, the 'perfected' tools of the first stone users. In fact, as Spinoza says, we do not know the intention of the makers, and therefore cannot possibly tell whether that intention had been fulfilled, or, in other words, whether the product is perfect or not.

Abstract perfection; idea of types

But, of course, this simple notion of perfection, in the sense of being finished, often merges in a conception much more abstract. For a number of finished articles of the same kind inevitably suggest a pattern or type, by which all such things must be judged. If they tally with the type, they are perfect; but if they do not so tally, then, however sure the maker may be that they are finished, they are judged imperfect. And this habit of forming in the mind ideal types has been extended to many other things besides the works of man. Thus, as soon as men conceive to themselves a type of the best race-horse, or the best rose, such ideals are considered as finished, complete, perfect, and all particular race-horses or roses are judged by the degree in which they approximate to the conventional ideal. Then from objects of man's particular delight, such as horses and roses, this notion of an ideal by which all particular objects must be judged is easily extended to all Nature.

in human art;

in objects of special human interest;

in all Nature.

'When, therefore,' says Spinoza, 'men see anything in Nature which scarcely agrees with the ideal conception they cherish of that particular thing, they believe that

And so Nature is supposed to have failed of her purpose.

Nature herself has been at fault, and has left that thing imperfect.' But this is a misimpression arising from an inveterate prejudice. For men will have it that Nature had the particular end in view and failed, when, as it has already been shown, Nature has no end at all in view. That eternal and infinite Being which we call God or Nature, is because He is. And this sublime necessity[1] is equally predicable of Him when we conceive of Him as acting and causing and directing. If He is because He is, He acts because He is, and the action is as determinate as the Being. As Spinoza puts it: 'the reason, therefore, or cause why God or Nature acts and why He exists is one and the same.'

Absurdity of the idea where no purpose is possible.

The being of God is incommensurate with purpose.

Can it be said that God is, or exists for any purpose?[2] No; even the very late Hebrew editor who redacted the first vision of Moses on Sinai appears to have felt the absurdity of such a question when he interpreted the traditional name Jahweh as equivalent to 'I AM that I AM.' To assign an object or purpose to the Infinite who embodies in Himself all possible purposes would surely imply a defect in reverence. But if the Being has no purpose, what we call the divine action, which is only an aspect of Being revealed to human activity, can have no purpose either. This aspect of the divine nature also is because it is, and has no other reason. The idea of 'final causes' of action, involving motive

But if so, the divine action, which is an aspect of Being, can have no purpose.

[1] A *free necessity*, because external compulsion is out of the question.

[2] If it be said that God exists for the good of His creatures, it should be remembered that the creatures are all 'parts and proportions' of God. But when we speak of anything existing for a purpose, we always mean a purpose outside itself.

and purpose, is therefore inconsistent with infinite and eternal Being.

How then has the belief in final causes for divine action arisen? Clearly from the inveterate human habit of measuring everything by desire. Thus when we say that habitation is the final cause of this or that house, we mean that a man, having conceived the comforts of domestic life, had the desire of building a house in which those comforts might be secured. Now this order of thought pervades all human life, in which every action has its motive; and that motive is desire, of which the fulfilment constitutes a final cause at which the action aims. It was therefore inevitable that as men began to think about the powers actuating Nature, and to personify or defy them, they should assume, as a matter of course, that final causes held in the world of the gods a place precisely similar to that which they hold amongst men. And this false analogy was persistently maintained throughout the whole course of religious evolution from animism or fetishism through polytheism, henotheism, and even up to the most refined monotheism. At this last stage, however, the inconsistency between God's eternity and the attribution to Him of temporal or temporary purpose was felt very early in the growth of Christian theology, and becomes abundantly evident in the devotional paradoxes of St. Augustine. But in proportion as Monotheism merges in Pantheism, those devotional paradoxes grow increasingly unreal, until they are transfigured into the 'intellectual love of God' preached by Spinoza, the love which drops the notion of divine purpose, being content to know that things

Origin of belief in final causes from false analogy,

the falsehood of which is partly realised in the higher Monotheism

and abandoned by Pantheism.

are because they are, and could not have been otherwise, since if the Whole could be realised, they are eternally perfect.[1]

Nature's contrivances and providential purpose as a *modus cogitandi*.

This surrender of any belief in 'eternal purpose' need not, however, prevent our treating of Nature's 'contrivances,' and of the concatenation of events in human history as though superhuman purpose were really involved. For that is a convenient *modus cogitandi*, fruitful enough in suggestion. It is like the injection of colouring matter in microscopic anatomical preparations—not a real part of the object to be studied, yet serving to make the relation of parts more obvious to human faculty. Thus Darwinians have often spoken and do still speak of the 'purpose' for which an insect proboscis was gradually lengthened and shaped by 'natural selection,' or the blubber of the whale was exaggerated, or a nictitating membrane given to the eyes of various tribes, or the fur of the mole caused to grow erect. Yet all the while the essential assumption of the theory is that there was no 'purpose' at all. Nevertheless the licence of language has been found highly convenient; for the supposition of a special purpose in a variation is a short and emphatic way of stating its particular use. And since, in speaking of the Eternal All, we are necessarily limited by the finite modes of human speech, a similar licence must be allowed to the Pantheist, provided only that we are as well on our guard as Naturalists against the superstitions engendered by a mere necessity of finite thought.

Case of 'natural selection.'

[1] On Spinoza's use of this epithet, as distinct from the use he condemns, see farther on.

The conclusion is that the ascription of final cause or purpose to Infinite God must be classed among what Spinoza calls 'inadequate ideas'; that is, it is a case in which 'God has this or that idea, not merely so far as He forms the nature of the human mind, but in so far as He has at the same time with the human mind the idea also of another thing' while this also involves another thing, and so on *ad infinitum*. In other words, our impression is an illusion arising from the impossibility of seeing or conceiving the whole Universe at once. Hence it is obviously presumptuous to apply to the divine action a test derived from the harmony or otherwise of His works and ways with human desire. Yet if we cannot suppress the consciousness that some things in the Universe please us better than others, there is a truer standard of comparison than that of human desire. Not that it is entirely free from anthropomorphism; but, at any rate, it is not so liable to superstitious abuse. According to the Master, this is the degree of *reality* involved. For while all creatures have their being in God, some, at least to our human perceptions, have more being than others. For instance, a crystal is more interesting than an amorphous mass, and its more complicated structure impresses us with a feeling of greater intensity of being. In the same way a living cell is more complicated still, and has yet more of being. Thus we may ascend from degree to degree of complication till we reach human mind, human genius, a Plato, an Augustine, a Shakespeare. On the other hand, some objects and creatures are, to our feeling, characterised by limitation and negation rather than by positive

Spinoza's standard, reality.

Degrees of interest proportionate to intensity of being.

Imperfection is negation,

qualities: such as a child born blind and deaf, or an idiot, or an incompetent fool. For it is by negation that these come short of their types. Such we may call imperfect, if we like, and regard them as possessing less of reality than other creatures of their kind. But this is not because they lack anything properly belonging to them as finite modes of the divine attributes; nor has *Natura Naturans*, in forming them, committed any mistake. For this would imply that in their creation — to use accustomed phraseology — a higher purpose was possible and missed. But as already seen, this is inadmissible. For, as Spinoza writes, 'nought belongs to anything in Nature except that which follows necessarily from its efficient cause,[1] and whatever follows from the necessity of the nature of an efficient cause, is inevitable.'

but does not imply a mistake of Nature.

Weakness of the flesh.

In following the Master through such inexorable reasoning we are haunted by the shadow of evil as we have felt it in our own lives, and are at times tempted almost to think that he is mocking us with a hardy denial of black realities which sometimes threaten to make life unendurable. But Spinoza is much too profoundly in earnest to indulge in a mocking vein, and rarely has recourse even to gentle satire. He does not for a moment deny the personal miseries of our human bondage. Undoubtedly, for those who insist that God must exist for a purpose, and that purpose the happiness of ourselves, the Master's teaching is useless and hopeless.

[1] The particular 'efficient cause' is, of course, only a link in the infinite network of causation, which, *sub specie eternitatis*, is a standing and motionless system.

Still, for those of more open mind it is worth while to hear what he has to say on the problem of evil.

Spinoza on Good and Evil.

'As to Good and Evil they connote nothing actual in things themselves, nor are they anything but modes of thought or notions formed by comparison of things with each other. For one and the same thing may be at the same time good and evil, and also neutral. Thus music is good for brooding melancholy, bad for acute sorrow, and for the deaf neither good nor bad. Yet however this may be, we must stick to the terms'—good and evil—'for since we desire to form an ideal of human nature for contemplation, it will be useful to us to retain these words in the sense I have assigned to them. And so in what follows I shall understand by 'good' whatever we know clearly (certainly) to be a mean whereby we may approach more and more to that ideal of human nature which we set before us. By evil, on the other hand, I shall understand whatever we clearly know to hinder us from attaining that ideal. Farther we shall call men perfect or imperfect in so far as they approach to or fall short of that ideal.'

Spinoza's apparent indifference to disease or pain

It will be observed that the Master here says nothing about pain or disease. But it is implied that such things are evil only when they prevent the attainment of ideal manhood. For they may very well be good, if in any case they promote its attainment. Are we then to suppose that Spinoza was indifferent to, or rejoiced in the dread disease which carried him off in the flower of his age? No; but he believed himself to have only 'an inadequate idea' of it. That is, as more than once explained before in terms of the Master, the persecuted sick and ailing Spinoza was only part of a divine idea, while his true significance could not be attained without a comprehension of the rest of that divine idea; and this

explained by his theory of inadequate ideas.

would involve a comprehension of the Infinite which is unknowable. Now, whether we approve of this attitude of mind or not, it at least enables us to understand in what sense the Master declares that everything in the Universe is perfect. For he means that it could be no other without marring the harmony of the divine Whole.

Plea of individual desire irrelevant.

What bearing has this upon the often pathetic pleas of individual desire? Such pleas have, as we shall find, their proper place in disciplined efforts towards the attainment of ideal manhood. But as bearing upon the perfection or imperfection of the Universe, they have no relevancy; they are *nil*. For just as in Cyclopæan masonry the most eccentric and distorted stones, as well as the most symmetrical, fill a place and exert a pressure in compacting and balancing the whole, so everything in Nature and life that seems to us abnormal and even repulsive is essentially necessary in precisely that abnormal or repulsive form. And we may in faith presume that if our inadequate idea of such dark features of Nature could be made adequate in the sense of seeing them as God sees them—in all their relationships to the infinite Whole—we should not desire to alter them if we could.

Things most undesirable from a human point of view may be essential to the perfection of the Universe.

Suggestiveness of human experience.

Even in our ignorance we can occasionally see that if our idea of what we call an evil were supplemented by a perception of only finite wider relationships, we should cease to call it evil. For is not this human life of ours, with its endurance and its heroisms, noble in our eyes? But how, without suffering, could it have been what it is? Undoubtedly its moral glory has been kindled by

the stress of conflict through which it has passed. And the afflictions which in each generation were mourned as evil, have produced greater good.

This not Spinoza's method.

Yet though such reflections may seem to throw some little light on the mysteries of sorrow, it must be confessed that they fall far short of the Master's method, not only in scope, but in principle. For he, denying that the action any more than the being of the Eternal can have any purpose at all, finds everything perfect in the sense of sharing in the absolute Reality. Or, in other words, each part and proportion, when imaginatively considered in all its relations, is just what it ought to be, neither more nor less, as a constituent of the Eternal.

Why then seek to alter anything?

But if it be asked why then should we try to alter anything, seeing that all is as it should be? the answer is not so difficult as it seems. For this very tendency to change is part of the perfect order of Nature. And the inspiration, of which we are in various degrees conscious, to modify ourselves or other things in the direction of a human purpose or an ideal, is as essential to the completeness of the Universe as is gravitation or cohesion. The fundamental antithesis between the eternity of the Universe and our human perception of temporal successions of change within its parts belongs to the region of the unknowable, which was perhaps not sufficiently recognised by Spinoza. But granting this, we may freely assert that the necessity laid upon us of dealing with phenomenal changes in our pursuit of human purpose is not in the least inconsistent with Spinoza's theory, that, as eternal being and doing are determined by the divine

Eternity and time.

Nature, so the phenomenal existence and phenomenal action in time of every finite part is determined by the derivative nature it possesses in virtue of being a mode of some infinite attribute of God. There is nothing in all this to neutralise the only genuine freedom, which is action from within, as distinguished from action by compulsion from without. Nor ought the joy of moral power and of devotion to high ends to be in the least diminished by the certain truth that it belongs to an ordered Whole.

Instinct of self-preservation ineradicable but fallible.

Throughout this Part of Spinoza's Ethics, as in the preceding Parts, the instinct of self-preservation is assumed as fundamental. But while ineradicable, it may be misguided, and may even take that for self-preservation which is really self-destruction. If it be asked how this can happen in a Universe identical with God, the answer has already been given, for no purpose[1] of God is defeated; and our conception of the human tragedy is an 'inadequate idea.' If we could see it as God sees it, and all that He sees along with it, we should know that it forms part of the perfection of the Whole.

Definitions.

The definitions given at the beginning of this Part need not detain us, for they have already been anticipated in our paraphrase of the preface, We know what the Master means by 'good' and 'evil.' Things contingent are so in appearance only; and so with things possible. Yet their apparent contingency and possibility have much to do with our moral trials. The end or final cause for which we do anything is the fulfilment of desire. Virtue and Power are identical. 'That is, virtue so far

[1] See pages 134-136.

as it belongs to man is the essential being or nature of the man, so far as he possesses the power of achieving such things as may be understood solely through the laws of his own nature.' My own understanding of this I would illustrate thus. When Socrates refused to join in putting to the Assembly the illegal vote of vengeance on the victors of Arginusae for their alleged neglect, he acted according to the essence of his own nature, apart from external influences. His claim to inspiration at such crises does not in the least interfere with the fitness of the illustration. Because according to the doctrine of Spinoza the man Socrates was a finite modification of certain divine attributes. Such modified attributes constituted the essential being of the individual, and so long as the influences under which he acted fell within the limits of those modified attributes, what he did could be understood 'solely through the laws of his own nature.' Thus the virtue and the power of Socrates were one and the same.

Socrates and the illegal vote.

But now let us take a very different case, that of Judas Iscariot—the historicity of details being of no importance to our purpose. Now the essence of Judas was also a finite modification of infinite divine attributes. And on Spinoza's theory, if Judas had acted solely from influences falling within the limits of those finite modifications, he could not have gone wrong. But the possible rewards of iniquity excited the passion of greed which enslaved him. He acted no more as a free man moved by impulses spontaneously arising within, and explicable only by the laws of his own nature. He was no longer governed by reason, but became the slave of passion.

Judas Iscariot.

Thus virtue became impossible just in proportion as power was lost, and vice was victorious.[1]

Passivity and what it implies.

Such is the view of human nature assumed throughout the Fourth Part of the Ethics. We are passive, or we suffer—not necessarily pain, but servitude—so far as our part in Nature cannot be clearly conceived by itself or apart from other things—or, as we might put it, so long as we have no individuality. Undoubtedly this sounds strange, coming from a teacher who regarded God and the Universe as identical, and who insisted that the infinite is indivisible. But, as I have had occasion to observe elsewhere, even Spinoza could not always adapt the imperfections of language to his purpose. And, taking the whole context into view, I think it probable that what Spinoza has immediately in view here is not the primary idea of the man as a finite modification of certain divine attributes, but rather the secondary conception thence arising of an apparent centre of spontaneous action. A man who acts from reason feels his impulses rise within himself and is free. But a man who acts from passion — *i.e.* passive susceptibility to outward attractions or repulsions—is drawn hither and thither against his judgment, and is a slave. In the one case—according to Spinoza—the man's doings are explicable from the laws of his own nature alone as a finite and definite expression of God; in the other we have to account for much by delusive external images, temptations and snares. Or, as the Master otherwise puts it, the man under moral bondage is 'an inadequate cause.'

[1] It must not be supposed that I regard such details of Spinoza's system as infallible, but they are worth understanding.

But it is not suggested that man can cease to be a part of Nature, or withdraw himself wholly from external influence. All that can be done is to consider carefully our natural and social surroundings, and to strive, as far as in us lies, to keep the proper development of our individuality free from undue submission to forces from without. And this is no easy task. For 'the force and increase of any passion, together with its persistence, is not limited by the strength of our instinct of self-preservation, but by the proportion between this and the force of an external cause.'[1] And thus 'the strength of any passion or affection may overwhelm all the rest of a man's energies[2] or power; so that the affection may obstinately stick to the man.' (Prop. vi.)

Absolute indifference to external influences impossible.

A test of servitude.

Venturing again to illustrate the Master by our own observations of life, we may recall cases of dipsomania in which the victim is perfectly aware that he is drinking himself to death. He does not want to die, but 'the force and increase of the passion' for drink 'is not limited by' the poor creature's instinct of self-preservation, 'but only by the proportion between this and the force of the external cause,' which latter is in this case overwhelming.

Illustration: the victim of drink.

Is there then no help? Yes, there is. But such passions 'can neither be controlled nor removed except by an impression (*affectum*) contrary to and stronger than the passion to be controlled.' It is necessary therefore to discuss the considerations affecting the relative

A possible remedy.

[1] Prop. v., Pt. iv.; see also demonstration of Prop. vi., Pars. iv.

[2] *Actiones*—but the word here is equivalent to the whole being as active, which is fairly expressed by the sum of energy.

Conditions affecting the strength of affections.

powers of various feelings. Thus we learn that affections arising from causes realised as present are stronger than those dependent on remote contingencies. (Prop. ix.) Here again we may bring our experience of life to bear. For cases have been known in which an apparently hopeless drunkard, being suddenly confronted by some special circumstances, with the results of cruelty inflicted on wife and children by his indulgence,[1] has really felt the force of an impression contrary to and stronger than the passion that has debased him. Yet mere warnings of future effects of his conduct have been of no use. The same advantage of causes realised as present over those regarded as remote contingencies might also be illustrated by the greater social influence of the actual millionaire as compared with that of the brilliant but impecunious young man who has just proved himself a genius. And, generally speaking, we know how hard it has been for ourselves, and how difficult it has been to persuade others, to set the probable gain of ten years hence against the enthralling attractions of immediate pleasure or ease. Similarly, hard present facts, such as the need of bread, have more influence in stimulating exertion than the contingent or possible advantages promised to temporary self-denial for purposes of self-culture.

Present influences stronger than future or contingent.

Knowledge to have any power must become feeling.

Even true knowledge of good and evil—that is, of what makes for and against self-preservation in its highest sense, attainment of the ideal self—does not control passion unless that knowledge takes the form

[1] The records of the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children show many such cases.

of mental affection, or, as we should say, of a feeling,[1] a saying which is merely a remarkable instance of the common-sense always underlying Spinoza's philosophy. Now, according to previous lessons, knowledge of good or evil is itself nothing but a feeling or affection of joy or grief, that is, consciousness of passage to a greater or a lesser degree of perfection. Thus the man halting between right principle and temptation to evil is moved alternately by a sense of the higher good which righteousness would be, and by a passion for the evil indulgence which, to a part of his nature, is so attractive. But unfortunately true knowledge of good and evil can too easily be prevented by desires of a low or limited nature from conversion into an adequate impulse or feeling for good. And this is specially the case when the good is future and the inferior attraction present as well as pleasant.

The moral struggle as in Rom. vii.

At this point we come upon a very noteworthy feature of the Master's ethical teaching. 'Other things being equal,' he says, 'desire arising from joy is stronger than desire arising from grief.' (Prop. xviii., Pt. IV.) Now Spinoza's own life was too full of persecution, affliction, and—from a worldly point of view—disappointment and failure and loss to allow any suspicion here of Epicurean illusion. And though, when we consider the prevalence of suffering and tears and blood in many epochs of humanity's re-birth to a higher life, the utterance appears at first sight paradoxical, we cannot ignore it as we might

The fruitfulness of joy.

[1] This is my interpretation of Prop. xiv. Much dispute might be raised as to the technicalities. But Prop. viii. of this Part seems to justify the above as the substantial meaning.

the self-gratulatory chuckle of a prosperous gold-grubber. Let us try, by the aid of the demonstration appended to the proposition, to make out the meaning, and then let us illustrate it if we can from human experience. We must first, however, remind ourselves that, according to Spinoza, joy is the passage from a less perfect to a more perfect state, while grief is the passage from a more perfect to a less perfect state. Now, desire is of the very essence of man, being involved in the effort to persist in his essential being. So then desire arising from joy—*i.e.* the passage from a less perfect to a more perfect state—must needs be stronger than desire arising from sorrow—*i.e.* the passage from a more perfect to a less perfect state. For, as Spinoza puts it, the force of desire arising from joy has two co-operant causes, the external object of desire and the inward exuberance. But in the case of desire actuated by grief the external object is negative, being the shadow of a loss, or the passage from a greater to a less degree of perfection, and there remains only the human longing which cannot be weighed against the exuberance of impulse in the other case. But if this appears to be merely a formal or technical plea, we have only to turn to the most thrilling records of human experience to recognise how remarkably the Master's apparently most abstract statements do often suggest the very life and soul of man's moral glory.

An idea dependent on the previous definition of joy.

Perhaps the most conspicuous example is to be found in the outburst of resurrection joy during the rise of Christianity. Whatever may have been the nature of the alleged historical events, with regard to which our

'The joy of the Lord is your strength.'

attitude here is one of comparative indifference,[1] it is indisputable that during the first century A.D. a wave of moral impulse rolled triumphantly from Syria over Asia Minor, Greece, Macedonia, and Italy. This moral impulse tended toward human brotherhood, equality, purity, and a 'Kingdom of God,' identical with the Republic of Man. And the chief note of this sacred impulse was one of unutterable joy, which was embodied in prophetic music because it could not find expression in prosaic speech. 'Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation, or distress, or persecution, or famine or nakedness, or peril or sword? . . . Nay, in all these things we are more than conquerors through him that hath loved us. For I am persuaded that neither death nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present nor things to come, nor height nor depth, nor any other creature shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.' There is abundant allusion here to the self-sacrifice essentially incidental to the Christian profession. But there is no minor tone of lamentation or grief. On the contrary, there is a triumphant realisation of the passage from a lesser to a greater perfection; and the rapture of concentration upon the divine ideal, the joy set before the saint, is swollen by the tide of that progress from a narrower to a larger life. It would be needless to multiply extracts; for the above utterance recalls a score of others in the New

The resurrection joy of pristine Christianity.

Rom. viii. 36.

Confirmed by the New Testament generally and by the Apostolic Fathers.

[1] Those who regard this as an illogical position would do well to consult the history of the Babi movement in Persia. Of the moral revival there can be no question. If this was largely caused by imagination and personal magnetism in the nineteenth century, so may it have been in the first century.

Testament, and many words of the Apostolic Fathers, which amply justify the familiar assertion that, despite all the stress of spiritual conflict, the chief note of the earliest Christian literature is one of exuberant joy.

Reformers.

The much inferior and in many respects divergent movement of the Protestant Reformation might afford other illustrations. For there is no doubt that Luther, Zwingli, Calvin, Knox, and their followers felt or believed themselves to be passing from a less perfect to a more perfect state; or that it was the thrill of joy in their experience which gave them an unconquerable energy of desire. Or if we turn from Church History to

Patriots.

political and social movements, the same note of joy in the passage from a less perfect to a more perfect state is recognisable even in the grim energy of Cromwell's Ironsides, and still more in the apostles of popular liberty and freedom of trade. The Mazzinis, the Garibaldis, the Cobdens, and the Brights of history have not been whining, melancholy pessimists, but men rejoicing in the inspired conviction that they were raising not themselves only but their nation, or even mankind, from a lesser to a larger perfection. So that of them too it might be said—giving to the sacred name its largest interpretation—'the joy of the Lord is your strength.'

At this point the Master interposes a short anticipatory excursus on the rules of Reason, which I quote as closely as possible:—

Prop. xviii., Schol. Anticipatory excursus on the rules of Reason.

'Thus briefly I have expounded the causes of human impotence and inconstancy, and the reasons why men do not observe the dictates of reason. It now remains that I should show what it is that Reason prescribes to us; also which

affections are consistent with the rules of human reason, and which are opposed to those rules. But before I begin to prove this at full length by our geometrical method, I desire here to give a short preliminary exposition of the dictates of Reason in order that my convictions may be the more easily appreciated by every one.

'Since Reason demands nothing contrary to Nature, she herself therefore demands that every one should love himself, that he should seek what is useful to him—that is, what is really useful—and that he should desire everything which truly leads a man to greater perfection; and generally that every one should strive as far as he can to preserve his own essential being (*suum esse conservare*).[1] This indeed is as necessarily true as that the whole is greater than its part. Moreover, since virtue is nothing else than action according to the laws of our own nature,[2] and no one may strive to preserve his own essential being unless by the laws of his own proper nature, hence it follows (1) that the basis of virtue is the impulse itself to preserve one's own essential being, and that happiness consists in a man's ability to preserve his own being. (2) It follows that virtue is to be desired on its own account, and that nothing is conceivably better than virtue or more useful to us, with a view to which virtue should be desired. (3) Lastly, it follows that those who commit suicide are impotent in mind, and that they are utterly overcome by external causes at discord with their own nature. Moreover, it follows from Postulate 4, Part II.,[3]

Reason demands the development of the ideal self.

Service rendered us by the external world.

[1] The word 'essential' is, of course, an interpolation. But I think it is needed to give in English the true significance of Spinoza's Latin. Of course the ultimate substance of the man is God, and for the preservation of this there can be no anxiety. But the essence of the individual—*qua* individual—is a finite modification of certain Attributes of that Substance. And 'self-preservation' in the man is the guarding of his spontaneity within those limits against undue external influences which cause inadequate ideas and reduce the man to an 'inadequate cause.'

[2] Always understand the finite Mode of God constituting our nature.

[3] 'The human body needs for its preservation very many other bodies by which it is, as it were, continually remade.'

that we cannot possibly succeed in putting ourselves beyond the need of things external for the preservation of our being, nor can we so live as to have no intercourse with things outside us; and further, so far as concerns our Mind, certainly our intellect would be more imperfect, if the Mind existed alone and had no understanding of anything beyond itself.[1] There are therefore given many external things which are useful to us, and which on that account are to be desired. Out of these none can be conceived more excellent than those which entirely harmonise with our own nature. For if two individual things of entirely the same nature are joined together, they form an individual twice as powerful as either when separate. To man, therefore, there is nothing more useful than man; nothing, I say, can men desire more excellent for the preservation of their essential being, than that all should so harmonise in all respects that the Minds and Bodies of all should make up, as it were, one Mind and one Body; and that all with one impulse, to the extent of their power, should strive to preserve their essential being, and that all with one impulse should seek, as for themselves, the common good of all. From which considerations it follows that men who are ruled by Reason, that is, men who by the guidance of Reason seek their own good (*utile*), will crave nothing for themselves that they do not desire for all other men, and thus be just, loyal (*fidos*), and honourable.'

The most serviceable elements of the external world are those most in harmony with our nature.

Hence social life is supremely important.

'Such are those dictates of Reason which I had purposed here briefly to set forth before beginning to prove them by the longer method. And the object with which I have done it is to win, if possible, the attention of those who regard as the very essence of impiety, and certainly not the foundation of virtue and piety, my principle that every man is bound to

The law of self-development is not to be confounded with passions of selfishness.

[1] Contemporary psychology would regard this as an impossible supposition, since the mind's knowledge of itself is supposed to be brought about by contact with the not-self. But the main issue, our dependence on what is called an external world for fulness of life, is not affected. For my part I do not believe that the old sharp division between self and not-self is essential.

seek his own good. Now, therefore, having shortly pointed out that the exact contrary is the case, I hasten to go on with my demonstration in the same way by which we have hitherto advanced.'

Succeeding demonstrations negligible.

The purport of the above extract is to remove prejudice and to facilitate an understanding of the proofs that follow. But it really does more; at least for the modern reader. For if the latter's aim is a basis for ethical practice, and not a curious study of seventeenth-century dialectics, these general observations may save him anxiety about the proofs of many succeeding propositions, if he should find them apparently unconvincing or unnecessary. He believes the teaching, or he does not, and in either case the reason is really independent of the so-called 'geometrical method,' and depends upon the attraction or repulsion of his sympathy. It would therefore be a waste of time laboriously to pursue the series of demonstrations by which the above ethical lessons are sustained. And even the propositions need not be quoted except where they add to or modify or explain the concise statements of the above extract.

And propositions only occasionally to be quoted.

Ideal self-preservation.

For instance, in a Scholium to Prop. xx. we are reassured as to the sort of self-preservation identified with virtue. That it is not the gross love of life at any cost is made clear. For, notwithstanding the previous condemnation of suicide, the act of Seneca is approved on the ground that he sought 'to avoid a greater evil by a less.' From which it is clear that the self-preservation Spinoza has in view is persistence in the divine idea of the finite self. It is in this sense that the greatest energy of self-preservation is identified with the highest virtue.

Virtue and reason.

We also learn in the succeeding propositions what is meant by the words, 'Virtue is nothing else than action according to the laws of our own nature'—that is, without undue interference by external causes. Thus no man is regarded as being actuated entirely by virtue who is determined by inadequate ideas to do this or that; because the inadequate ideas imply undue interference of causes outside his own nature. Virtue, at least in its purity, is predicated only of the man who is impelled by what he clearly understands. Now, it is undeniable that this language sounds like a mere technicality of an arbitrary system. But there is sound sense at the back of it for all that. Let us illustrate by an instance which will also show within what limits we should take the assertion that a virtuous man is actuated 'by what he clearly understands.' King Henry VIII. was perhaps not wholly bad; but it cannot be said that his policy as a ruler was guided by adequate ideas, or that he clearly understood his own motives. Thus in securing, through Thomas Cromwell, the passage of a novel Treason Act, making traitors of all who doubted the legitimacy of his second marriage, he was certainly impelled by causes lying quite outside the divine idea of his kingship, as defined by the human expression of God[1] within the

Henry VIII. and Sir Thomas More.

[1] 'The human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God; and accordingly when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we say nothing other than that God, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He is expressed by the human mind, or so far as He constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea. And when we say that God has this or that idea, not only so far as He constitutes the nature of the human mind, but so far as He has together with the human mind the idea of some other thing, then we say that the human mind perceives the thing in part or inadequately.'

limits assigned by historical evolution to an English king of the time.

Distinction of the case of Sir Thomas More.

But now take the case of Sir Thomas More, the victim of that novel treason law. Of him it is impossible to say with truth that he saw far into the future, or at least understood the sort of Nemesis that the king and Thomas Cromwell were preparing. But this thing at any rate he understood; that wrong could not be right; and that to acknowledge the legitimacy of a marriage clean contrary to all the sanctions associated by his conscience with the marriage rite would be a treason against divine order, and infinitely more guilty than disobedience to any 'law of a carnal commandment.' It may therefore be said that Sir Thomas More acted from causes that he understood; while King Henry acted from 'inadequate ideas.'

Prop. xxvii.

The highest good.

From this we are led to see that good and evil things are to be judged by the one test: do they conduce to understanding, or do they hinder it? That is, do they help toward that serene clarity of spiritual vision possessed by Sir Thomas More in his supreme hour, or do they hinder it? But if this be so, then the highest good of the mind must be the knowledge of God, that is—as I take it—of our relation as parts to the Whole, which relation imposes upon us a duty of unreserved loyalty.[1]

(Prop. xi., Pt. II., Coroll.) Which I apply to Henry VIII. thus. His attempts to make Parliament merely the registering court of a despotic will were an essential element in the forces preparing the revolution of the following century. They were in that sense part of the divine order of the world. This answers to Spinoza's 'some other thing' which was in the mind of God, but not in the mind of Henry. The idea of the latter therefore was 'inadequate.'

[1] 'The highest good of the Mind is the knowledge of God; and the supreme virtue of the Mind is to know God.'—Prop. xxviii., Part IV.

Practical details.

Having reached this lofty point of view, we are made to descend to some practical details, and to consider what rules of life may help toward that highest good. Thus so far as anything harmonises with our nature—always understand our *divine* nature—it is good. Thus, for instance, the majesty or the sweet insinuations of natural scenery, the alluring mysteries of organic life, and the impressive march of human history, are all in harmony with our nature, and of necessity good, in the sense already given, that is, they conduce to our understanding of our place in the world. And generally everything is good so far as it harmonises[1] with our nature understood as above.

Props. xxix., xxx.

What man needs most is man.

It follows that, apart from the imperfections caused by obedience to passion rather than reason, our fellow-men are, in a higher degree than anything else in *Natura Naturata*, good for us and helpful to us. Because, of course, they have most points of harmony with our individual humanity. But the drawbacks to so cheerful a view are many. For men are very generally subject to passion, that is, to moral impotence; and as Spinoza will have it, mere agreement in negations cannot constitute harmony of nature. Or, to put it in more vulgar fashion, two boys who are equally indolent, selfish, and incapable of moral aspiration, are the worst possible companions for each other. Again, men buffeted by passions are constantly brought into conflict one with another, and instead of helping, devour one another. In fine, it is only so far as men are governed by reason that there can

Prop. xxxii., Schol.

Prop. xxxiv.

And man finds man when each is governed by reason.

[1] That is, as I understand, so far as it does not oppose, but promotes, the evolution of the individual ideal.

be a real harmony of nature between them and mutual help toward the ideal life. And though, when put in that way, this sounds too philosophical for 'human nature's daily food,' yet if for 'reason' we substitute loyalty to the best we know, with the desire to know more, together with a temper of sincerity and honour, this is very much what Spinoza means by 'reason.' Thus interpreted, the above doctrine is plain common-sense.

Practical meaning of the doctrine.

Men governed by reason in this sense will always desire to be useful to others and to share with them a form of wealth that is increased and not lessened by giving. Also this desire will always be the greater in proportion to the knowledge of God attained by such men, that is, their knowledge of their relation as parts to the infinite Whole. But here again it may be well to quote as nearly as possible the Master's own words:—

Root of the enthusiasm of humanity.

'Whosoever, actuated merely by feeling, strives that others should love what he loves, and that others should live in accordance with his notions, acts solely from impulse, and is on that account hateful, especially to those who prefer other things, and who on that very account also desire, and by the same impulse strive that others should on the contrary live according to *their* notions. Moreover, since the highest good which men desire by force of feeling is often of such a nature that only one person may possess it, hence it follows that they who love it are not inwardly consistent, and while they glory in reciting the praises of the thing they love, are alarmed lest they should be believed.[1] But he who strives to lead others by reason does not act from impulse but from

Prop. xxxvii., Schol. 1. Benevolence of impulse inferior to the benevolence of Reason.

[1] What is really meant seems to be 'lest they should be so far believed that others should be impelled to obtain possession of the object so praised.'

human sympathy and kindness, and inwardly[1] he is perfectly at one with himself. Moreover, I regard as *Religion* every desire and action of which we are ourselves the cause through having the idea or the knowledge of God.[2] But *Piety* I call that desire of well-doing which is begotten in us by the life according to Reason. The desire, again, by which every man living according to Reason is possessed to unite others to himself in friendship I call honour'—(social loyalty)—'and I call that honourable which men, living according to Reason, praise; and that, on the contrary, base which is inconsistent with the bonds of amity. . . . Again, the difference between real virtue and impotence is easily gathered from the above. For plainly real virtue is nothing else than life strictly according to reason. And thus impotence consists in this alone, that a man suffers himself to be led by things outside himself, and is determined by them to do, not what is required by his own proper nature regarded in itself alone, but (what is required) by the current order (*communis constitutio*) of outward things.'

Social loyalty.

'Natural' and civic humanity in relation to the moral law.

In a succeeding Scholium the Master draws a noteworthy distinction between the natural and the civic—or, if we like the word better—the social state of man. Thus he denies that man in his natural state is bound by any law to consider anything other than his own convenience and pleasure. But if we are startled by such

[1] *Mente*—as in the preceding sentence.

[2] Literally, 'whatever we desire and do of which we are the cause so far as we have the idea of God, or so far as we have the knowledge of God, I refer to Religion.' I submit, however, that if the writer had been English, and written in his own tongue, the above is what he would have said. But, as premised in the first sentences of this paraphrase, Spinoza is made needlessly obscure by our forgetfulness of his Pantheism. Thus, in the present case, he does not in the least suggest that the Jewish Jahweh, or personal God, must be thought of at every moment in order to make our lives religious, but rather that everything is so, which we desire and do consistently with the sense of our being infinitesimal parts of one perfect Whole.

a doctrine, let us ask ourselves whether lions and tigers and wolves are bound, so far as their conscious impulses are concerned, by any other law than that of appetite? Surely no one will pretend it for a moment. And if we try to make a moral difference between such creatures and 'natural' man, the effort is only an indication that we are still influenced by obsolete traditions of man's miraculous origin. But on the theory of evolution the Master is obviously right. There was a time when, so far as conscious impulse[1] was concerned, men were 'a law unto themselves' just as much as lions and tigers are.

Prop. xxxvii., Schol. 2.

Now such a stage of human evolution had obviously less perfection, that is, less fulness of being, than any stage attained by man when awakened to a sense of God, that is, a consciousness of being part of a Whole, which consciousness, being finite, is necessarily subject to regulations co-ordinating it with other parts. 'In order that men may live harmoniously and be helpful to each other,' says the Master, 'it is necessary that they should yield their natural right and mutually give security that they will do nothing which would injure their neighbour.'[2]

The God-consciousness and moral law.

[1] This limitation is intended to prevent possible misunderstanding. Because, of course, if by 'law' we mean regular and inevitable succession, 'natural man' in all his impulses and in every other respect was as much subject to law as trees and stones and streams.

[2] I do not read this as implying any anticipation of the eighteenth-century myth of the *contrat social*. The passage only describes the practical effect of natural man's evolution into the social state. Nor do I see the slightest ground for the inference sometimes drawn that Spinoza regarded the moral law as only 'positive,' or artificial, and dependent on human authority. Not only the general tenour of his writings, but his life, contradicts this. Nor does the passage following, in which he does discuss positive law, justify such a view of his

To attain this, they must have recourse to the principle already laid down that no affection or impulse can be controlled except by an affection or impulse both stronger than and contrary to the affection to be controlled; and that in general every one will abstain from hurting another if the injury will entail a greater hurt to himself.

Society's right to self-preservation

Prop. xxxvii., Schol. 2.

'By this law, then, Society can be bound together if only it can assert for itself the right which every individual has, of defending himself, and make itself the judge of good and evil. Provided also that Society must have the power of ordaining the community's order of living, and the power of legislation, and of sanctioning its laws not merely by reason, which cannot compel affections (or impulses), but by threats.

involves enforcement of regulations,

Now this Society, held together by laws and by the power of self-preservation, is called a State (*Civitas*), and those who are defended by its jurisdiction are called Citizens. From all this we readily gather that in a condition of nature there is nothing declared to be good or evil by the consent of all.

of which the infraction is crime.

Because every one, in a condition of nature, considers only his own convenience, and according to his own fancy, having regard solely to the standard of his own convenience, determines what is good or what is evil; nor is he bound by any law to obey any one but himself alone. Hence, in a condition of nature, crime (*peccatum*) cannot be conceived; but

teaching; for he is there discussing the political definition of mutual rights, and what is good for the State as a whole, not good in the sense of that which helps each man to realise his ideal self. It is to this aspect of higher manhood as *res actu existens* that eternal morality appertains—eternal in the sense that whenever and wherever the same conditions occur, the same rule holds good. Spinoza's view seems to have been that, when the sense of being parts of a whole began to dawn, the need of living by reason began to be felt. And Reason means the realisation—which may take many forms from animism to pantheism—that man is a 'partaker of the divine nature,' and subject to the eternal necessities of God's life. See Part v.

only in the civic state in which, while good and evil are determined by the general voice, every one is held bound to obey the State. Crime, therefore, is nothing other than disobedience, which accordingly is punished by State right only; and, on the other hand, obedience is counted as merit in a citizen because, on account of this very thing, he is reckoned worthy to enjoy the advantages of the State. Farther, in a condition of nature, no one by the general voice is possessor of any single thing, nor does anything occur in nature which can be said to belong to this man and not to that; but all things belong to all. It follows that, in a condition of nature, there can be no disposition (*voluntas*) to render to each his own, nor yet to take away from any man what is his. In a word, no action can be called *just* or *unjust* in a condition of nature, but only in the civic State where the general voice determines what belongs to this man or to that. From all which it results that justice and injustice, crime and desert, are notions from without,[1] and not attributes which manifest the nature of the mind.'

Property not an institution of nature.

Passing over two propositions about the conservation of a balance of motion and rest in the body, propositions essential to the intellectual completeness of the system but not to the practical lessons I am trying to emphasise, I may summarise a number of succeeding propositions as follows:—

All things are useful which make for social peace: whatever has the contrary effect is evil. Aphorisms. xl.

Joy, in its direct operation, is not evil but good: Grief, on the other hand, in its direct operation, is evil. xli.

[1] *Notiones extrinsecas—i.e.* generated by outward relations. The practical meaning is that 'morals' are evolved only out of special relations between special Modes of the divine Attributes—*e.g.* men. But perhaps the 'condition of nature,' as above, was prehuman rather than human.

xlii. Cheerfulness cannot be in excess; but it is always good. On the other hand, Melancholy is always evil.

xliii. Pleasurable excitement may run to excess and be evil. Pain may be good to the same extent as pleasurable excitement or joy may be evil.

xliv. Love and sensual passion are subject to excess.

The Scholium here is worth quoting.

Scholium. 'The affections (or passions) by which we are daily buffeted have reference generally to some single part of the body which part is more affected than any of the rest. And accordingly the affections have an extreme excess and so hold the mind fixed upon one sole object that it is unable to think of others. And although men are exposed to many affections (or passions), and accordingly very few are found who are always buffeted by one and the same affection, yet there are not wanting those to whom the same one affection obstinately adheres. For we sometimes see men so much affected by one object that even if it is not present they fancy that they have it at hand. If such a thing befalls a man who is not asleep, we say that he is delirious or mad. And not less are they thought mad who burn with Love, and who day and night dream of a mistress, or a paramour; for they usually excite laughter. But when the miser thinks of nothing else than gain or treasures, and the ambitious man of glory, and so on, these men are not believed to be mad; they are rather offensive and considered deserving of hatred. But in very deed Avarice, Ambition, Lust, and such like are a sort of madness, although they are not reckoned as disease.'

The madness of violent passions.

Evil of Hatred. Hatred can never be good—that is, hatred towards men. He who lives by the guidance of reason endeavours

xlv. as much as possible to counteract by love or generosity hatred, anger, and contempt toward himself.

xlvii. Affections of Hope and Fear cannot in themselves be

good, but only so far as they serve to restrain the excesses of Joy. 'So far as we strive to live by the guidance of Reason, to that extent we shall depend less on Hope, and free ourselves from Fear, while at the same time we endeavour as far as possible to be lords of fortune (*fortunæ imperare*) and to direct our own actions by the certain counsel of Reason.' Hope and Fear superseded by Reason.

The affections of Self-conceit and of Contempt are always evil. xlviii.

Pity[1] is out of place in a man whose life is guided by Reason, and in itself is evil and useless. l.

The demonstration goes far to explain the paradox, and runs thus :— Paradox on Pity.

'Pity is sorrow and therefore in itself evil. But the good which follows from pity, namely, that we endeavour to free from his misery the man whom we pity, is what we desire through the dictate of Reason alone to effect. Nor can we achieve anything that we know clearly to be good unless we do it by the dictate of Reason alone. Therefore Pity in a man who lives by the guidance of Reason, is evil in itself and useless.'

That is, help to the suffering should be prompted by reason and not by passion.[2] The Scholium is worth giving at length :—

'He who fully knows that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and are carried on according Schol.

[1] *Commiseratio.* As said before, the attempt to render Spinoza's Latin word for any Affection always by the same English word would cause confusion on account of differences of connotation in different passages.

[2] Morbid sentiment may condemn such teaching. But if it were followed for ten years in our land, idle vagrancy and social malingering would be abolished.

to the eternal laws and rules of Nature, will surely find nothing that is worthy of Hatred, Laughter, or Contempt. Nor will he pity any one; but so far as human virtue avails he will endeavour, as the saying is, to do good and rejoice.[1] To this we may add that he who is easily touched by the sentiment of pity and is moved by the misery or tears of another, often does something for which he is afterwards sorry. This is partly because we do not know clearly that anything done from sentiment is good, and partly because we do know clearly that we are easily deceived by fraudulent tears. Of course, in the above remarks, I have in view the man who lives by the guidance of reason. For he who is not moved either by Reason or by Pity to help others, such a creature is rightly called inhuman; for he seems to be alien to manhood.'

Gratitude. li. 'Favour' (in the sense of special love to a man who has done good to another) 'is not contrary to reason, but is in harmony with it, and may arise from it.'

Schol. Indignation illegitimate. 'Indignation' (in the sense of hatred to a man who has done harm to another) 'is essentially evil. But mark that when the sovereign power, in virtue of the desire by which it is actuated to defend the peace, punishes a citizen who has done harm to another, I do not say that the sovereign power shows indignation; because it is not by hatred impelled to the destruction of the citizen, but it punishes him at the instigation of piety.'

Humility. lii. Humility is not a virtue; that is, it does not spring from Reason.

Penitence. liv. Penitence is not a virtue; that is, it does not spring from Reason.

These paradoxical utterances are necessitated by Spinoza's fundamental principle that a man's essence is

[1] 'Trust in the Lord, and do good.'—Ps. xxxvii. 3.

his power, not his impotence. Therefore anything which concentrates a man's attention on his impotence is bad; that is, it hinders the ideal self. There is more in this than would at first sight appear. But it is admittedly dangerous and is guarded by the following Scholium.

'Since men seldom live under the direction of Reason, these two affections, namely, Humility and Penitence, and, in addition to these, Hope and Fear, do more good than harm; and accordingly, since error is inevitable, it is better to err in that direction. For if men impotent in mind (*i.e.* morally impotent) should all be as presumptuous [1] as they are weak, they would scruple at nothing. And if they had nothing to fear, by what bounds could they be held together and kept in order? The mob terrifies when it does not fear. And so there is no wonder that the Prophets who had regard to the advantage of all, and not of a few, should give such high praise to Humility, Penitence, and Reverence. And indeed those who are susceptible to these affections can be led much more easily than others towards a life under the guidance of Reason, that is, toward freedom, and the enjoyment of the life of the blessed.' Scholium on Humility, Penitence, Hope, and Fear.

Either excessive pride or excessive self-depreciation indicates both utter ignorance of one's self and extreme impotence of mind. Pride. lv. and lvi.

Hence it follows that the proud and the despondent are specially susceptible to affections (or passions).

The proud man loves the company of parasites or flatterers, but that of the noble-minded he hates. lvii.

Here follows a Scholium:—

'It would be too long a task to reckon all the evils of Pride; since the Proud are susceptible to all passions and to none less than those of Love and Pity. But here it must by no means be forgotten that any man is called proud who Schol. Pride susceptible to all passions.

[1] So I take *æque omnes superbirent.*

thinks less of others than they deserve, and therefore with this understanding Pride is to be defined as Joy arising from a man's false notion that he is superior to the rest of men. And Self-depreciation (pusillanimity) in contrariety to this Pride would be grief arising from a man's false notion that he is inferior to the rest of mankind. But this being granted, we readily conceive that the proud man is necessarily envious, and that he regards with the utmost hatred those who are most praised on account of their virtues. Nor can his hatred of them be easily overcome by Love or kindliness. And he takes pleasure only in the company of those who humour his impotence of mind, and from a fool turn him into a madman.

The essence is joy arising from a false idea of superiority.

The opposite of pusillanimity.

Pride akin to madness.

'Now although Self-depreciation (pusillanimity) is contrary to Pride, yet the Despondent (pusillanimous) is next neighbour to the proud. For since his Grief arises from measuring his own impotence by the power or virtue of other men, that Grief will therefore be lightened, or he will rejoice, if his fancy should be engaged in the contemplation of other people's vices. Hence the proverb, "*The consolation of the miserable is to have partners in affliction.*" And on the other hand he will be all the more sad in proportion as he believes himself debased below the rest of men. Whence it follows that none are so prone to envy as the despondent (pusillanimous); and also that such people for the most part watch the actions of mankind more with a view to fault-finding than to reformation; so that at length they praise self-depreciation for its own sake and glory in it, but so that they may still seem to be despondent. Such consequences follow from this mental affection as inevitably as it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles; and I have already said that I call these and similar mental affections bad (only) so far as I confine my attention to the service of man alone. But Nature's laws are concerned with the general order of Nature of which Man is a part—a remark I make in passing, lest any one should suppose that I have desired here to recount the wicked and preposterous deeds of men, whereas I have

Pride and pusillanimity as extremes meet.

The inconvenience caused to mankind by such passions does not imply disorder in Nature.

sought only to set forth the nature and properties of things (as they are). For as I have said in the Preface to the Third Part, I look on the mental affections of man and their properties just as I look on the rest of natural phenomena. And indeed if the mental affections of man do not manifest human power, at least they set forth that of Nature and also her art, not less than many other things at which we wonder, and by the contemplation of which we are delighted. But I hasten on to note concerning the affections whatever is productive of profit or loss to man.'

Glorying (*i.e.* joy in the thought of some action of ours which we suppose others to praise) is not repugnant to Reason and may even spring from Reason. Glory. lviii.

Here it seemed necessary to the Master to exclude 'vainglory.' And this he does in a Scholium which explains that the latter depends upon the shifting opinion of the mob. The implication is that true glory can be sustained only by the praise of those who are steadfastly guided by Reason. And vainglory. lviii., Schol.

'As to Shame, all that is needed may be gathered from what we have said about Pity and Penitence. This only I add; that just like Compassion, Shame, though it be not a virtue, is yet good in so far as it shows that the man affected by Shame has in him a desire for an honourable life, even as pain, so far as it shows that the injured part is not mortified, is also good. Thus, even though a man ashamed of some deed is of course subject to Grief, yet he has more of perfection than the shameless one who has no desire for an honourable life. Shame.

'This is all that I designed to say about the mental affections of Joy and Grief. As to Desires, they are good or evil according as they spring from good or evil affections. But in truth, all desires, so far as they are begotten in us by affections which are passions, are blind, nor would they be

in any way needed if men could easily be led to live under the sole direction of Reason. And this I will now briefly show.'

Reason can supply the place of pure passion.

Prop. lix.

We were taught at an earlier portion of this section of the Ethics that knowledge, if it is to have practical power, must put on the nature of feeling, which of course is a form of passion in its technical sense. We now have the converse lesson that reason may be as effectual as feeling. But this does not contradict the previous passage; for more knowledge of this or that is not to be confounded with Reason.

Actions are in themselves indifferent.

'To all actions to which we are determined by a mental affection, which is a passion, we may also be determined by Reason without passion.' The idea is that bodily actions are all in themselves indifferent, that is, neither good nor evil. And they only become good or evil according as they make for or against the development of the ideal self. Thus talking, eating, drinking, and, to take Spinoza's illustration, the act of striking, are colourless except in their relation to the ideal self. If they serve that, they are good; if not, they are bad. Now to act according to Reason is simply to do those things which follow from the inward necessity of our own nature considered in itself—that is, apart from the powers of the external world which deflect it from its true course. And such of us as consider ourselves—in spirit, though not always in the letter—to be Spinoza's disciples make bold to say that if any man could emulate the serene devotion of the Master who, from the time of his enlightenment, sought only to realise the divine thought identifiable with the man Spinoza, he would find

Moral quality depends on spiritual relations,

that is, on Reason.

Reason as thus conceived to be to him 'wisdom and righteousness, and sanctification and redemption.'

'Desire springing from Joy or Grief such as affects only one or several, but not all parts of the body, has no proper bearing[1] on the good of the whole man.' Vices of one-sided desire. lx.

We must remember that in Spinoza's system the body is the man in extension, and the mind the man in thought. They are therefore the same thing in two different aspects. For practical illustrations of the above proposition we may refer to drunkenness, sensual vices, and gambling, which gratify a part but do not serve the whole of the man.

'Desire springing from Reason is incapable of excess' —that is, it is always an impulse toward the realisation of our best self. lxi. Desires of Reason are incapable of excess.

So far as the Mind conceives anything under the direction of Reason, it is equally affected thereby whether the idea be of a future thing or a past or present. lxii. Reason is unaffected by time.

We may remember that on the natural man things immediate have much more influence than things remote, notwithstanding that the power of the latter over him is in the order of Nature equally certain. We may also remind ourselves of the fine utterance of Kepler when under the direction of reason he published his laws of planetary motion.

'The lot is cast. I have written my book. It will be read; whether in the present age or by posterity matters little. It can wait for its readers. Has not God waited six thousand years for one to contemplate his works?'[2] Instance of Kepler.

[1] *Rationem utilitatis totius hominis non habet.* But the practical sense is as above.

[2] Sc. the true laws of planetary motion. The reference, of course, is to the old chronology, which dated creation about six thousand years back.

lxiii. He who is led by fear and does what is good in order to avoid trouble (*malum*) is not led by reason.

Penalties cannot inspire righteousness.

The suggestion is that fear of penalty cannot sustain noble conduct as reason can. For by the desire springing from reason we pursue good directly, and only as an incidental consequence escape evil. The difference between the positive pursuit of good and the negative avoidance of evil is not inaptly illustrated by the example of a sick and a healthy man. 'The sick man through fear of death eats what he dislikes; the healthy man takes a pleasure in his food, and so enjoys life more than if he feared death and made it his chief aim[1] to avoid it.'

lxiv. Adequate knowledge excludes evil.

The knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge; hence it follows that if the human mind has none but adequate ideas, it would form no notion of evil.

In other words, if our consciousness could expand so as to fill the infinite Universe—of course an absurd supposition—there would be no shadow of evil in it.

lxv. Under the guidance of Reason we shall take the greater good and the lesser evil wherever a choice lies between the two.

It must be remembered that good and evil here mean respectively what favours and what hinders the development of the ideal self.

lxvi. Under the direction of Reason we shall prefer a greater future good to a present smaller good, and a present smaller evil to a future greater evil.

This, of course, has been a familiar doctrine of preachers

[1] *Eamque directe vitare cuperet.*

in all ages. But the distinctive note of Spinoza is that under the guidance of Reason he recognises only real good and real evil verifiable by experience. With this agrees the following:—

The free man thinks of nothing less than of death; and his wisdom is meditation not of death but of life. lxvii. The free man not concerned with death.

These words need no comment.

Proposition lxviii. may be treated parenthetically. For it puts an hypothesis which in a succeeding Scholium is shown to be impossible. That is, 'supposing men to be born free, they would form no conception of good or evil so long as they remained free.' For that man is free who is led by reason alone. But such a man can have no other than adequate ideas, and therefore has no conception of evil. (Prop. lxiv.) The implication is that he sees things as God sees them. An impossible hypothesis.

But Spinoza takes the opportunity of illustrating the meaning of the above impossible hypothesis by the myth of Adam's innocence and fall. Perhaps the great Jew gives us here a reminiscence of his studies in the Hagada or exposition for purposes of edification rather than exact interpretation. At any rate, he suggests that in the story of Adam's creation, 'no other power of God is conceived excepting that by which he created man.' It was to keep the latter within the range of adequate ideas that he was debarred from 'the tree of knowledge of good and evil.' And by an edifying modification of the ancient text Spinoza tells us, God warned Adam 'that as soon as he ate of it he would immediately dread death rather than desire to live.' With an obscure allusion, possibly Spinoza as Hagadist.

to sensual degradation, we are told that when Adam 'came to believe that the brutes were like himself he immediately began to imitate their affections' (passions). Thus he fell under inadequate ideas and lost his freedom. This freedom, however, was regained by the Patriarchs, who were 'led by the Spirit of Christ, that is to say, by the idea of God, which alone can make a man free, and cause him to desire for other men the good he desires for himself.' Sir F. Pollock seems to doubt whether Spinoza was serious here. I do not know why we should hesitate. Early habits of thought had a charm for him as for lesser men. And after all he only uses the myth as a sort of paradigm to explain what the condition of man would be on the impossible hypothesis of Prop. lxviii.

lxix. The virtue of a free man is seen to be equally great whether in avoiding or in overcoming dangers.

Abraham Lincoln and Slavery. This may be illustrated by the attitude of Abraham Lincoln towards slavery; an attitude subject at the time of the war and after to undeserved criticism. He had no constitutional power to make the existence of slavery the gage of battle at the outset. And his virtue or his valour was seen in declining the danger which such an unconstitutional course would have involved. The Union alone could be legally alleged as the prize to be maintained at all costs. But when the conflict had reached the stage at which slavery was recognised *on both sides* as absolutely incompatible with a restoration of the Union, then Lincoln's virtue, or valour, was equally shown in facing the danger of the emancipation proclamation as justified by the emergencies of war.

A free man living among the ignorant[1] seeks as much as possible to avoid their favours. lxx. Avoidance of favours from the worthless.

This is because the servant of Reason and the devotee of superstition estimate so differently things good and bad that there is between them hardly any current coin.

Only free men are entirely congenial (*gratissimi*) toward each other. lxxi.

The free man never acts with malignant deceit but always loyally. lxxii.

A man directed by Reason has more freedom in a commonwealth (*civitate*), where he lives according to an agreed constitution of things (*ex communi decreto*) than in solitude, where he obeys only himself. lxxiii. Freedom greater in social life than in solitude.

This looks paradoxical, but the explanation is that the man actuated by Reason alone knows no fear, nor does he suffer compulsion, but from the free action of his essential nature seeks the good of his kind. For such free action there is more scope in a commonwealth than in solitude.

The concluding Scholium is as follows:—

'These and such-like principles of the true freedom[2] of man as hitherto expounded are related to Fortitude, that is, to Force of Mind and Generosity. Nor do I think it worth while here to exhibit separately all the properties of Fortitude; still less (to prove) that a brave man should hold no one in hatred, should feel anger toward no one, should not envy nor cherish indignation, nor feel contempt for any, and least of all should give way to Pride. For these lessons and everything concerning true life and Religion are readily

[1] There is a doubt whether this is the word Spinoza wrote. A version taken direct from his autograph has *ignavus*—vile, or worthless—instead of *ignarus*.

[2] The avowed subject of Part IV. is human bondage. But by contrast the principles of liberty have necessarily been suggested.

enforced by earlier propositions of this Part,[1] as for instance that hatred is to be conquered by love, and that every one guided by Reason desires for the rest of men the good he desires for himself. To which must be added what in many places we have remarked, that a brave man puts in the forefront of all his considerations the fact that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature; and that accordingly whatever he thinks to be hurtful or evil, and also what seems impious, terrible, unjust, and vile, occurs to him in that form because he conceives the facts themselves in a disorderly, fragmentary, and confused manner. On this account he tries first of all to conceive things as they really are, and to free himself from hindrances to true knowledge, such as are Hatred, Anger, Envy, Derision, Pride and the like, which we have pointed out above, and so he endeavours, as much as lieth in him, to do good—as we have said—and to rejoice. To what lengths, however, human virtue may proceed in such attainments, and what is its power, I will show in the succeeding Part.'

APPENDIX

To this Fourth Part Spinoza adds an important appendix. He seems to have been aware that his so-called 'mathematical' method of proof must cause special difficulties to students of his system. And he apprehended, not without reason, that these difficulties would be specially felt in regard to his method of discussing human bondage. He therefore added a kind of *précis* of the whole Part compressed into thirty-two paragraphs or chapters. Whether these are really much easier to understand than the propositions themselves, with such illustrations as above given, is a question on which opinions may differ.

[1] Sc., Props. xxxvi., xxxvii., xlv., xlvi., etc.

But I think it well to give the appendix without note or comment, only premising that the translation is intended as usual to exhibit the meaning clearly to English readers, and therefore does not adhere verbatim to the Latin where such a method would make the English obscure.

The Master's reasons for the Appendix.

My observations in this Part concerning the right principle of living have not been so arranged as to be (readily) seen as one whole, but have been proved here and there according as I could more easily deduce one from another. I propose therefore here to recapitulate them, and to arrange them under the most important heads.

I.

Theory of Desire.

'All our efforts or Desires follow from the necessity (inevitable tendency) of our own nature in such a manner that they may be understood either through that nature itself alone as their immediate cause, or else from our being a part of Nature which part cannot be adequately conceived apart from other individuals.

II.

Active and passive desire.

'The desires which so spring from our own nature that they can be understood through that nature alone, are such as belong to the Mind in so far as the latter is conceived to consist of adequate ideas; but other desires do not belong to the Mind except so far as it conceives things inadequately; and their force and growth is not to be determined by human power, but by the power of external things. Therefore the former desires are rightly called active (or actions), but the latter passions (*i.e.* passive). For the former indicate our power, and the latter, on the other hand, our impotence and fragmentary knowledge.

III.

Good and bad desire.

'Our activities (*actiones*), that is, those Desires which are determined by man's power or Reason, are always good. But the rest may be as often bad as good.

IV.

The chief end of Man.

'Thus in life our prime advantage is as far as possible to make perfect the intellect or Reason; and in this one thing the highest happiness or blessedness of man consists. That is to say, blessedness is nothing other than that very peace of mind which springs from the intuitive knowledge of God. Now to make perfect the intellect is nothing other than to understand God, and the attributes and actions of God which follow by necessity from His very nature. Wherefore the chief end of the man who is led by Reason, that is, his supreme Desire, by which he seeks to regulate all other desires, is to get an adequate conception of himself and of all those things which may fall within the scope of his intellect (*intelligentiam*).

V.

Good and bad.

'There is therefore no reasonable (*rationalis*) life without intelligence, and things are good only in as far as they help the man to enjoy that mental life which is measured by intelligence. On the other hand, those things only do we call bad which hinder a man from perfecting Reason and enjoying a reasonable life.

VI.

Evil from outside a man.

'But since everything of which a man is an efficient cause is good of necessity, therefore nothing evil can happen to a man unless from outward causes; that is to say, inasmuch as he is a part of all Nature whose laws human nature must obey, and to which it must conform itself in an almost infinite number of ways.

VII.

The natural man dependent on circumstances.

'Now it is impossible that man should not be a part of Nature or not follow her usual order. But if he should have a position among such individual objects as accord with his own nature, by that very fact will his power for action be aided and sustained. If, on the other hand, he lives among such objects as scarcely accord at all with his own nature, he will hardly be able without a great change in himself to accommodate himself to them.

VIII.

Prerogative of self-preservation.

'Whatever in Nature is met with that we judge to be evil, or able to hamper our existence and enjoyment of a life according to Reason, this it is allowable for us to get rid of by such method as appears safest. And whatever, on the contrary, is met with which we judge to be good or useful for the preservation of our (essential) being and for the enjoyment of a life according to Reason, this it is allowable for us to take for our benefit and to use it in any way. And by the supreme right of Nature absolutely everything is allowable to each man which he judges to conduce to his welfare.[1]

IX.

Place of society in the life of Reason.

'Nothing can be more accordant with the Nature of an (individual) thing than other individuals of the same kind. And therefore (see VII. above) a man can have nothing more suitable for the preservation of his (essential) being and his enjoyment of a life according to Reason than (another) man who is led by Reason. Farther, since among individual objects we know nothing more excellent than a man led by Reason, therefore in no way whatever can any one more clearly manifest his resources in skill and talent than by so

[1] Any one who has followed the Ethics so far can scarcely need a reminder that no one acting according to Reason can judge anything to be good for himself if it injures another.

moulding[1] men that they come at last to live under the direct authority of Reason.

X.

No enemy more fatal than man to the higher life.

'In proportion as men are mutually actuated toward each other by Envy or by some other passion of Hate, in that proportion are they contrary to each other,[2] and consequently the more to be feared inasmuch as they have more power than any other natural things.

XI.

Such enmity yields to Love.

'Minds, however, are conquered, not by arms, but by Love and Generosity.

XII.

Union is strength.

'To men it is above all things profitable to form communities and to unite themselves by such bonds as are best fitted to make of them all one man, and generally to do whatever serves for the strengthening of friendships.

XIII.

Ineffectiveness of denunciation.

'But for such purposes art and watchful care are needed. For men are changeable—few indeed being those who live by the direction of Reason—and at the same time they are predominantly envious, and more inclined to vengeance than to pity. To bear with each, therefore, according to his disposition, and to refrain from imitating his passions, requires a rare strength of mind. But, on the other hand, those whose only skill is to criticise men, and to revile their vices rather than to teach virtue, and rather to break their spirit than to fortify their minds, are injurious both to themselves and others. On which account many of them,

[1] *Hominibus ita educandis.*

[2] This is not the truism that it looks. The underlying thought is always the development of man's highest good, the life according to Reason. It is with respect to this that men mutually envious and angry are 'contrary to each other.' Whenever the above becomes a truism there will be no more war.

through excessive impatience and a false zeal for Religion, have chosen rather to live among beasts than among men; just as boys and youths who cannot bear calmly the rebukes of their parents, betake them to the army and choose the discomforts of war and despotic command rather than home comforts with paternal reprimands; suffering any kind of oppression, if only they may spite their parents. How false zeal for religion has made hermits.

XIV.

'Although, therefore, men generally bend everything to their low desires, many more advantages than disadvantages arise from their social union. Wherefore it is better to endure with an equal mind the injuries inflicted by them, and to apply our minds to those things which make for concord and the confirmation of friendship. Moral claims of society.

XV.

'The things that beget concord are such as belong to justice, fairness, and honour. For besides what is unjust and unfair, men are revolted by what is accounted base, or by the contempt of any one for the established customs of the State. In order to win Love, our prime requirement is Religion and Piety, with all that they imply. On this point see, in this Part, Prop. xxxvii., Schol. 1 and 2; Prop. xlvi., Schol.; Prop. lxxiii. Moral bonds of society.

XVI.

'Concord, moreover, is often the result of fear; but then it is without good faith. It is to be observed, too, that fear arises from impotence of mind and therefore is of no service to Reason; nor is pity, though it assume an aspect of piety. Neither fear nor sentiment a sufficient bond of concord.

XVII.

'Men are also conquered by bountifulness, especially those who have not the means of providing the necessaries of life. On the other hand, to help every one who is in need, far surpasses the resources and faculty of a private person. For Care of the poor the business of the State.

the wealth of a private person is utterly insufficient to meet the demand. Besides, the capability of any one man is too limited to enable him to unite all the needy with him in friendship. So that the care of the poor is the business of the community, and concerns only the general welfare.

XVIII.

Gratitude has its moral considerations.

'In receiving favours and returning thanks, quite different considerations are necessary; on which see Part IV., Prop. lxx.; and Prop. lxxi., Schol.

XIX.

Illegitimate love.

'The love of a harlot, that is, the lust of sexual intercourse, which is stirred by bodily form, and absolutely all love which recognises any cause other than the freedom of the mind, easily passes over into hatred; unless indeed, which is worse, it is a sort of madness, and even then it begets discord rather than concord.

XX.

Marriage.

'As to marriage, it is clearly in accordance with Reason if the desire of corporal union is occasioned not merely by bodily form but by the Love of begetting and wisely educating children; and also on condition that the love of both the man and the woman has for its cause not merely bodily form but also and especially freedom of mind.

XXI.

Flattery.

'Flattery also produces concord; but only by the base vice of self-enslavement or by treachery. There are none, therefore, who are so easily taken by flattery as the proud who wish to be greatest and are not so.

XXII.

Self-depreciation akin to Pride.

'In self-depreciation there is a false colour of Piety and Religion. And although Self-depreciation is opposite to

Pride, yet the self-depreciating man is next neighbour to the proud.[1]

XXIII.

'Shame also helps concord, but only in such things as cannot be concealed. Moreover, since Shame itself is a kind of Grief, it is not adapted to the service of Reason. Shame.

XXIV.

'The rest of the affections of Grief in their bearing on men are directly opposed to justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion; and although Indignation seems to have a colour of equity, yet in a state of things where it is permitted to every one to judge the deeds of another, and to vindicate his own or another's right, life is practically without law. Grief cannot help us. Indignation borders on lawlessness.

XXV.

'Affability, that is, the craving to propitiate men, if it is determined by Reason, is related to Piety (cf. Pt. IX., Prop. xxxvii., Schol. 1). But if it should arise from passion (*ex affectu*) it is Ambition, or a craving, by which men under a false pretext of Piety very often stir up quarrels and seditions. For he who desires to assist the rest of men either by advice or by his substance, in order that they may together enjoy the supreme good, will study above all things to win their love; but not to draw them into admiration (of him) so that a system may be named after him; and he will avoid giving any occasion whatever for envy. In ordinary talk, too, he will avoid mention of the vices of men, and will take care to speak only sparingly of human impotence. But he will talk at large of human virtue or power and of the means by which it may be perfected; so that men, being moved not by fear nor by revulsion of feeling, but by the Affability, right and wrong.

[1] The common phrase, 'the pride of humility,' shows that the same thing has been observed by the unphilosophic many.

affection of Joy alone, nay, as much as in them is, try to live by the Rule of Reason.

XXVI.

Our attitude toward Man and Nature.

'Excepting men, we do not know any individual object in Nature in whose mind we can take pleasure or that we can unite to ourselves in friendship or in any kind of society;[1] and therefore regard to our own profit does not demand that we should preserve anything which exists in Nature except men; but such regard teaches us to preserve it or destroy it according as either course may be useful, or to adapt it to our own use in any way whatever.

XXVII.

Food, Body, and Mind.

'The profit which we derive from objects external to us, over and above the experience and knowledge we obtain because we observe them and change them from their original form into others, is chiefly the preservation of the Body. And for this reason those objects are the most profitable to us which can feed and nourish the Body, so that all its parts may be able properly to perform their functions. For the more capable the Body is of being affected in many ways, and affecting external bodies in many ways, the more capable of thinking is the Mind. (Pt. IV., Props. xxxviii. and xxxix.) But of this particular character there seem to be very few things in Nature. Wherefore it is necessary for the requisite nourishment of the Body to use many foods of diverse sorts. That is, the human Body is made up of very many parts of diversified nature, which need constant and varied food in order that the whole Body may be equally adapted for all those things which naturally result from its constitution, and that the Mind also may by consequence be fitted for conceiving many things.

[1] Presumably Spinoza never kept a dog. But the more liberal estimate formed in modern times of the intelligence and sympathy of higher animals does not directly contradict the above doctrine as to our right to use Nature. It only modifies it by bringing some non-human things within the outer circle of human sympathies.

XXVIII.

'In procuring all this the capacity of any one man would be insufficient if men did not mutually assist one another. But money has furnished a concentrated equivalent of all possessions. Hence it comes to pass that the idea of money has such a hold on the Minds of common men; because they can scarcely conceive any sort of Joy without the concomitant idea of money as its cause.

Money answereth all things.

XXIX.

'This, however, is a vice only in those who seek money not because of poverty nor because of urgent needs, but because they have learned the arts of gain, by means of which they make a grand appearance. As for the Body, they nourish it according to custom, but sparely, because they believe they entirely lose just as much of their possessions as they spend on the preservation of the Body. But those who know the true use of money and regulate the measure of their wealth according to their needs alone live contented with little.

Misers and thrift.

XXX.

'Since therefore those things are good which help the parts of the body to perform their functions, and since Joy consists in this, that the power of man, in as far as he is both Mind and Body, is aided, or increased, therefore all things which bring Joy are good. Yet since things do not work for the purpose of giving us Joy, nor is their power of action regulated by the consideration of what is profitable for us, and lastly, since Joy very often affects predominantly one part of the Body, it follows that the affections of Joy and by consequence the desires also suggested by it, run to excess, unless Reason and watchfulness are at hand. And we must add that we are most chiefly affected by what is sweet to us at the present moment, nor are we able to prize the future with equal emotion. (Pt. IV., Prop. xliv., Schol.; Prop. lx., Schol.)

Joy, its blessings and dangers.

XXXI.

Errors of Superstition concerning Joy and Grief.

'Yet Superstition appears on the contrary to make whatever brings sadness to be good and whatever brings Joy to be evil. But, as we have said (Pt. IV., Prop. xlv., Schol.), no being, unless affected by envy, is pleased by my impotence or misfortune. For the greater the Joy with which we are affected, the greater is the perfection to which we attain, and by consequence the more are we partakers of the divine nature. Nor can any Joy ever be evil when a sound consideration of our own profit controls it. But, on the other hand, he who is led by Fear and who shuns good as an evil thing is not guided by Reason.

XXXII.

The triumph of Reason.

'But human power is very limited and is infinitely overpassed by the power of external causes. And therefore we have no absolute power to fit to our needs the world around us. Nevertheless we shall bear with an equal mind whatever happens contrary to our notions of our own welfare if we are conscious that we have done our duty, and that such power as we possess could not by any possible exertion have avoided those ills; while at the same time we remember that we are part of the Whole of Nature and follow in its course. If we clearly and distinctly understand this, that part of us which is determined by intellect—the better part of us—will entirely acquiesce and will endeavour to hold fast that acquiescence. For so far as we live by the intellect we can only desire that which is inevitable,[1] nor can we at all acquiesce in anything but what is true. Thus in as far as we rightly understand these things, so far the better part of us is in harmony with the Whole of Nature.'

[1] The ideal of the reformer or the philanthropist—if it be true to the nature of things, *i.e.* to the nature of God—*is* inevitable, though seldom realised in his personal lifetime.

PART V

THE POWER OF THE INTELLECT; OR, THE FREEDOM OF MAN

Method adopted.

To bring home to the modern English mind the practical common-sense forming the core of Spinoza's teaching in the concluding Part of his Ethics, it seems best to abandon even more entirely than we have done in the immediately previous Parts, any attempt to fit together in their so-called mathematical order the successive steps of the argument. Instead of that, we may try to present the practical results of the argument in such a form as may be available for the guidance of daily life.[1]

Practical issues kept chiefly in view.

Recapitulation of the doctrine of freedom,

The first thing to be fixed in our minds is familiar enough if we have followed the Master to this point; but it may need reiteration. For the freedom expounded is not that of caprice or self-will, but simply action without compulsion or restraint from without. And by compulsion or restraint from without is meant any impelling or deterring influence which is not spontaneously[2] generated within the area of the man's nature considered as a finite

[1] The preface may, for our purpose, be ignored. For it is mainly a discussion of Descartes' quite fanciful speculations on the pineal gland, and also of that illustrious philosopher's dualistic theory of body and soul, a theory utterly alien to Spinoza's doctrine of the identity of the two.

[2] 'Spontaneously' in the sense of John iv. 14: 'The water that I shall give him shall be in him a well of water springing up into ever-

as independence of influences outside our proper nature.

expression of God. Thus no man is free who acts through hope of Heaven or fear of Hell, or through the impulsion or restraint exercised by any other pleasure desired or penalty feared. Because, of course, in any such case, the man affected would by hypothesis act quite differently if the fear of punishment or the hope of reward were withdrawn. He cannot therefore be said to act freely. For that prerogative belongs only to the man who carries his essential being into action without being warped or thwarted by external influences. Thus, when Tennyson wrote:

The Poet's Afflatus.

> 'I do but sing because I must,
> And pipe but as the linnets sing,'

there was no thought of compulsion in the ordinary sense of imperious pressure from without, but only of an unimpeded issue into outward form of an impulse proper to his essential nature. According to Spinoza this is the only freedom possible to finite beings, and is the assured and everlasting prerogative of God.

Exuberance of innocent life.

The sports of lambs on a spring evening, or the healthy infant's spontaneous gambols accompanied by trills of laughter sounding like the song of the skylark, are also illustrations of Spinoza's idea of freedom. The inward nature, or 'essence,' in either case is a fathomless fountain from which joy in action bubbles forth without other apparent motive than itself. In other words, the little life is an 'adequate cause' of such displays, and there is

lasting life:' The creature is not the source of the living water, but it wells up in him through his relation to the life of God. It cannot be traced to any finite cause outside the area of the man's own nature, though, of course, it is related to such untraced 'cause' or 'causes.'

nothing else needed to account for them. Or if it be suggested that, according to Spinoza, there is no cause but God, this is perfectly consistent with all that has been said. For it is of course God—not as infinite, but as manifest in a finite mode of extension and thought or consciousness—who is the adequate cause of animal or infant spontaneity of joy. Our present object, however, is to fix as definitely and clearly as possible Spinoza's idea of freedom, which is simply action from within and according to the divine nature in us, without interference by external causes. Thus the fully developed free man is one who 'does justice, loves mercy, and walks humbly with his God' as spontaneously as the lamb frisks or the child plays.[1]

Hindrances to freedom.

The hindrances to such freedom are, in the ordinary man, mainly the passions, or, as St. Paul has it, 'the works of the flesh . . . adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry,[2] witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strifes, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like.' The Apostle did not pretend to give an exhaustive list. But

[1] Readers of the previous Parts of the Ethics ought not to need any caution against the hasty and mistaken inference that action from conscious motive, or under external influence, forms no part of Spinoza's ethical system. As a discipline it was a conspicuous element in his plan of salvation (see Scholium to Prop. x. in this Part). But actual salvation, the higher life with its holy freedom, was, in his view, what is here set forth.

[2] My inclusion of *idolatry*, *witchcraft*, *sedition*, *heresies* might seem foreign to Spinozism. But it is not so. For 'idolatry' includes the worship of a god framed out of our own sentiment of what he ought to be, as well as that of a god wrought out of wood or stone. 'Witchcraft' would include much of modern 'spiritism.' 'Seditions' and 'heresies' may mean any arbitrary rebellion of a part against the whole in a finite community.

he gives us illustrations which suggest that his notion of spiritual freedom and its hindrances was in its essence nearly akin to that of Spinoza. 'This I say then, walk in the spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the flesh.' Surely the theological *Aberglaube* generated by technical uses of the word 'spirit' need not blind us to the fact that St. Paul's idea of freedom is spontaneous action issuing from the inner nature which is in touch with God, or is rather a manifestation of God, and is untroubled by interference from without. And for St. Paul as well as for Spinoza hindrances to freedom were all those disturbing influences from without which thwart or distort the spontaneous action of the finite manifestation of God constituting the 'adequate idea' of each individual man.

St. Paul and Spinoza.

For instance, the raging man is not himself as he would be, but as he is forced to be by the resistless impulse of an external provocation. And Spinoza's doctrine is that the raging man, for all his bluster, is not active but passive, suffering under the suppression of his true self by violence. It is easy to apply the same doctrine to all forms of passion which overmaster us. The ordinary notion is that they are states of morbid activity. But Spinoza's theory agrees with St. Paul's intuition [1] that they are rather states of morbid passivity in which we suffer under alien forces too strong for us.

The slave of passion.

Shakespeare's King Lear affords a case in point. For one of the most pathetic elements in the tragedy is the raving king's shame that his true self is lost and that

[1] See, in addition to the above-cited passage from Gal. v. 19, also Romans vii. 15, vi. 16.

with it is gone all real spontaneity of utterance and action:—

'Life and death! I am ashamed — King Lear.
That thou hast power to shake my manhood thus;
That these hot tears, which break from me perforce,
Should make thee worth them.'

'O most small fault,
How ugly didst thou in Cordelia show!
That, like an engine, wrenched my frame of nature
From the fixed place, drew from my heart all love,
And added to the gall. O Lear, Lear, Lear!
Beat at this gate, that let thy folly in, [*Striking his head.*
And thy dear judgment out!'

These last lines describe exactly Spinoza's idea of ignoble passivity as contrasted with free action. It matters not that, to Shakespeare, philosophy came through imaginative insight into reality rather than through any process of reasoning; except indeed that by this very triumph of imagination he proves Spinoza to have been as far from infallibility as any other great man.[1] However that may be, the fall of Lear is conceived as the dislocation of the true self with its spontaneity, and its subjection to external influences that ought never to have the mastery.

The plan of salvation

How then is such a bondage to be broken, and true freedom achieved? There are many subsidiary suggestions to which we may recur with advantage after we have grasped the main solution to which Spinoza leads up by his favourite method of successive propositions and proofs. But for our purpose it is best to state at once with such plainness as the subject permits, what is the

[1] The 'imagination,' however, which Spinoza depreciates is scarcely that which was Shakespeare's glory.

lies in maintenance of our prerogative as partakers of the divine nature within our own limits.

Master's answer to the above question, or, as we may say, his plan of salvation. In essence it is this. We should habitually realise our prerogative as partakers of the divine nature. And the prerogative consists in this: that within limits we can make our lives in thought, word, and deed a finite but, within those limits, an adequate expression of God. For each individual man is a finite mode of divine Extension and Thought. Now the prerogative just mentioned is the capacity to manifest God within the limits of certain finite Modes while resisting the intrusion of other finite Modes of the divine Attributes. For such an intrusion, though it cannot mar the harmony of the Infinite Whole, can certainly disturb the self-contained inward concord of the individual life or finitc expression of God.

Case of Lear.

For illustration of this view of moral evil we may recur to the raging King Lear, who, being a type, embodies in himself the experience of myriads of actual men. With the wickedness of the two daughters we are not concerned here, though, in the eclipse of the divine nature within them by the obtrusion of greed, ambition, and pride, they also illustrate Spinoza's theory of sin. But anger at their baseness, to which Lear's folly alone had given power, not only does the outraged father no good, but aggravates his misery tenfold. His former slavery to ill-regulated love has become now an even more hopeless slavery to impotent hate. His madness does not, according to Spinoza's system, mar the infinite peace and harmony of the Universe or God. But it does disturb within Lear's finite self the expression of God. Or we may put it thus: that to find the divine meaning of Lear's passion

The evil in such cases is limited to finite relations and does not affect the Infinite.

we have to go far beyond himself, and may be driven to imagine that an explanation might be found if the infinite scheme of things could be grasped by our minds in its totality.

Resumption of main thesis.

We return then to the main thesis that the prime condition of freedom is the continuous realisation of our prerogative as partakers of the divine nature. In the enunciation of this doctrine as taught by the Master in this part of his work there is a strain of poetry nobler than any conceivable by Lord Bacon, though Shakespeare attains it now and then. But it is found only in those passages where, instead of 'suiting the shows of things to the desires of the mind,' the great poet unmasks reality from all shows and gives us to feel eternal rest in God.

Self and God.

'Whosoever,' says Spinoza, 'clearly and distinctly understands himself and his own mental affections, loves God, and all the more in proportion as he better understands self and its affections.'[1] The doctrine is that the confused and inadequate ideas associated with passion are excluded. This being so, a man who clearly and distinctly recognises his place in the Universe, or God, necessarily regards God as the cause of whatever joy or satisfaction he has in existence; or if little of such pleasure has fallen to his lot, he can look beyond himself to 'the glory of the sum of things.' The glow of feeling with which such a man responds to the Universe is what I understand the Master to mean by 'the intellectual love of God.'

'Intellectual love of God.'

Thelate Professor Huxley, in the meridian of his great gifts and in the full career of joyful work, used to say that at the end of every day he felt a strong desire to say

[1] Prop. xv., Part v.

'Thank you' to some Power if he could only know to whom to say it. Now that seems to me the attitude of soul described by Spinoza in the above-quoted proposition; and the fact that Huxley preferred to call himself an Agnostic rather than a Pantheist, scarcely detracts from the value of the illustration. The Pantheist does know to whom to say 'Thank you.'[1] But this difference in his theory of the Universe does not in the least prevent his cordial recognition of the devout Agnostic's loyalty to the unknown source of his joy.

The 'God-consciousness' is for Spinoza the main condition of human freedom. But, as we noted above, there are many subsidiary and indeed precedent conditions to be fulfilled before that state of blessedness can be reached. For instance, we have to remember that the passions under which we suffer are to a certain extent like physical forces, at any rate in this respect, that action and reaction are equal and opposite. This is the practical meaning of an axiom stated thus: 'If two opposite movements are excited in the same subject, there must of necessity arise (*fieri*) a change in both or in one alone until they cease to be opposed.' Here a concrete instance is not difficult to conceive. Mrs. Humphry Ward's Robert Elsmere was actuated at once by devotion to truth and by loyalty to ecclesiastical tradition. Now, though he was not at first aware of the fact, these affections were two contrary movements in the same subject, and one or other, or both, had to be changed before the inward discord could be attuned. In the supposed instance it was ecclesiastical tradition that had to give

Subsidiary and precedent conditions of freedom.

Case of Robert Elsmere.

[1] This is very different from saying that he comprehends God.

way. But in many real cases, as is well known, the reverse change takes place and ecclesiastical tradition triumphs. I do not say that in the latter cases there is any conscious disloyalty to truth. But what happens is that the mind in course of the conflict begins to divide truth into two sorts; the one verifiable as in everyday life, the other transcendental, going beyond experience altogether, as, for instance, in the assumption that God *must* be a 'person who thinks and loves,' and that He *must* have given a supernatural revelation to man. This is quite sufficient to effect a change in one of the opposing affections or mental movements. Truth, as understood by common-sense, is ignored, and tradition is triumphant.

Other cases in which doubt is arbitrarily suppressed.

Very different illustrations of Spinoza's axiom may be found in the struggle of more commonly opposed passions, such as drunkenness and family affection, love of ease and desire for success, philanthropy and sensual appetite, or a hundred other pairs of affections, or 'movements' in the same mind. But the ultimate bearing, already anticipated, is the incompatibility of any baseness with the intellectual love of God.

Contrariety in more ordinary affections.

A second axiom at the beginning of Part v. is the following: 'The power of a' (mental or bodily) 'affection is limited by the power of its cause, so far as the essence of the affection is explained or limited by the essence of its cause.' This sounds very obscure, but I venture to think that a simple illustration may show that it sets forth a truth of common-sense. In these days of golf many a business man is tempted by fine weather and first-rate links to spend more time on the amusement than is quite compatible with the interests of his

Power of an affection limited by its cause.

The golf player.

business. But the power of the attraction—affection or passion—is limited by 'the essence of the cause,' the enjoyment of skilful action and emulation in an open-air game. Now let a messenger come with the tidings that a very important debtor is bankrupt. The clubs are dropped and the first train taken for the place of business. For the power of passion for the game is limited by the essence of the cause of that passion, as above described, a cause which after all touches only the fringe of the player's interests in life. But the claims of self-preservation are overwhelming, and an attraction which a moment ago seemed all-absorbing is now eclipsed and forgotten.

Is it worth while?

A more general illustration may be found in the recurring question 'Is it worth while?' which obtrudes itself in times of fevered and disproportionate exertion. The question 'Why do I labour and bereave my soul of good?' is perhaps more frequently asked now than it was in the days of Koheleth. And it generally signifies that the power of the affection which urged the labour tends to pass beyond the limits fixed by the essence of its cause. That cause may be a desire for honest independence and for freedom from care. But should it lead to increase of care and intolerable pressure of demand for exertion, that cause has exceeded the limits of its essence, and the passion it has excited begins to pall.

The applications of these salutary principles is facilitated by the truth that the order or arrangement of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.[1] Thus the order and connection of ideas and of bodily affections is the same. For example, in the morbid constitution of

[1] Prop. vii., Part II.

the wine-bibber the idea of the public-house is associated with the craving for drink. And though this may seem to be a truism, it opens the way to some lessons of practical value. For if we can remove a mental excitement or affection from the thought of an external cause and can join it to other thoughts, then Love or Hatred toward the external cause, as also the perturbation of mind arising from that particular affection, will be destroyed.[1] Which may be illustrated thus: The craving for drink, though it is conceived as bodily, has its mental counterpart in the longing to pass from a less perfect to a more perfect condition. And if this seem a paradox, let it be remembered that an erroneous conception of a less perfect and more perfect condition cannot cancel the fundamental fact that happiness is the passage from a less perfect to a more perfect state. True, the projected means of securing this are in the case in point entirely delusive. Nevertheless, the collapsed, trembling and thirsty drunkard clings to the delusion. For the contrast between his shrunken, nerveless, miserable condition and that which he remembers to have been produced by fulness of wine is to him the difference between a lower and a higher perfection. Hence the bottle as the means of passing from the one state to the other is an object of overwhelming attraction, or, in Spinoza's language, of desire and love.

Interconnection of ideas and affections or passions and practical issues involved.

Alcoholic excitement conceived by the drunkard as a more perfect condition.

But now if, by some intervention of sufficiently powerful causes, the drunkard's longing for a more perfect state can be connected with a more real object, as, for instance, the restoration to health and happiness of a suffering wife and perishing children, or the attainment

The delusive object may be replaced by a more real object.

[1] Prop. ii., Pt. v.

of a little heaven of a home such as he sees his sober and industrious neighbour to possess, then the love for drink and the perturbation of mind caused by the passion will be destroyed. All this seems perhaps too obvious to be the real meaning of a great philosopher. For it may be plausibly represented as a presentation in an obscure form of the common-place principle of counter-attraction. But this would certainly not be an adequate interpretation of Spinoza's meaning. If an angry baby wants to grasp a glittering knife, it is well to distract the infant's attention by dangling before its eyes a brightly coloured ball. But surely it is a higher spiritual process by which the mind of a mature man is disengaged from an illusive object and drawn into truer relations with things as they are, that is, with God. And the complications attendant on the application of the principle in daily life make such a moral maze that only a man of great genius could discern the unifying truth which, when discovered, appears so plain.

This is more than counter-attraction.

An equally practical explanation may be given of another proposition which directly follows: 'An affection which is a passion, ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.' For example, a miser suffers from the passion of accumulation. But this passion is caused by an inadequate or confused idea of money apart from any realisation of its true relations to human life. If, however, the miser could get a clear and distinct idea of the proper place of money in the social system, that is, of its economic and philanthropic use, the desire for it may cease to be a 'passion,' and

Passion reduced by clear ideas. Prop. iii.

The miser.

become legitimately active. The relation of such principles to the main thesis that freedom is found in a realisation of our prerogative as partakers of the divine nature is surely apparent. For they point the way to our becoming consciously, and not merely as passive units, 'parts and proportions of one wondrous Whole.'

Passions assuaged by realisation of inevitable sequence. Prop. vi.

Passing over some links in the argument which are important rather to Spinoza's ideal of intellectual completeness than to the practical purpose of this handbook, we must dwell for a moment on the suggestion of a certain moral strength derivable from the doctrine of inevitable sequence.

'In proportion as the mind understands all things to be linked together in inevitable sequence,[1] in that proportion has it greater power over the affections (passions).'

Spinoza's illustrations of his doctrine.

The Scholium following the so-called demonstration is worth quoting, though the latter part of it is somewhat surprising as coming from a man who is said to have sat in summer evenings on the door-steps with his landlady's children, interesting them and teaching them many things.

'In proportion as this recognition that things are linked together in inevitable sequence has to do with matters of detail which we conceive very distinctly and vividly, in that proportion is the mind's power over the affections greater: which experience itself attests. For it is matter of observation [2] that sorrow over a possession lost is assuaged so soon

[1] '*Res omnes ut necessarias intelligit.*' The translation of Hale White and Stirling has 'understands all things as necessary.' But the last word has so many connotations in English that it seems to be insufficiently exact here. At any rate, the phrase substituted above gives Spinoza's meaning.

[2] *Videmus.*

as the loser reflects that by no possibility could the possession have been preserved. So likewise we observe that no one mourns over[1] an infant because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, and because, farther, it lives so long a time without full self-consciousness. But if most infants were born fully developed while only one here and there were born as a babe, then every one would mourn over[1] the babes; because in that case the infantile condition would be regarded not as natural and inevitable but as a defect and fault of Nature. And we might note many other cases of the same kind.'

Strange suggestion about infancy.

Its significance for the argument.

Lovers of babies and children as they are, must not suppose for a moment that this great lover of all mankind regarded undeveloped infancy with disgust. For he thought everything beautiful in its season; indeed he considered every object in the Universe as perfect within its own range. But if the reader can get over an element of grotesqueness in the case put, he must recognise the truth of the lesson taught. For if Dogberry had been right, and 'reading and writing came by nature' to all except a few unfortunate infants, the ignorance which we now regard with complacency because it is inevitable, would, if it were exceptional, be treated as one of the mysteries of Providence. We are not to let our attention be engrossed by the fantastic mode of putting the case. The point is that men readily reconcile themselves to the inevitable, but accuse Nature when they fail to recognise inevitable sequence.

Distinction between Fate and inevitable sequence.

At this point it may be well to protest against a plausible but groundless inference that the doctrine here taught is 'sheer fatalism.' Not so; for fatalism involves

[1] *Miseretur, miseret.* But it is the pain involved in pity that is in the Master's mind.

a fixed decree made by some mysterious Power beyond ourselves; a decree ruthlessly carried out by the ministry of external causes directed by that Power, and overruling the spontaneity of man. But this is not the teaching of the Master at all. There is no external power overruling our destinies. There is no shadow of fate pursuing us. We are ourselves part of the eternal energy that moves the world. And if, to our finite intellect, all existence seems to consist in an innumerable and infinite series of interwoven sequences in which we and what we call our wills have place, this is not in the least inconsistent with the spontaneity which, as Spinoza insists, is the only reality in 'free will.' For when we do what we would, the impulse arises within our own divine nature and is not forced on us from without. True, this impulse has its antecedents, rarely to be traced far back, in the chain of invariable sequences. But that does not interfere with our consciousness of spontaneity, a consciousness which is no fiction but most true and real. On the other hand, when, as St. Paul says, 'the thing that we would not, that we do,' we are warped by external influences, and do not act spontaneously at all.

The former controls; the latter leaves spontaneity.

The use made by Spinoza of this doctrine is, of course, to urge that in a world where all apparent successions are linked by invariable sequence, passion is out of place, at least in the 'free man.' For the Master holds that the free man, consciously a partaker of the divine nature, is more or less—and in case of ideal perfection, entirely—shielded from the impact of passion by the sense that all things are of God, and could not have been otherwise.

Spinoza's use of the doctrine.

Impossible of adoption by those who want more than spontaneity.

Of course the obvious retort occurs that if indeed everything, whether bodily, mental, or spiritual, occurs by invariable sequence, all this intellectual gospel of freedom is vain, and exhortations to its acceptance thrown away. And to those who are not satisfied with the freedom of conscious spontaneity, a condition in which we do just as we want to do, though our will is a link in an endless series of untraceable sequences, I suppose this objection must still be final. But those who can accept the doctrine need have no fear that it is inconsistent with the influence of exhortation, warning, and entreaty. For all moral influences are as much a part of the web of invariable sequence as are eclipses and tides. In fact, Spinoza's doctrine leaves the phenomenal action and interaction of what we call the 'moral world' just as it is in the minds of the many. Hope and fear, aspiration and despair, love and hate, exultation in the right, repentance and remorse for sin remain in the world as conceived by Spinoza precisely as they do in the world of Christian Endeavour or of the Salvation Army. It is for the most part only in his explanation of the ultimate nature of such moral facts that he differs from church teachers. But the growing incompatibility between the world as it is and the world as conceived by those teachers, seems to me to make some such explanation as his to be religion's most pressing need.

But not inconsistent with moral influence.

The propositions immediately following are the last steps leading to the final enunciation of the main thesis of the whole of the Ethics. This main thesis we have already anticipated, thinking that the purpose of this handbook would be better served thereby. But we may

Main thesis of the Ethics.

remind ourselves that this thesis concerns the prevalence of reason through the attainment of a distinct consciousness of our divine nature. The propositions I have described as last steps toward that goal are necessary, as already said of others, to the completeness of Spinoza's 'demonstration.' But for reasons previously given I pass them by. Our practical purpose is sufficiently secured by citation of the following :—

Omission of theoretically necessary propositions.

'So long as we are not oppressed by affections (passions) hostile to our (divine) nature, so long we have the power of ordering and arranging our bodily affections (passions) in due proportion in accordance with the intellect.'[1] Prop. x.

That is, affections or passions are bad just in proportion as they hinder the mind from seeing things as they are, or in their due proportions to the Whole. But if such evil affections or passions are absent, the mind is serene, forming clear and distinct ideas. Of such ideas it may be said, as Tennyson sang of blessed spirits:

True vision incompatible with passion.

> 'They haunt the silence of the breast,
> Imaginations calm and fair,
> The memory like a cloudless air,
> The conscience as a sea at rest.'

The Scholium to this proposition, though long, is so practical that it must be quoted entire.

'By this power of rightly ordering and co-ordinating the bodily affections we are able to secure comparative immunity[2] from evil passions. For more force is needed to overcome affections ordered and co-ordinated in due proportion according to the intellect than to overcome such as are loose and Scholium, Prop. x.

[1] *Secundum ordinem ad intellectum.*

[2] *Efficere possumus, ut non facile malis affectibus afficiamur.*

vague. Therefore the best thing we can do, so long as we lack a perfect knowledge of our affections, is to conceive a right rule of living, or definite maxims[1] of life, to commit these to the memory, and regularly to apply them to the particular affairs confronting us from time to time in life; that so our imagination may be thoroughly saturated with them, and that we may have them always at hand. For instance, among the maxims of life we have reckoned this: that Hatred is to be overcome by Love, or Generosity, but not to be balanced by reciprocal Hatred. But that this prescription of Reason may always be at hand when wanted, we must think of and often meditate upon the ordinary wrongs of the social state, and how and by what method they may best be warded off by Generosity; for thus we shall connect the spectacle of the wrong with the recollection[2] of this maxim, and it will always occur to us when wrong is done to us. But if also we should have at hand a rational estimate of our own true profit, as also of the good which attends on mutual friendship and common fellowship, and likewise (should remember) that supreme peace of mind arises from a right rule of living, and that men, like the rest of things, act according to the invariable sequences of Nature;[3] then the wrong, or the Hatred which usually arises from it, will have a very slight hold on the imagination, and will be easily overcome. Or if the anger usually excited by the greatest wrongs should be not quite so easily overcome, still it will be overcome, though not without fluctuation of mind, in a far shorter time than it would have been had we not these premeditated maxims at heart.

Need of a rule of life.

Value of maxims.

Overcoming evil with good.

'To the strength of mind needed to put away fear the same rules apply. That is, the common dangers of life are

[1] *Dogmata.* But the original sense of the word is obviously out of place here. What is meant is a familiar form of words.

[2] *Imaginationi*—simply recollection here.

[3] *Ex naturæ necessitate.* But there is no notion here, or anywhere in Spinoza's teaching, of compulsion from outside Nature. His idea is therefore best expressed by invariable sequence.

to be reckoned up and often imagined, and (we must think) how by presence of mind and manliness they may best be avoided and overcome. But an important point is that in ordering our thoughts and mental images we should always give special heed to the good features in everything, so that we may always be determined to action by an affection of joy. For example, if any one finds himself to be too much set upon Glory, let him meditate on the just use of Glory, and for what purpose it is to be sought, also by what means it may be acquired. But let him not reflect on its abuses, and its emptiness, and the fickleness of men, or other topics of this kind, since about these no one thinks, except by reason of sickness of mind. For with such thoughts excessively ambitious men do most afflict themselves, when they despair of achieving the honour they are seeking, and while only spitting forth their angry disappointment they assume the rôle of sages.[1] Indeed it is clear that those who are most greedy of Glory shout the loudest about its abuses and the vanity of the world.

No freedom without fortitude.

Think on good rather than evil.

'Nor is this peculiar to the ambitious, but it is a common characteristic of all to whom fortune is unfavourable, and who are not fortified by Reason.[2] For the poor man also who is greedy of money never stops speaking about the abuse of money and the vices of the rich; while by this he achieves nothing but to make himself miserable and to show that it is not so much his own poverty as the wealth of others which disturbs his mind. Thus again, those who have been coldly received by a mistress think of nothing but the fickleness and falsehood of women and other commonly quoted vices of the sex. But all this is forgotten at once the moment they

Beware of the chagrin that simulates virtue.

[1] *Dum iram evomunt sapientes videri volunt.*

[2] *Animo impotentes sunt.* The literal rendering, 'weak in mind,' does not give the connotation to be gathered from the whole treatise. Keats certainly was not weak in mind, but he was scarcely fortified by reason, when he mourned that his name was 'written in water.' Many, if not most, of the kind of men described here by Spinoza have been conspicuous for mental power.

are again welcomed by the mistress. Whoever then seeks to regulate his affections and appetites solely by love of Freedom will endeavour as far as possible to recognise virtues and their causes, and to fill his mind with the joy that springs from their true appreciation. But he will shun the contemplation of men's vices, and will abstain from invectives against men, and will take no pleasure in a sham boast of liberty. Whoever then will assiduously study these lessons—for indeed they are not difficult—and will practise them, assuredly that man will within a short space of time be able generally to direct his actions by the dictates of Reason.'

Some connective propositions and their bearing.

The next three propositions are perhaps, like others preceding, more necessary to the intellectual completeness of the Spinozan system than to the practical application of his doctrine; but we may see how all bear upon his basic principle that the freedom of man depends upon a conscious realisation of his divine nature.

'XI. In proportion as a mental picture (*imago*) is related to a greater number of things, in that proportion is it more constant and claims more of the Mind's attention.'

Man and God the main subjects of thought.

For instance, the mental picture of the human form is related to millions of individuals, and is therefore never out of our minds. But the thought of God is related to absolutely everything, and therefore claims perpetual attention.

'XII. The images of things are more easily united to images relating to things clearly and distinctly apprehended than to others.'

In the 'demonstration' the things 'clearly and distinctly apprehended' are identified with 'common properties of things,' such as are gathered by reasoned

experience (Prop. xl., Pt. II., Schol. 2) or proper deductions from them. *E.g.* gravitation, proportionate chemical combination, the laws of motion would belong to the category of things 'clearly and distinctly apprehended.' But not so telepathy, though it may exist, nor the sea-serpent, nor so-called 'miracles.' The reason is that these latter things are not 'common notions'; the *names* may be in thousands of mouths, but the things represented are probably not identical in any half-dozen minds. The outlook of the Master in this proposition is toward that idea of God which is the summation of the whole order of Nature. For an infinite number (*sit venia verbo*) of infinite series of things which separately may be clearly and distinctly apprehended imply, in his view, Infinite Substance consisting of an infinity of Attributes subject to infinite modifications.

Realms of exact and of inexact thought defined.

'XIII. In proportion as a conception is united with a greater number of others the more frequently it is in evidence.'[1] (*Sæpius viget.*)

In the proof of this we are referred to the law of association treated in the First Part. If a number of impressions are made together at any one time upon the mind, then if at another time one of these impressions recurs, it will tend to revive some or all of the others which formerly accompanied it but are not now renewed from without. Thus the chamber of a sick man makes many impressions upon him—window, table, fireplace, pictures, and the faint odour of some disinfectant. The

Power of association especially when its net is widely thrown.

[1] Note that this proposition differs from xi. above in that it deals with conceptions or mental images not merely related to but 'joined with' others.

whole of these impressions may never come together again from the same external surroundings. But the odour of that particular disinfectant will at any time recall the entire scene to him. Now here the particular impression of an odour has a very limited set of associations; and so with the sick-chamber to which it is related. But now take the conception of home. The familiar chambers, the daily outlook, the loved forms of wife and children, the kindly mutual service, the sense of repose—all this is so widely human that, wherever the traveller goes, a hundred sights and sounds call up the picture of what he has left behind. No meeting of a father with his children in the evening but reminds the wanderer of his own life at home. No loving interchange of word and look between man and wife but recalls the unforgotten image of her who is far away. A glimpse of river and woodland is like the outlook from his door. Some child Christ or girl Madonna of a picture-gallery seems to his transfiguring affection to portray his boy or girl at home. In fact, the idea of home has such universal associations that it is recalled at any moment. The point then made in the last-quoted proposition is that the more numerous the objects with which any conception is associated, the oftener will that conception be in the mind. And the bearing of this upon the conception of God is obvious; for that should be associated with everything. Indeed this is the meaning of the proposition following.

Power of home associations.

'XIV. It is possible for the mind to secure that all affections of the body or the images of things shall be referred to the idea of God.'

That is, all that we feel or conceive or desire shall be consciously harmonious with the divine Whole.

A parting point.

In what has been said so far, the soul developed by Christian forms of devotion can find many points of agreement and feel many impulses to good. But as we approach the final application of the principles so laboriously expounded, our attitude will depend very much on the degree in which we can put truth beyond and above every other consideration. Now this is an effort of moral courage not quite so easy as it seems. It would indeed be much easier than it generally is, if only we were free in Spinoza's sense, that is, if the spontaneity of our divine nature were not subject to illegitimate influence from without. There are cases in which[1] eligible brides of high birth are given in marriage to royal religionists of an alien church. And one of the essential conditions of the contract is that the wife shall conform to her husband's faith. Now if the reception of the distinguished convert into her new communion were avowedly a legal form only, involving no pretence of personal conviction, it might perhaps be justified by expediency. But it is not so. The studious preparation under the direction of spiritual guides, the serious examinations, and the final declaration of personal belief make the pretence of a mere legal form a cloak for hypocrisy, unless the conversion is real, which I can well believe that it often is. For the experience of a hundred generations shows that it is difficult or impossible to analyse fairly

Issue dependent on unbiassed love of truth.

Illustration from royal marriages between members of different communions.

Conversions by desire are often superficially sincere.

[1] It may be as well to state that this was written some time before any announcement had been made of a recent royal marriage which has been the subject of some ill-natured and, as I venture to think, most unjustifiable criticism.

the state of mind of the victim of such conventions, or to follow the subtle play of feelings which, after many windings in 'sub-consciousness,' finally emerge as sincere belief. Such a case is only an extreme instance of the fact that the wish to believe will, in nine instances out of ten, or perhaps in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, very quickly ensure belief. And the motives tending to facility of conviction may be conspicuously good. For, apart from ordinary human love, which may or not be involved, the peace of kingdoms, profitable intercourse between nations, the welfare of millions all have in past times been involved in such contracts, or at any rate were seriously thought to be so. And for a wavering conscience biassed by such tremendous issues much allowance must be made if the worse has sometimes too easily been allowed to seem the better reason.

Application to the motives operating against a reception of Pantheism.

The digression is intended, if possible, to prevent any offence being given by our words above, that our appreciation of Spinoza's highest teaching will depend very much on the degree in which we can put truth beyond and above every other consideration. For we need not be weighted with responsibility for national destinies in order to realise solemn or pathetic motives for bias toward particular religious dogmas. The recollection of childhood's prayers, the ineffaceable impression of a father's manly faith, the echo of a mother's voice as she sang of the 'wondrous, blessed Saviour,' or of 'sweet fields beyond the swelling flood'—all are spiritual lines of force to keep us within the halo of the Cross. And farther, through generations of tradition and years of training that seemed eternal, our souls have been so

impregnated and saturated with belief in a personal God made after the image of humanity's best men, and with a fanatical repudiation of any possible morals without a future Heaven and Hell, that, when confronted with a denial of these things, we fling it off as white hot metal repels a spray of cold water-drops. Now it is obvious that such a frame of mind does not put truth beyond and above every other consideration, because it only lives after the tradition of the fathers and has taken no pains to seek and find for itself.

If we must, at all cost of contradicting earth and heaven and history, imagine a personal God acting toward us precisely as a magnified father or nurse or teacher would do, and if this craving is regarded as the highest utterance of reason, there is no use in attempting to follow teachers like Spinoza. For their position is that cravings cannot determine truth,[1] and that if we follow truth, even against the clamour of unreasoned feeling, we reach at length a much higher life than that of common devotional fervour. But if it be asked why should we follow your Spinoza rather than our prophets and apostles? we can only reply, we do not pretend to 'follow' him in your sense of the word. For he made no claim to infallibility or to any monopoly of truth; and would have been the last man, as Sir Frederick Pollock says, to wish any one to be a 'Spinozist.' But he has much to teach that is of enormous moral and spiritual value, the preciousness of which we cannot appreciate

Truth not to be determined by desire.

Nor by individual men, however great.

[1] See an incisive article in the *Hibbert Journal* for October 1905, on 'The Inadequacy of Certain Common Grounds of Belief,' by Dr. J. Ellis M'Taggart. The reference is strictly limited to the particular article.

unless, without any reserve whatsoever, we put truth beyond and above everything else. On this understanding we proceed.

The love of God.

In the First Part of the Ethics we had a definition of God which identifies Him with the Universe; or all that is, was, or can be. This is perfectly consistent, in Spinoza's view, with the possibility of that 'intellectual love toward God' of which, with the purpose of making plainer the main practical objects of the Fifth Part, I have partly treated on an earlier page. I now give in its entirety the Proposition (xv.) enunciating the Master's doctrine :—

Love to God.

'He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his own affections loves God, and all the more in proportion to the greater clearness of his understanding thereof.'

The proposition refers to activities, not passions.

In the demonstration we are referred to Proposition liii., Part III., which declares that the mind rejoices in realisation of itself on its active side, and all the more as it more distinctly conceives its powers of action. We must not suffer ourselves to be confused by the substitution of 'affections' in the new proposition for 'powers of action' in the former. It is true that 'affections' may include 'passions,' which are not active but passive. We have already learned, however, that an affection which is a passion ceases to be a passion so soon as 'we form a clear and distinct idea of it.' (Proposition iii., Part v.) Therefore, when the Master here speaks of a man who 'clearly and distinctly understands himself and his own affections,' he means a man who realises his own powers and energies. The idea is not that of a self-denying hermit, still less that of a Commodus or Elagabalus. It is that of a man of action,

who, whether the thought is articulately framed in his consciousness or not, has the joy of sounding a clear note in the grand harmony of the world. It is that of a great engineer like George Stephenson, of a great statesman like Peel, of a great poet like Milton.[1] For all such men, though reverence may forbid vanity, do clearly and distinctly realise their own powers. And in so far as their theology allows them to refer all to God in whom 'they live and move and have their being,' their realisation of the joy of life is always accompanied by the thought of God, whom they must therefore love. But the purer their theology, the more intellectual is their love, and hence the freer from the passions that have polluted faith.

Concrete instances.

It may be said that such men are few and can reflect little light upon the common lot. But we might as well say that the laws of light from the sun are inapplicable to the light from a glow-worm. For it is not their exceptional brilliancy or strength which illustrates the teaching of the Master, but just their clear and distinct consciousness of active faculty and the place it gives them in the divine Whole. But precisely such clear and distinct consciousness may be enjoyed by the working engineer whose hand on the valve wields the weight and speed of a rushing train, or by a letter-carrier who helps the intercourse of mankind, or a newspaper reporter who makes a meeting in an obscure, smoke-grimed town visible and audible to the whole civilised world. However humble we may be, we have some active powers

Not wholly irrelevant because of their exceptional character.

[1] In Spinoza's sense of the words Milton was a man of action even in his retirement and blindness.

whose exercise may be for the good of all around us. And if, in faithful discharge of such a trust, we clearly and distinctly realise ourselves and our modest activities as of God and in God, our lives may be a continual hymn of praise, not indeed in the childish sense of obsequious homage, but in the sense of uttering forth that intellectual love which rejoices in the perfection of the Whole.

The intellectual love of God should have supreme dominion of the mind. Prop. xvi.

This love toward God, says the Master, ought wholly to possess the mind.[1] For when once we realise that we are finite expressions of God, every movement of the body, in healthful activity, in honest industry, and in legitimate pleasure, is in the mind associated with the recognition of God as the Whole, of which our joyful activity is part. And if it be suggested that this is a mere theoretic love which never had and never can have any practical power, the example of the Master himself is a sufficient answer. For if he was, as Novalis said, a 'God-intoxicated man,' it was not in the sense of any fanatic zeal. The victims of ancient or modern superstition have shrieked and torn themselves, or chanted pious blasphemies when their god has entered into them through mephytic vapours of a cave or through the nervous excitement of a stifled crowd in a chapel; but this man was possessed of God as are the starry heavens or the calm, deep sea, or the snowy heights in Coleridge's vision of Mont Blanc. His life was brief and, at some crises, troubled and sorrowful. Cast out of the synagogue and cursed with a frightful curse that made him even to his own kin an object of horror, he yet retained the

The doctrine tested by the life.

[1] *Maxime occupare.*

complete self-control to which vindictive thoughts are impossible. His life was so short that his doctrine of God and Man must have been practically completed within his own thoughts at the period when he might truly be described as 'destitute, afflicted, tormented.' Yet this 'intellectual love of God' not only sustained his courage, but conquered irritability of temperament and gave a sweetness of tone to his soul which made him beloved by the humble folk and children among whom he made his home. Nor was it any mere self-abnegation that kept him pure. For where right was concerned he could assert himself in the law-courts, and then instantly surrender almost all that justice awarded to his righteous claim. And though brought up in circumstances of considerable comfort, he could for the sake of independence content himself with the wage of a lens-grinder, and refused a proposed legacy to which he thought others had more claim. Enough: if there is any truth in the saying 'By their fruits ye shall know them,' the 'intellectual love of God' was to this Master a veritable inspiration.

'By their fruits ye shall know them.

The utterances of saintly devotion and aspiration are often tuned in the key of human passion, and the relations of the soul and its Saviour are sung in words taken from the vocabulary of earthly lovers. But Spinoza, whose love to God endured the tests we have described, will not permit such profanation. For no sooner has he claimed for love to God the sole dominion of the mind than he hastens to teach us that God is untouched by passion, and cannot be affected by Joy or Grief. And there is added a corollary that, strictly speaking, God neither loves nor hates any one.

God untouched by passion.

Prop. xvii.

The intellectual love of God, at least in its highest form, has assuredly not been always possible to men. But even when they could not love as they ought, Spinoza maintains that no one could ever hate God. He did not know that about the very time when he wrote these words, a poet, of whom perhaps he had searcely heard, was conceiving an Epic, of which the whole plot should turn on precisely such hatred burning in an archangel's soul. It must be conceded, however, that even to Milton's imagination such a conception would have been impossible had not his theology reduced the idea of the Eternal to that of a stupendous personality, greater indeed than all other personalities, yet still not so incommensurable with them but that jealousies and mutual friction should be possible. Whereas if the great poet could have so far transcended his reputed 'Arianism' as to realise that ultimate Being must needs include all being, he would scarcely have ventured on so hazardous a plot. Unless indeed his intention had been to show that the myths of the Hebrews were woven out of human warp and woof, precisely like those of the Greeks, and were therefore fit material for similar poetic broidery.

No one can hate God.

Prop. xviii.

Milton's Satan.

A conception impossible to Pantheism

But now let us note how Spinoza sustains his confident denial that any one could ever hate God. His proof is indeed fine spun and technical, but as usual has commonsense at the back of it. 'The idea of God which is in us' is adequate and perfect.[1] Therefore, so far as we contemplate God, we are active, not passive.[2] Consequently

as expounded by Spinoza.

Prop. xviii.

[1] Prop. xlvii., Pt. II.

[2] 'The mind's actions (*i.e.* spontaneous activities) spring only from adequate ideas; but passions (*i.e.* passivity to undue external influence) depend entirely on inadequate ideas.' (Prop. iii., Pt. III.)

there can be no feeling of grief having the idea of God as its correlate. (Literally, with the concomitant idea of God.) That is, no one can hold God in hatred.'

Explanation.

The practical bearing of this technical and abstract argument is surely not far to seek. For it is impossible for any one to hate the whole Universe. If a pessimist thinks he does, it is because he is fixing his mind on a part only—as, for example, on the incidence of death and suffering and unequal fortune. That is, in the Master's way of putting it, the pessimist suffers under inadequate, confused ideas—certainly 'God is not in all his thoughts' —and therefore he is passive to undue influence from without. But if such a man could enlarge his thought so as to get a more adequate idea of that perfect Whole in which the subjects of his confused thought are necessary incidents, his feeling would be changed. Nay, supposing him to see things as they are eternally, his inadequate ideas would be transfigured into intellectual love. Or if it be said that a Universe which involves in its necessary sequences much mental and physical suffering must be bad, or at best imperfect, the answer is that such an argument assumes man to be the final cause of a Universe which has no final cause at all. And such an assumption is surely not one of reason but of passion. Whereas, if we would only follow out, as far as faculty allows us, the maze of sequences by which the things of which we complain do as a matter of fact—without being designed or intended for it—maintain natural order and, if we may so speak, keep the Universe together as an eternal Whole, we should to some extent understand the

The Universe adequately conceived cannot be hated.

causes of sin and sorrow; and Reason would take the place of Passion.

A hard saying. Prop. xix.

It seems, however, a hard saying that he who loves God cannot strive to have God's love to him in return. But according to the Master such an endeavour would be contrary to the preceding proposition that God cannot be touched by passion, and therefore cannot love or hate. Many Churches have indeed authoritatively pronounced that God is 'without body, parts, or passions.' But they have not dared to be consistent in the application of their creed. Spinoza therefore makes no innovation in doctrine on this point. His only distinction is that he consistently adheres to what he says. For he maintains that for a man to desire that God should personally love him is only a proof that the man does not love God; because it is a wish that the Eternal should cease to be God.

Practical meaning.

Let us try to put the truth more plainly, if with less severe accuracy than the Master. When a man desires that God should love him, he thinks of God as outside of him, a separate personality whose favour he would win. But such a thought is utterly and fundamentally opposed to Spinoza's central doctrine that God is not some one separate from us, but our essence and completion. As 'parts and proportions' we may very well love and worship the 'wondrous Whole'; for to our finite Mode of existence the joy we have in the Universe is accompanied by the idea of an external cause, the majesty of heaven and earth. But the idea of the Whole severally considering and loving the 'parts and proportions' is much too anthropomorphic; for it suggests a consciousness located in a brain and contemplating its body, a

conception absolutely inconsistent with Spinoza's doctrine of God.

In what sense we may still think of an eternal love toward us.

And yet though this particular suggestion must be condemned as misleading, there is surely a sense in which we may triumph in an Eternal Love toward us. This is indicated in a brief passage toward the end of the book (Prop. xxxvi., Coroll.): 'God, inasmuch as He loves Himself, loves men'; because men are parts and proportions of God; 'and consequently the Love of God toward men, and the intellectual Love of the Mind toward God, are one and the same.' For the Infinite, at least to our comprehension, is compact of innumerable parts which all draw toward each other. Gravitation, cohesion, chemical affinity in the physical world; sympathy, brotherhood, the enthusiasm of Humanity in the spiritual world, are symbolic of forces beyond our imagination which keep all things eternally One. And by their means we sometimes attain heights of contemplation from which the inspiration of Love that saved Coleridge's Ancient Mariner represents a grander mood than mere love of bird or beast or man. It is a sense of all things working together in a perfection beyond our thoughts. And of the blessed influences here implied we are as much the objects as star or flower, landscape beauty or human genius. The complacency of the Universe in its self-awareness, the love of God toward Himself, as Spinoza has it, includes us in its embrace, and that is enough.

The true catholicity

These lessons on the soul's supreme good are concluded by a declaration of the spotless purity and broad human sympathies that always attend it. For 'this love toward God cannot be soiled by any passion of envy or jealousy;

Prop. xx.

but the more men we conceive to be united to God by the same bond, the more is this love strengthened.' 'Lord, are there few that be saved?' asked one of the followers of Jesus, a question suggestive of a desire to magnify the preciousness of salvation by the extent of its denial to the many. Such was not the spirit of Jesus, though it is said that He made the question a text for an exhortation to each man to make his calling and election sure. But Tertullian represented in himself too truly the tendency of the Church when he described the spectacle of Hell as heightening the ecstasies of Heaven. We must not, however, forget or minimise the generous sympathies of later churchmen, especially in our own day, who have striven to interpret the opinions of aliens and heretics as being fundamentally identical with the orthodox faith. But assuming the creeds to be true, and the Bible to be or contain 'God's Word written,' such efforts, generous though they may be, are a severe strain on veracity and common-sense. For the emphasis laid by the creeds on a right belief, an emphasis often taking an imprecatory form, makes the appreciation of any goodness apart from right belief consciously inconsistent and halting. It is only Spinoza's 'intellectual love of God,' which, like a clear sunny sky, can receive and transform and adorn the clouds of sacred myth and even the smoke of superstition, so that we may come to love them as they are transfigured there. The laboured faith of Augustine, the bright common-sense and kindly feeling of Chrysostom, Wesley's zeal for the salvation of souls, are, no less than the altruism of Agnostics and the increasing mysticism of Science, germs of a higher religion which

contrasted with the spirit of Tertullian.

The better spirit of our own day.

only find their final fruition in the intellectual love of God as All in All.

In the Scholium following the above proposition, but which for our purpose it is not necessary to quote here, the Master tells us that he has now completed his doctrine of salvation from the Passions, and that he will proceed to treat of the immortality of the soul. This is not indeed his phrase; for the thesis, as announced by himself, is this: that the human mind cannot be utterly destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal. Yet after all, the subject which he does discuss is that commonly described as the immortality of the soul.

Concerning immortality.

Prop. xxiii.

Here occur three propositions dealing with that perplexing antithesis between man as mortal[1] and man under the aspect of eternity, which has puzzled the most sympathetic students of the Master. I will first quote the propositions and then give my own view of the meaning.

Relations of body and soul.

'Prop. XXI. The mind cannot imagine anything nor can it remember past events except while the Body continues to exist.'

Now the whole spirit and purpose of Spinoza's teaching forbids us to tolerate for a moment anything like a 'materialistic' interpretation of these words. For as the 'demonstration' shows, the proposition depends on the theory that the mind and the body are each respectively correlated finite modes of two Attributes—Thought and Extension—each of which expresses the same divine

Not materialistic.

[1] More properly—man as a finite group of apparent successions.

Substance. They are therefore the same thing under different aspects.

The Body as a divine idea.

'Prop. XXII. Nevertheless there is necessarily given in God an idea which expresses the essential being of this and the other[1] human Body under the aspect of eternity.'

For 'God is not only the cause of the existence of this and the other body'—*i.e.* an appearance in temporal succession—'but also of its essential being, which must, of course, be conceived through God's own essential being,' and that because it is involved therein by a kind of eternal necessity.[2] But this proposition will be better discussed in connection with the following.

'Prop. XXIII. The human Mind cannot be entirely destroyed with the Body, but of it something remains which is eternal.'

The truth about Eternity.

To get at the common-sense underlying these transcendental utterances we must recall the Master's doctrine that between Eternity and Time there exists no relation at all. They are absolutely incommensurable. Eternity is not 'everlasting duration,' nor is Time a fragment of Eternity. As to duration, it is impossible to explain it except by the illusions[3] necessarily involved in finite consciousness.[3] But all philosophers and even contemplative

[1] *I.e.* as I understand it, each several human body has its own several divine idea—or rather is that idea.

[2] The latter words are a paraphrase, and not a rendering of *idque æterna quadam necessitate*. But I think I give the meaning. For we are referred to Prop. xvi., Pt. I., which teaches that by necessity of the divine nature an infinite number of things in infinite variety—that is, all things within the scope of infinite thought—must arise.

[3] It is a very hasty and utterly baseless criticism on such a view of finite consciousness, to say that it 'makes all life a lie.' Illusions may be relatively true. Thus a 'straight staff bent in a pool' is really bent

poets have generally agreed that to the thought-attribute —or self-awareness—of God there can be no temporal succession. To say that Infinite Being lives in an 'eternal Now' may be equally futile. For the notion is generated by our experience of a constant transition from past to future, and proverbially represents nonentity. For 'Now' perishes when we think of it. Nevertheless, though Eternity may be to us only a dim but great surmise of truth, necessities of thought compel us to believe that in the self-awareness of the Eternal all things that we call past and present exist at once. And therefore all Bodies and all Minds of endless generations are unbegotten and imperishable ideas in Infinite Thought. Now this consentaneous being of all ideas at once is real, while the succession of generations is an illusion of finite consciousness. And it is this reality, unattainable to mortal thought except in some momentary ecstatic glimpse, which the Master has in view when he speaks of Body and Mind 'in the aspect of eternity.' It is likely enough that this may bring small comfort to those who insist that the everlasting *duration* of a finite 'self' is an essential condition of bliss. But for many, and for a rapidly increasing number, it will be sufficient to know that while their illusive duration is as the twinkling of an eye, they are eternal in the thought of God.

Fallacy of an 'eternal now.'

Yet eternity is real

while time is made up of illusions.

so far as sight is concerned, and the artist so renders it. Only when the apparently bent staff has to be seized or handled below the water must a correction be made. But the relative truth of the illusions of finite consciousness has an indefinitely wider range, and their relative truth can, within that range, always be verified. It is only when dealing with matters transcending sensuous experience, but not wholly beyond the interests of Reason, that the fact of those illusions becomes clear.

F. D. Maurice on eternal life.

The doctrine of the late F. D. Maurice and of other more or less orthodox Christians on the subject of eternal life is clearly allied to, if not influenced by, this teaching of Spinoza. For it insists on an incommensurable difference between eternity and time. Not only so; but devout holders of this doctrine have been entirely indifferent to the attractions of a narrower heaven. For the supreme blessedness according to them is to 'lay hold on eternal life,' and to live it now. The duration of the limited self is then a matter of quite secondary import.[1]

'Flower in the crannied wall.'

To this view of eternal life everything is a manifestation of God, and therefore 'the more we understand individual objects the more do we understand God.' (Prop. xxiii.) This follows from the truth enunciated in Part I., that 'individual things are nothing but affections or Modes of the divine Attributes, by which God's Attributes are expressed in a particular and limited manner.' And Tennyson might have had the above proposition in mind when he wrote his often-quoted lines to the flower in the crannied wall:

Prop. xxv. Pt. I., Cor.

> 'But if I could understand
> What you are, root and all, and all in all,
> I should know what God and man is!'

Yet how many have quoted with delight this mystical and musical lyric without ever suspecting its essential Pantheism!

The function of intuition in our *Weltanschauung*.

But in order that this religious contemplation of individual objects may attain the vision of God, it is neces-

[1] To labour this point further here would be out of place; but I may be permitted to refer to *The Religion of the Universe*, Macmillan and Co., 1904.

sary that we should grasp things by the third kind of knowledge, that is, by intuition. 'The highest attainment of the mind and its supreme virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.' Now, of course, it would be absurd to attribute to a man of such scientific attainments as made him the valued correspondent of the foremost scientists of his time the crude notion that intuition can dispense with the labour of research. But what he meant was that the recognition of ourselves and all things as 'parts and proportions of one wondrous Whole' is more akin to the insight by which we grasp a universal truth than to the logical process of induction. For, he adds, 'the apter the mind is to understand things by this third kind of knowledge the more does it desire to understand' them so. That is, it is a habit of mind which consistently sees things in their divine relations. And then he tells us that 'from this third kind of knowledge springs supreme contentment of the mind.' The religious faith here involved may be better discussed farther on under the final propositions of the book. Meantime, whether the 'demonstration' satisfies us or not, it is well to take note of it.

Prop. xxv.

Prop. xxvi.

Perfect peace. Prop. xxvii.

'The supreme virtue of the Mind is to know God or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge (intuition). And this virtue is all the greater in proportion as the Mind has a fuller knowledge of things by this kind of knowledge. Therefore he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes into the highest perfection of man. Consequently (by the previous definition of joy) he is affected by supreme Joy which is accompanied by the idea of himself and his own virtue. Accordingly from this kind of knowledge springs the most perfect peace that can be given.'

Points to be noted in the above.

Here note that the knowledge of God is treated as simply another phrase for the intuition of things as they are—in eternity, of course, and not in time. Note again that 'the idea of himself and his own virtue' is not to be taken as suggestive of vanity or self-eomplaeency. For throughout the Ethies man is treated as having no real self but God—*i.e.* as a finite modifieation of divine Attributes expressing the divine substanee. The 'idea of himself and his own virtue' is therefore equivalent to the realisation of his plaee in the divine nature. Again, the word 'virtue' is not to be confined to its English eonnotations; for it ineludes fulness of spiritual life, and moral force. These observations may help us when we eonsider the praetical application of the truth.

The next four propositions (xxviii.-xxxi.) may, for our purpose, be passed over with a mere mention of their general bearing. For while neeessary in the Master's view to the Euelidean proeess of his argument, they do not obviously help the religious application we have in view. They turn upon the doetrine that all things may be regarded either under a temporal aspect, which has only relative truth, or under the aspect of eternity, that is, their unity in God. We then eome to Proposition xxxii.:—

The temporal and eternal aspects of things.

'We delight in whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge (intuition), and our delight is accompanied with the idea of God as its causc.'

No one can deny that there is force in the brief 'demonstration.' From this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible contentment, that is (by a previous

definition), Joy, and this, moreover, accompanied by the idea of one's self, and consequently accompanied by 'the idea of God as its cause.' That is, every one who sees clearly a universal truth, even if it be only mathematical, but much more if it be moral, finds a keen intellectual pleasure in it. This pleasure is inevitably accompanied by joy in the consciousness of possessing such a power, and the mind accustomed to see all things under the aspect of eternity necessarily refers both power and joy to its true self in God. The corollary here also has an obvious bearing on religion.

The joy of intuition and its aspect toward eternity and God.

'From the third kind of knowledge necessarily springs the intellectual love of God. For from this kind of knowledge springs Joy accompanied by the idea of God as its cause, that is to say, the love of God, not as though we regarded Him as present, but in so far as we realise His eternity; and this is why I call the love of God "intellectual."'

We are then told that 'this intellectual love of God is eternal' (Proposition xxxiii.)—that is, unrelated to time or succession. Then the Master seems to bethink him that this 'intellectual love' might to some appear inconsistent with his definition of Love as 'Joy accompanied by the idea of external cause.' For God is not 'an external cause,' nor has He 'presence' such as a finite external cause can have. True, the epithet 'intellectual' should guard against any confusion with temporal passion. But then how can an eternal love, having neither beginning nor end, be called by the same name as a passion that seizes us like a magic spell and to which the sweet uncertainties of hope and fear seem essential? For answer a Scholium is added:—

Definitions of Affections. vi.

'Although this Love toward God has had no beginning, yet it possesses all the perfections (charms)[1] of Love just as though it had an origin, as we supposed just now.[2] Nor is there any difference except that the Mind has possessed as eternal those perfections which we have supposed to accrue to it, and has possessed them with the accompanying idea of God as the eternal cause. Now if Joy consists in the passage to a greater perfection, surely Blessedness must consist in this, that the Mind is endowed with perfection itself.'

Hoping that the difficulties of this utterance may be at any rate alleviated by concluding remarks to follow, I pass on. Anxious to keep his doctrine of eternal life apart from the carnal notion of immortality, the Master, in another proposition (xxxiv.), shows that only in connection with the body in its temporal aspect (*durante*) can the Mind be subject to passions; and he adds a Scholium:—

'If we regard the ordinary opinion of men we shall see that they are conscious of the eternity of their Mind, but that they confuse this with duration and identify it with the imagination or memory supposed to remain after death.'

Our Love to God is His love to Himself.

Let us take together the two following propositions (xxxv. and xxxvi.), for the latter is the complement of the former, and united they throw perhaps as much light as our half-opened spiritual eyes can receive on eternal life and eternal love.

'God loves Himself with an infinite intellectual love.'

'The intellectual love of the Mind toward God is the very

[1] *Perfectiones*; but what are the perfections of Love unless its charms which bind us in delight?

[2] In the corollary quoted above.

love with which God loves Himself, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He can be manifested through the essential being of the human mind viewed under the aspect of eternity.[1] That is to say, the intellectual love of the Mind toward God is part of the infinite love with which God loves Himself.'

Perhaps the best way of dealing with these grand but difficult utterances will be to offer a paraphrase which must go for what it is worth, though I think it presents in contemporary forms of thought the real meaning of the Master. At the very beginning of this work we remarked that our difficulty in understanding Spinoza often arises from an erroneous assumption that he is using language familiar to theologians in approximately their sense of the terms. And this is the case here; for divine love—whether of man to God or God to man—is—with reverence be it spoken—commonly supposed to have something in it akin to earthly passion. To what an extent this was carried even among the most spiritual of the Hebrews is well known to students of the Prophets. And though Christianity exercised a highly refining influence, yet something of the old earthly associations remained. For St. Paul was not averse to picturing the union of the saints and their Saviour as a betrothal. And in Revelation the marriage supper of the Lamb is thought a fitting emblem of the blessed consummation of Christ's work.

A paraphrase offered.

Earthly associations lingering round divine love.

But against any such misinterpretation Spinoza guards by the saving epithet 'intellectual,' which is applied first to man's love toward God, and by implication to the love

Excluded by the epithet 'intellectual.'

[1] Be it remembered that this essential being is in God.

of God for Himself, including man.[1] If it be asked how can Love be intellectual? the reply is that the phrase is an adaptation of language to a transcendental idea, or let us say a *modus loquendi*. For the word Love, with its associations of admiration and satisfaction, and warmth of sentiment and self-devotion, comes nearest to what Spinoza wants to express. But its other connotations of passion —in the sense of passivity—and exclusive or peculiar possession of the beloved object, and longing for reciprocal exclusive love, must be shut out. Therefore it is that he uses the epithet 'intellectual.'

Blessedness of peace with the Universe.

The idea thus becomes that of a joyful and even triumphant contemplation of the Universe as a living Whole, one, undivided, indivisible and eternal; perfect as a Whole, and therefore perfect in every part. It is even perfect in ourselves, if we could see things aright. Because though it has not its being for us, that is, to gratify our whims, or even to fulfil our inadequate ideals, yet one way or another, even in our faults and pains, we do our infinitesimal part toward making the infinite Perfection what it is. But the advantage of the free man over the unfree, or slaves of passion, is that he does this willingly, as an 'adequate cause,' not trespassing beyond the divine thought of himself into the divine thought of other things which are incomplete except upon an infinite survey.

This Love impregnable.

'There is nothing given (existent) in Nature that is contrary to this intellectual Love or which could cancel

[1] 'Hence it follows that God in so far as He loves Himself loves men, and consequently that the Love of God toward men and the intellectual love of the Mind toward God is one and the same thing.' (Prop. xxxvi., Coroll.)

it.' (Prop. xxxvii.) For proof the Master is content to say that 'this intellectual Love follows inevitably from the nature of the Mind in so far as that nature is considered as eternal truth in and through the nature of God.' If, therefore, anything were conceivably able to cancel it, the result would be to make that false which, by hypothesis, is eternally true. Which is absurd. If we are unaffected, as probably we are, by such a 'proof,' may it not be because we are even yet insufficiently possessed of the Master's Gospel that we are one with God? With a curious sensitiveness to any apparent break in the long chain of his argument, Spinoza here recalls the axiom in Part IV., which assumes that 'there is no individual thing in Nature which is not surpassed in potency by some other individual thing' capable of destroying it. But that axiom he now tells us does not affect the impregnable persistence of the intellectual Love of God; for this is neither individual nor temporal, and that axiom obviously referred to individual things in their relation to time and place.

Problem of death.

The Master now recalls his promise, given in Part IV., Prop. xxxix., Schol., to say more on the problem of death. Those who insist on personal immortality accompanied by a persistent sense of identity cannot derive from his words any support for their hope. 'In proportion as the Mind understands a greater number of things by the second and third kind of knowledge' (viz. reasoned experience, *i.e.* induction, and intuition), 'in that proportion does it suffer less from the passions, which are evil, and the less does it fear death.'

I shall try to paraphrase the proof and a following

Scholium. The second and third kinds of knowledge, especially the third, or intuition, confront us with eternity as incommensurable with time. But the more we realise the eternal life of the Universe or God, a life in which we share, the more constant is our better nature against the assaults of passion. Not only so, but the more we realise God's eternal life the less important do our incidental and temporal interests in the world of succession appear to be. Or, in other words, what remains of us is of far more import than what seems to perish in death. Therefore it is well to cultivate those kinds of knowledge which confront us with eternity. On this we can only say, 'he that is able to receive it, let him receive it.' The same thing has had to be said of other gospels in times long past. But this involved no admission either of their falsehood or of their inadequacy to the needs of a more fully evolved mankind.

Death touches only our relations to the world of succession.

Again, taking up the apparently dropped threads of earlier argument, the Master now shows that a variously mobile and adaptable body is not only useful to temporal needs, as shown in Part IV., Prop. xxxviii., but that it makes for a better appreciation of eternal life and leaves less to perish at death. The argument is that to which we are now so much accustomed. As said before, we are not to leave out of account the nervous system and brain when interpreting the meaning of a variously mobile and adaptable body. Remembering this, we may well agree that such a body, to which on Spinoza's theory the Mind corresponds,[1] will be a good instrument for the

Religious value of a mobile and adaptable body.

[1] That is, as a correlated finite Mode of another divine Attribute, that of Thought.

work of the Mind in controlling evil passions according to the rule of the intellect, and of referring all bodily affections to the idea of God. Thus the love of God takes possession of the Mind, and whatever that Love possesses belongs to eternity.

In asking whether any, and if so what amount of, common-sense is at the root of such speculations, we had better not give too rigid an interpretation to the Master's doctrine of the higher mind and its outlook on eternity. For thousands have preferred noble aims to mean ones and a larger spiritual to a lesser and lower good, who would have been shocked had they been suspected of sharing Spinoza's views of religion. And it will be found that among such men a considerable majority possessed a physical constitution of great mobility and adaptability. The statesman whose disappearance in the last year of the last century left a blank not yet filled, was admired by professional judges of the human frame even more for his physical than for his mental gifts.[1] This is not the place to pursue such a question; I only suggest that there is more in the Master's theorem than airy speculation. The following Scholium may help to confirm the suggestion; and the idea of education with which it concludes is well worth attention in these times.

How far realised in actual life.

'Since human Bodies are susceptible of very many adaptations, we cannot doubt the possibility of their being

[1] Apparent exceptions are not always really such. There is a pathos in the recollection that Benedict de Spinoza himself suffered as an invalid during a considerable part of his short life and died prematurely of consumption. But his perfect mastery of a delicate handicraft showed that, notwithstanding disease, he possessed a variously mobile and adaptable body.

Body and Mind in the free man.

correlated with Minds which have a large knowledge of themselves and of God, and whose greatest or characteristic[1] part is eternal, so that they scarcely fear death at all. But to make this plainer, be it here noted that we live in a course of incessant change, and according as we are changed for the better or the worse we are said to be happy or unhappy. For he who from an infant or a boy is changed into a corpse is called unhappy. On the contrary, if we are enabled to live through the whole period of life with a sound Mind in a sound Body, that is counted as happiness. And truly he who like an infant or a child has a Body adapted to very few uses and mainly dependent on external causes, has a Mind which, considered in itself alone,[2] has scarcely any consciousness of itself or of God or of surrounding things. On the other hand, he who possesses a Body adapted to very many (actions) has (also) a Mind which, considered in itself alone[2] has a large consciousness of itself and God and of surrounding things. In this life, therefore, we endeavour as soon as possible that the Body of infancy, so far as its nature permits, and so far as is consistent with health (*ei conducit*), shall be changed into another Body such as may be adapted to many uses, and may be correlated to a Mind as fully conscious as possible of itself and of God and of surrounding things; the ultimate aim being that everything concerned (merely) with its memory of self or fancy shall in comparison with its intellect be of little consideration.'

[1] *Præcipua*; but the notion is not so much what is obviously chief or conspicuous as what makes the contemplative mind that which it is. Skilful movements, strenuous action, successes in management are temporal—of the season, the hour, or the moment. But that which is *characteristic* of the great mind is the outlook beyond narrow surroundings, or, as Spinoza says, on eternity. As to their attitude toward death, the reference is not to any lingering dread of 'the King of Terrors,' but rather to the apprehension of annihilation. It is this that almost vanishes when they realise how much of them is eternal as being one with God.

[2] That is, apart from the impact of external impulse, or slavery to habit and routine.

In interpreting these last words it must be remembered that for Spinoza 'intellect' was not a mental logic-chopping machine, but the higher nature which sees things as they are. *Imaginatio*, which I have here rendered 'fancy,' was to him a process of fictitious image-making, a travesty of things as they are. And the memory of which he speaks as nothing worth is self-centred always, hovering about one's own achievements and feelings. If this be borne in mind we shall be no longer shocked by his exaltation of that 'intellect' in which the love of God is enshrined.

Still dwelling upon the Mind's eternity apart from personal immortality, the Master supports his idea with the following proposition (xl.).

Perfection and activity.

'In proportion as each thing has more of perfection, in that proportion it is the more active and the less passive; and contrariwise, the more it is active the more perfect it is.'

Perfection depends on reality.

We have learned as early as the beginning of Part II. that perfection means reality, that is, identity with God, not necessarily as infinite but as forming by a modification of some Attribute the essence of the 'creature.' Again, activity does not mean fussiness or even busy-ness, but spontaneity free of external compulsion. Suffering, too, may be more than passive. The martyrs were never more truly active in Spinoza's sense than when giving their lives for the faith. What the above proposition means, therefore, is that the more the Mind realises its place in God, the less is it passive to external influences and the more spontaneous are its functions. And contrariwise, the more spontaneous its functions are, the more does it realise its place in God.

Case of Socrates.

For illustration let us again have recourse to Socrates, though many Christian worthies would serve our purpose, did not their use endanger misunderstanding. Socrates was not a Pantheist, and yet his spontaneity and his sense of divine inspiration or suggestion throw light on the Master's words here. He fulfilled the above idea of activity as contrasted with passivity, because his spontaneity, or, if we prefer the word, his originality, was unenslaved by any external influence. He was and would be himself; and this in virtue of the divinity he believed to speak to his soul. That is to say, his activity involved reality, and this Spinoza identifies with perfection.

Farther, in a corollary we are told that the perfect, or real or eternal, part of the soul is the intellect, by which alone we act spontaneously. But the part that perishes must be the fancy, the weaver of fictions through which alone we are said to be passive. Whatever there is of intellect, it has more perfection (or reality) than the fancy.

The supreme ideal

The consummation of the Master's moral teaching is reached in two final propositions concerning the measureless worth of goodness in itself altogether apart from arbitrarily attached rewards or punishments either in this temporal life or in any other supposed to succeed it.

not first propounded by Spinoza.

The doctrine declared is, of course, not original, nor in any way specially characteristic of Spinoza. For it is to be found here and there throughout the Bible and most notably in the words of Jesus. Thus the hardest duty imposed by him on his followers, 'Love your enemies, bless them that curse you,' is enforced only by the purely

ideal motive, 'that ye may be the children of your Father who is in heaven': which reminds us of Spinoza's teaching about the inherent blessedness of the eternal life lived here and now. Again, when the sublime exhortation is added, 'Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect,' there is no suggestion of any reward save the glory of realisation. It is true indeed that Jesus, speaking not like the seventeenth-century Jew to the elect and cultured few, but to the suffering and ignorant many, often made use of the traditional hopes and fears into which he was born, and which certainly had their place among his sincere beliefs. But it is abundantly clear that to himself goodness was heaven and vice was hell here and now. The same lofty ideal glimmers here and there in later parts of the New Testament, especially in the writings attributed to St. Peter and St. John.[1] It is impossible perhaps to suppress a regret that the active and successful apostle, of whom we know the most, failed sometimes to imitate the spiritual elevation of his Master in this respect, and even suffered himself, in a moment of argumentative heat, to suggest that if there were no personal resurrection the old despairing cry would be right which said, 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.'[2]

The words of Jesus compared.

The contrast of St. Paul.

Yet though there is nothing in the slightest degree novel or peculiar to himself in Spinoza's final assertion of the measureless worth of goodness apart from reward for its achievement, or punishment for its neglect, yet it is of great interest to see how appropriate the doctrine

The value of goodness for its own sake essentially involved in Spinoza's Ethics.

[1] Cf. 1 Pet. i. 15, 22, 23; ii. 15-20; iii. 17; 2 Pet. i. 5-9; John xvii. 3, 22, 23; etc. etc.

[2] Isaiah xxii. 13, etc.

is as the topstone of his laboriously constructed temple of Ethics.

'Even if we did not know that our Mind is eternal, yet we should regard as of supreme importance Piety and Religion, and everything whatever which in the Fourth Part we showed to be correlated with strength of Mind and Generosity.'

Implied in the doctrine of self-preservation.

The proof consists simply in recalling the high interpretation put in the earlier Parts on self-preservation. It is the higher self, as recognised by Reason, that is to be preserved, not the lower self swayed by passion. And the claims of Generosity and strength of Mind as factors in the higher self were maintained altogether apart from questions of time or immortality. They therefore remain independent of either.

The Scholium appended to the above is not very attractive, but it is of interest:—

Contrasted with the supposed creed of the many.

'The ordinary creed of the multitude seems to be different. For most people appear to believe that they are free only so far as they are allowed to yield to lust, and that to whatever extent they are bound to live by prescription of divine law to this extent they give up their independence.[1] Piety, therefore, and religion, and everything whatever correlated with strength of Mind, they regard as burdens which they hope to shake off at death and to receive the reward of their slavery, that is, of their Piety and Religion. Nor is this hope alone their inducement, but also, and more particularly, in living so far as their frivolity and feebleness of mind allows, according to the prescriptions of divine law, they are

[1] *De suo jure cedere*—the phrase 'give up their rights' may be more literal, but scarcely gives the spirit so well. Besides, to be 'sui juris' *is* to be independent.

actuated by fear of being punished with dreadful torments after death. And if men were not pervaded by this hope and fear—if, on the contrary, they thought that Mind and Body perished together—that there remained no longer existence for wretches weary of the burden of Piety, they would return to their natural bent, they would take lust as the only guide, and would prefer the chances of fortune above (their better) self. Now this seems to be not less absurd than for a man, because good food will not preserve his body for ever, to betake himself rather to poisons, and stuff himself with deadly potions. Or it is as if, because a man finds the Mind to be neither eternal nor immortal, he should therefore prefer to be a fool and to live without Reason. But all this is so absurd that it scarcely deserves consideration.'

The warmest admirers of this Master must wish that he had not written the above Scholium. It is true he does not, like St. Paul, appear to sanction the ignoble maxim, 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.' But he attributes this meanness to the vast majority of mankind. And one wonders how many he expected to influence by his noble Ethics. Nay, we cannot believe that the kindly, gentle soul who could descend from the solitary chamber of his sublime musings and talk, at the evening meal, with landlady and children about the church service, and the sermon of the day, or even lesser interests of their daily life, could regard as mercenaries and cowards the good, humble people who loved him. Such a thought could not have been true then, and it is not true now. The fact is that Spinoza's *vulgus*, or multitude, think very little indeed either of death or what comes after it. From the pulpit or religious platform we may occasionally—though much more rarely than of old—hear very emphatic or even lurid language

A caveat

Spinoza's *vulgus* a freak of 'imagination.'

Average humanity wholly indifferent.

on such subjects. But it is only hysterically inclined hearers who are much disturbed by it. The vast majority, perhaps ninety-five out of every hundred, go home to their dinner or their supper and enjoy their meal with as healthy an appetite as though they believed neither in heaven nor hell.

Besides, medical men and other attendants on the dying know that not two out of a hundred are ever troubled by fears of a world to come. To what then is the average good conduct and kindliness of the vast majority of the multitude to be attributed? It is undeniable that religious traditions have a certain influence. But it is only so far as these traditions fall in with the course of moral evolution that advances almost independently of them. And the course of this moral evolution proceeds from experience of utility to contentment with results of useful maxims; and from contentment with results to the formation of a standard; and from the formation of a standard to the slow crystallisation of an ideal, which is not wholly wanting among the 'multitude,' but reaches effulgence only in solitary souls like Spinoza. The uncultured good people, the ordinary church and chapel goers who lustily sing about heaven on the Sunday and honestly mind their business during the week without much thought of things supernal, have their ideals, though these may be dim and veiled. Let any one propose to them a mean trick in trade, or treachery to a friend, and it will soon be proved that they, no less than Spinoza, though within a narrower horizon, value goodness for its own sake without the slightest reference to heaven or hell.

Proximate causes of average goodness.

Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter; for it is given in a nobler tone.

'Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; nor do we rejoice in that blessedness because we subdue our lusts; but contrariwise, it is because we rejoice in it that we are therefore able to subdue our lusts.'

The proof is as follows:—

'Blessedness consists in Love toward God, which Love springs from the third kind of knowledge (intuition); and therefore this Love is correlative with the Mind in as far as the latter is active; and accordingly it is Virtue itself.[1] This was the first thing (to be proved). Next, in proportion as the Mind exults more in this divine Love or Blessedness, in that proportion it understands the more, that is, it has the greater power over the affections and also suffers the less from evil affections. Thus it is because the Mind rejoices in this divine Love or Blessedness that it has the power of restraining lusts. And because man's power of controlling his lusts is the prerogative of intellect alone, therefore no one exults in blessedness as a consequence of controlling the affections, but contrariwise, the power of controlling the affections springs from blessedness itself.'

'Thus I have finished all that I had wished to set forth concerning the power of the Mind over the affections and concerning its freedom. From all this clearly appears the surpassing worth of the Wise man as compared with the ignorant, who is driven by lust alone. For the latter besides being distracted by a host of external influences, and

[1] Because by Def. viii., Pt. iv., Virtue and Power are identical, *i.e.* power of effecting such things as can be accounted for by, or find their adequate cause in, man's (divine) nature alone. I interpolate (divine) because wherever Spinoza speaks of a finite being's own nature, he means the Mode or modification of divine Attributes which constitutes the essence of that finite being.

constantly deprived of true contentment of soul, lives also without a true sense of himself, of God, and of the world, and at what moment he ceases to suffer he also ceases to be. Whereas the Wise man, so far as he is (rightly) considered such, is rarely shaken in mind; but being conscious of himself and of God and of the world in an aspect of eternal necessity, he never ceases to be, but for ever enjoys true contentment of soul. If now the path which I have indicated to such an attainment should seem very hard, yet still it can be found. And indeed it must be hard, since it is so rarely discovered. For if salvation were ready to hand, and could be found without much trouble, why should it be neglected by almost all mankind? But all noble attainments are as difficult as they are rare.'

An apparent inconsistency

Sir Frederick Pollock, while acknowledging with profound sympathy the exalted moral tone of these final words, observes that 'in their literal sense they are not quite consistent' with the Scholium to Proposition x. of this Part. For there we are told that 'whoever will assiduously study these lessons—for indeed they are not difficult—and will practise them, assuredly that man will within a short space of time be able generally to direct his actions by the dictates of Reason.' Whereas here it would appear that the very arduousness of the pathway to the life of Reason explains why 'few there be who find it.' In the Gospel of Christ, however, as indeed the last-quoted words remind us, there is a strictly analogous appearance of inconsistency susceptible, as I shall suggest, of a like explanation. For we are told on the one hand that the most suitable subjects of the kingdom of Heaven are little children and child-like men and women, an instruction certainly suggesting that the entrance to that

found also in the Christian Gospel.

kingdom is 'indeed not difficult.' And this is confirmed by the saying, 'My yoke is easy and my burden is light.' Yet, on the other hand, we are told 'strait is the gate and narrow is the way which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it.' Nay, 'many will seek to enter in and shall not be able.' Now, whatever be the various theological interpretations of the 'strait gate,' no one, so far as I am aware, has held that it is in any way inconsistent with the facility of entrance promised to the child-like and the meek. The only difficulty is found in the average moral condition of mankind, which indisposes them to 'strive to enter in,' and which indeed sometimes plucks them back when they are half-way through the gate. But the difficulty is not in the gate: it is in the half-heartedness of the would-be pilgrims.

The life of Reason has its strait gate.

Perhaps the same explanation in principle is applicable to the apparent inconsistency between the two passages in this Part of the Ethics. For in the former passage comparative ease of entrance on the life of reason is conditional on assiduity of thought and diligence in practice. If only those be given, any man may 'in a short space of time be able generally to direct his actions by the dictates of Reason.' Yes; but there is here too a 'strait gate.' Inadequate ideas must be abandoned, or at least appreciated at their true worth. There must be a sincere and earnest craving for salvation from passion. There must be a total surrender of self-assertion beyond the limits of that finite Mode of the divine Attributes which is our essence and only being. No wonder then that in his mournful remembrance of the aversion of Man in every age to heroic moral endeavour the Master should

in his last words magnify the need of earnestness if freedom is to be attained.[1]

Does Spinoza teach 'conditional immortality'?

Much harder to interpret are those sentences in the epilogue, which, if the idea were not so utterly contrary to Spinoza's whole philosophy, might at first sight appear to have anticipated a doctrine very popular some thirty or forty years ago, and known as 'conditional immortality.' For we are told that the ignorant man (*i.e.* the slave of passion) ceases to exist when he ceases to suffer, whereas the wise man (*i.e.* the free man) never ceases to exist. Now, to get the right point of view here, we must remember the Master's reiterated warning against our inveterate confusion of eternity with infinite duration. But the eternal life which he himself lives is not in time at all. For when he was phenomenally subject to time he fixed his mind on God as All in All, and recognised that his true self was a finite Mode of God. Now in God there is no past nor future. Therefore Spinoza thought of himself under the aspect of eternity as a finite Mode of God, and thus having neither beginning nor end. Not only so; but from the bewilderment occasioned by

The true consciousness of eternal life.

[1] Sir Frederick Pollock thinks the apparent inconsistency may be explained by the assumption that Spinoza contemplated the possibility of two grades in the life of reason—the one 'a practical standard . . . attainable by ordinary men,' the other a higher life of strenuous thought and 'contemplative science.' The suggestion is amply justified by the analogy of similar grades in the great religions. But I venture to think that if Spinoza had intended this he would have expressed it more plainly. For it would obviously have facilitated the acceptance of his ideas, as similar concessions to the practical and social difficulties of 'ordinary men' quickened the spread of Buddhism and Christianity. I cannot help thinking that the above analogy with a similar inconsistency in the Gospel fits in better with the whole scheme of the Ethics.

successive experiences of parts only of the divine Whole he sought relief in a vision of the Infinite Living Universe, within which everything has its serviceable place, and in which all discords are reduced to harmony.

Even his intellect was baffled by the insoluble problem of the Many and the One. But in his view the best approximation man can make to a vision of the co-existence of innumerable parts in one perfect eternal Whole is the conception of inevitable sequence. That is to say, we cannot image the Infinite as it is, in what we may call its eternal moment of being. Yet we are sure that if we could in vision see it as it is, we should recognise that every part is necessary to all the rest, and could not be otherwise than it is—without changing the whole Universe—that is, the eternal and changeless. But this is just what the doctrine of inevitable sequence teaches under the aspect of time. That is, it instructs us that though the necessities of our finite nature compel us to see things under the aspect of time, or as subject to succession, we are not on that account justified in denying the fixity of relationship which all parts of the Whole must have under the aspect of eternity. Spinoza's eternal life, therefore, is a consciousness of himself as a finite Mode of God, and of the Universe as an infinity of divine Modes, all together constituting absolute perfection.[1] Into this consciousness no thought of death enters. In his contemplations all things, past, present, and to come, work together for good, that is, are essential elements in

Importance of the doctrine of inevitable sequence as mediating between the eternal and the temporal.

Spinoza's eternal life.

[1] Not, of course, in the sense of a finished work, but in the sense of such absolute concinnity, that an infinite intellect—if the term be allowed—would realise the impossibility, or rather the inconceivability, of any smallest part being other than it is.

the perfect Whole. And the change from the illusion of succession to the reality of co-existence cannot possibly make him 'cease to be.' Therefore there is no disturbance of his serenity; but being conscious of God and the world with a sense of eternal necessity, he for ever enjoys contentment of soul.

The fate of moral slavery.

The (morally) ignorant man, the slave of blind desire, is not so. For knowing nothing of his true relations to things as they are, he has no consciousness of his true self—as a Mode of God—no realisation of the apparent world as God-manifest. And though we are not to forget that the ignorant man's body and soul have 'an aspect of eternity,' he is not aware of it. He has no power to 'lay hold on eternal life.' His notion of existence is gratification of a perpetual craving, a craving only aggravated by attempts to stay it. And for him, when craving ceases, existence ceases too. True, this 'inadequate cause,' the (morally) ignorant man, is in God. But his idea of himself is inadequate because he is not content with the divine idea of himself, but confuses it with other things which do not belong to it.[1] He therefore mars it, and can have no conscious part in the eternal life of God. Thus the difference between the free man and the slave of blind desire is not a matter of external destiny in heaven or hell. It is rather a subjective difference, inasmuch as the former is conscious of eternal life and the other is not.

'*The Eternal knoweth the way of the righteous; but the way of the ungodly shall perish.*'

[1] Prop. xi., Pt. II.

CONCLUSION

THE liberalism of present-day theology and what we may call the mystical tendencies of contemporary science indicate enormous changes in the world of thought since the seventeenth century. And those to whom Spinoza is not merely a philosopher, but a seer, can hardly help asking themselves as they lay down his Ethics, how far those changes have made possible, or may in the near future make possible, a wider human reverence for his great vision of God. Of course there is no question here of the adoption or propagation of a religion in the ecclesiastical sense. For that Shechinah is the emblem of no sect. It is rather the infinite background, 'dark with excess of light,' from which all faiths of the world emerge. Nor does reverence for that vision of God necessarily involve an entire rejection of historic religions. Indeed, long before Spinoza's day many a devout Christian has, in the innermost shrine of his soul, cherished a *Weltanschauung* impossible to distinguish from Pantheism. At the same time it must be acknowledged that any forced and obstinate adhesion to any fragmentary article of faith which has lost its hold on a man's reason must needs incapacitate that man from appreciating the larger faith. 'Truth in the inward parts,' a possession which makes merely self-willed belief impossible, is essential to the realisation of Spinoza's vision of God.

Changes in the world of thought since Spinoza's day.

Do they suggest the possibility of wider appreciation of the Ethics?

The question asked above, then, amounts to this. Putting aside subsidiary details of definition and of method, are there any signs that the world is nearer than

Relations of Spinoza's doctrine of God and man to modern thought.

it was in Spinoza's day to his essential doctrines of God and man? I think the question may fairly be answered in the affirmative. For, first, the mystery of matter, which is now more widely recognised than ever before in all the history of thought, has obviously a certain spiritual suggestiveness which points in the direction of Spinoza's Substance One and Eternal. For instance, contemporary science has made Dalton's atomic theory utterly untenable, except, of course, so far as concerns its doctrine of definitely proportional combinations. But though this latter part of the doctrine is unassailed, the explanation of it by the hypothesis of ultimate and indestructible atoms has been practically abandoned. For these atoms have been dissolved away into something indistinguishable from Boscovich's 'centres of force.' The latter most original thinker knew nothing, indeed, of 'electrons.' But the substitution of that mystic word for his centres of force is rather a change of terms than of theory. The believers in the finality of the new views of matter may indeed rejoin with some plausibility that the above substitution is more than a mere change of terms, because the action of the presumed electric force in the infinitesimal vortices formed of electrons is calculable and verifiable, which could hardly be said of Boscovich's vague 'centres of force.' But why not? Boscovich was a great mathematician in addition to his other scientific attainments. And it is incredible that he should have propounded a theory which he did not see his way to maintain on mathematical principles. Indeed the presumed 'force' without the epithet electric at each infinitesimal centre into which Boscovich dissolved matter

I. Spiritual tendencies caused by the acknowledged mystery of matter.

Practical recurrence to Boscovich's centres of force.

Facilities for calculation and verification do not necessarily assure the fundamental truth of the working hypothesis on which they are based.

away, was just as much subject to measurement and verification as it is with the epithet added to it. Nor should it be forgotten that one main attraction of John Dalton's theory was the facility and apparent completeness with which it lent itself to measurement, calculation, and verification. Yet all the same, we now know that the fundamental truth, which makes these calculations and verifications possible, must be something very different from Dalton's idea of hard, indestructible atoms.

New working hypothesis.

We are now asked to recognise, as the really ultimate constituent of matter, an infinitesimal vortex formed in the ether by enormous electric force. But experience of vanished finalities surely justifies a healthy scepticism even in regard to such brilliant and fascinating theories as this. For the only term which is knowable to us in this new theory, or which belongs to what Spinoza calls 'common notions'—that is, the common stock of human experience—is 'vortex,' a thing that can at any time be exhibited on a large scale by any popular lecturer on science, or even by a skilful smoker of tobacco. Yet even though the thing signified by the word be thus producible on what, comparatively, may be called a gigantic scale, it is not easy to see how these complex revolving rings, with no stability and but momentary continuity, can help much to make conceivable the infinitesimal vortices in the ether whose prerogative it is to simulate, for an indefinite period and in many cases for æons, the supposed indestructible atom of Democritus, Lucretius, and Dalton.

The vortex.

But beyond that word 'vortex' there is no single term in the newest theories of matter that presents any clear

Ether.

image whatever to the mind. For as to the 'ether,' no one, however learnedly he may be able to calculate its 'strcsses' or 'tensions,' and its undulations or vibrations, can pretend to have the remotest conception of what it is. And thc mere fact that certain working hypotheses about its properties have been found to accord with mathematical calculations about the movements and action of light and electricity, proves nothing whatever as to the fundamental essence of the thing itself. For, as already noted, Dalton's working hypothesis about atoms seemed for many years to be amply verified by the uniform results of physical and mathematical research into chemical combinations. And yet we now know that there are no such things at all as indestructible, indivisible, unchangeable atoms, and that the laws of chemical combination must depend upon something else.

Electricity.

Then again, Electricity, which plays so large a part in the latest theories of Matter, is just as unknowable as the Ether. Scientific men can indeed measure its force, calculate its action, and harness it to engines. But there is scarcely a teacher of its mysteries who does not begin his lessons with a warning to his students that, however much they may learn about electricity, they must not expect to know what it is.

The bearing of this mystery of matter.

Under these circumstances it would be unreasonable to ask us to allow that thc new theories of Matter have reached—or have any prospect of reaching—finality. For if the seemingly solid atom, for ages the stronghold of materialistic science, has been found to be a bewildering whirl of swift electrons, who is to guarantee us that the electron itself will not rcveal somc timc a still inner

world of forces yet unnamed? To assume the impossibility of this would be as irrational as the hope sometimes cherished in bygone days that some impossible increase of microscopic power would discover the innermost core of matter, whether atom or otherwise, and so make it obvious to sense. Whereas experience, according to the witness of science, lends no encouragement whatever to such hopes. For we only know that the more the powers of the microscope have been increased, the more perfectly continuous and the more exquisite in refinement are organic tissues made to appear. Nor do inorganic sections or granules give any encouragement whatever to the hope that a step has been made toward unveiling the ultimate constituent parts.

Modern theories of matter not conclusive but suggestive.

The truth is that the most recent theories of Matter, so far from giving us a sense of finality by clearness of definition, rather open up unexpected vistas of speculation. And far in the perspective of these vistas is the revelation of a Universe at once material, spiritual, and divine, such as fascinated Spinoza. For he was not a dreamer who dissolved away the material world into fancies of the mind. Nor could he tolerate the harsh dualism which makes 'Mind' and 'Matter' essentially alien to each other and wholly incommensurable. To him they were different forms of the same divine Being and, together with other endless modes of unrevealed infinite Attributes, constitute the Universe. But on such questions argument is out of place except to prove tendencies of thought or probabilities of future advance. And so far as this limited purpose is concerned, I believe I have shown some reasons for thinking that most recent

And the suggestions point to the ideas of Spinoza.

theories of Matter point to a conception of the material Universe such as may easily in the future merge in that of Spinoza.

II. The idea of creation discredited.

Secondly, it is impossible to disguise the fact that where theories of a Creation, and of a Creator entirely separate therefrom, are still held, they are either unwillingly accepted on account of certain now discredited doctrines of catastrophe and ruin leading to the final death of all worlds and thereby implying the birth of the Universe in time; or else they are tolerated through an amiable desire to reassure the fears of the multitude for the mythology the latter hold so dear.

Theory of universal death through loss of heat.

Now as to the former notion of a Universe gradually aggregating itself into a huge, congealed sphere, its very grotesqueness always repelled reverence even where knowledge was lacking to show its fallacy. Surely where the scale is infinite, no mortal man should presume to propound such a theory merely because a few orbs have apparently collided, or because the existence of innumerable dark orbs seems probable. The supposed inevitable process of congelation alternating with vapourisation caused by new collisions on a continually growing scale until there shall be left only one inconceivably vast frozen orb, may quite fairly be regarded as a nightmare of mortal ignorance, rather than as the conclusion of inexorable logic.[1]

Not a certain conclusion.

[1] I have quoted elsewhere scientific authority for this opinion (*Religion of the Universe*, p. 129, etc.), and it would be out of place to repeat here what has been there said. It may suffice here to refer to Sir Norman Lockyer's suggested cycle of star life, and to the interesting theory of 'shearing' collisions propounded by Professor Bickerton of New Zealand. Quite recently also Professor Robert K. Duncan of Jefferson College, U.S.A., in his work *The New Knowledge* (London,

But granted that no one, not even the most competent and learned of our instructors, can yet speak with any absolute certainty upon ultimate questions concerning the material Universe, surely here is an opportunity for loyalty to that instinct of faith of which theologians have been loud in praise. Why may not those of us whose souls are repelled by the grotesque theory of a dying Universe take advantage of the recent doctrine of 'the will to believe'? I am aware that this doctrine has been formulated and maintained in the interest of the curious temporary reaction which has of late inclined many learned, philosophic, and scientific men to return to the mythology of the early Christian centuries. But that doctrine is a two-edged weapon. For if some have an emotional propension toward a religious system of a personal Creator, personal Providence, revelation, incarnation and miracles related thereto, why may not others have an emotional propension to a system that loyally takes things as they are, and excludes alike a beginning and an end? Why may we not feel an emotional propension toward a faith that admits only one Being manifested by infinite Attributes, such as are subject to infinite modifications all keeping an eternal and unbroken order? Surely the vision of the Universe is not less, but more impressive, not less but more divine, if we regard it as in its totality immune from all processes of manufacture or decay, as being in itself both substance and life; and as offering for study neither origins nor

The will to believe.

Hodder and Stoughton, 1906) has given in Part VII., Chap. iii., a very judicial statement of the position of this question. In his summing-up he regards the eternity of the Universe as the conclusion more acceptable 'to most people of scientific training.'

ends, but only the actual relations of its apparent parts.

The real motive of temporary reaction.

Indeed there is only one worthy reason to be given for the favour at present accorded by men of intellect to 'the will to believe' the old mythology, and this reason is involved in the inveterate tradition that the interests of morality and of the higher or spiritual life are bound up with that belief. But to adhere to tradition on such a subject, to the neglect of a human experience which far outranges that tradition, is scarcely reasonable. We must admit indeed that, by the very nature of religious evolution out of Animism through Polytheism and Henotheism to Monotheism with an outlook toward Pantheism, it has been inevitable that the greater number of lofty and saintly characters should have been found among those who have striven to expand and exalt and refine the idea of a personal God and of His varied dealings with mankind. Inevitable, I say, because that was precisely the stage of evolution at which it became possible for the spiritual nature of man to disengage itself, at least in part, from the coarse influences of Animism and Fetishism. But on the other hand, there are two noteworthy facts of world-wide religious evolution which distinctly forbid any hasty judgment in favour of the exclusive claims of the Judæo-Christian tradition to the guardianship of morality. For, first, this process of moral and spiritual refinement went on amongst so-called 'Pagans' such, for example, as Socrates, Plato, Seneca, Tacitus, Marcus Aurelius, and a countless multitude of others forgotten or unforgotten. And, secondly, one of the most remarkable and wide-

Fear for the foundation of morals,

a fear not justified by any wide survey of human experience.

Pagan saints.

spread of all religious revivals, that of the Buddha, without denying any theories of deity, simply ignored them as entirely irrelevant to moral issues. But in all these cases alike, high moral aspiration and 'the enthusiasm of humanity' were found quite compatible with entire ignorance of, or else complete indifference to, the creeds of Moses and the Church.

As for the claims of Pantheism to be the ultimate religion, those have been largely the subject of the preceding Handbook, and cannot be repeated here. My point now is simply that the acknowledgment of those claims has been delayed, not so much by Reason as by the preoccupation of even the most thoughtful minds with the essential necessity to morality of belief in Creation, a personal God, and man's personal immortality. Take away this supposed necessity, which the widest survey of human experience contradicts, and the inherent unworthiness, incongruity, and absurdity of the theory of an *opifex deus*, making, minding, and mending the world, becomes patent, glaring, and repulsive.

Signs of a growing repulsion to creation and miracle.

That there is at any rate a current of feeling and opinion tending toward a recognition of this incongruity is made probable and even apparent by the extremely vague and indefinite form in which the doctrine of Creation and a personal God is held, even under the influence of 'the will to believe.' For it has little, if anything at all, in common with the definite Chaldæo-Hebrew cosmogony received of old and, until our own early days, held by the Christian Church. And no wonder; because, to the compilers of the Bible cosmogony, the Universe lay within so small a compass, as compared

with the outlook of modern knowledge, that the analogy between a human builder of a palace or city and a celestial builder of heaven and earth did not seem at all impossible or even difficult of conception. Indeed the analogy is carried so far that the celestial craftsman is described as doing his work in successive stages, his superior might being indicated by the swiftness with which each stage is accomplished, as they occupy only one day each. But the anthropomorphic analogy involved in this progress by diurnal stages is too obvious for denial. It is not characteristic of omniscience and omnipotence which, presumably, could just as easily have made in one moment heaven and earth and all that in them is. But the reminiscence of the human workman was too strong; and therefore the work was done by stages.[1]

Superiority of the Hebrew narrative.

True, this mythical story, which in its present form is certainly a late document, and adapted to a more cultured age than that of the original Chaldee or Sumerian myth, does not presume to ascribe to Jahweh the use of tools or instruments, or even the application of hands[2] to the work. With a sublimity generally and deservedly recognised, the narrative makes the word of God the sufficient means for separating the light from the darkness, for dividing the 'firmament' from the ocean, for establishing the bounds of sea and land, as

[1] Any attempt to see in the creation days a forecast of evolution is surely a harsh and incongruous insult to the simplicity of the ancient tale.

[2] In other parts of the Old Testament, however—mostly in parts older than the Priestly Code—creation is often spoken of as the work of God's hands. See Isa. xlv. 12; Ps. viii. 6; xcv. 5; cv. 25; Job x. 8, etc. etc.

well as for all the other processes that culminated in the creation of man after God's own image. The whole story regarded as a poetic myth has a grandeur which gives it a high place in the literature of religion.

Feebleness of late attempts at rationalism.

But when we contrast this tale from the childhood of the world with the vague, indefinite, and inarticulate allusions to creation in recent writing on world-origins, the change is like that from a child's fairy tale to a preacher's feeble attempts to moralise it. There is no real relation between the two things. The conception—if such it can be called—which unreasoning tradition would impose upon modern knowledge is wholly incongruous with the latter. For the stupendous and infinitely varied Universe, to which no bounds have been or can be set, is really incommensurable with the two- or three-storied structure that constituted the Chaldæo-Hebrew world. Let us for a moment imagine that our knowledge of the material Universe had attained its present extent before the Chaldæo-Hebrew tradition had been made known to Western races. Suppose that the poem of creation had been recited for the first time by Eastern missionaries to London, New York, Paris, and Berlin audiences familiar with the nebular hypothesis and with the theories of the Milky Way and with baffled efforts to count the stars, and with probabilities of innumerable repetitions of planetary systems like our own. Can any one sincerely doubt for a moment how such a message must have been received by even the most devout and religious hearers? No candid or impressionable soul could have denied its charm, but the notion of accepting it as, in any sense whatever, a

reasonable account of the actual origin of the world would not even have occurred to the hearers. Of course I may be told that, even though the story is with us a venerable tradition, no intelligent believer thinks of accepting it literally. Then why accept it at all? Only because it gives a religious sanction to the dogma of creation in some sense, which dogma is supposed to be essential to the most important articles of the creed—a personal God, the Fall of Man, Incarnation, Atonement, and human Immortality.

Parallel of 'the origin of species.'

On this subject many minds are in the same position as almost all were in regard to the origin of species before the epoch-making utterances of Darwin and Wallace. For it was then thought essential to religion to believe that each species was the product of a special creative act. Yet such a faith was utterly vague, inarticulate, and incapable of distinct presentment. For any pious but candid man who tried to picture to himself the objective actuality of such creation found himself involved in absurdities. To maintain in general terms that each species was the result of a creative act seemed easy enough. But to picture to oneself either the sudden starting into existence of a whale or an elephant, or the building up of such huge bodies by a divine worker out of surrounding materials, was an impossible effort. And perhaps one of the greatest spiritual blessings conferred by Darwin's *Origin of Species* upon mankind was its deliverance of us from the conventional necessity of pretending to believe what, in the 'subconscious' region of the mind, was recognised as absurd.

Yet even greater will be the emancipation when man-

kind finally renounce the hopeless attempt to conceive any act of creation at all, and acquiesce in the truth preached by Heaven and Earth that, amid unceasing, finite change, there is one infinite, changeless Universe, without beginning and without end. In proportion as this truth is recognised, the world will need Spinoza.

Relief from the dogma of creation.

III. Taking things as they are.

For in effect the surrender of the idea of creation means that we take things as they are, and that we cease from curious and vain inquiries into origins and endings. Now this is precisely what Spinoza teaches, though the plainness of his doctrine is at first obscured to the student by the profundity and subtlety of his analysis of things as they are. Thus, when we are confronted with ideas of eternal Substance and its Attributes and their modifications, we are almost disposed to mistake all this for a new theory of creation. But of course nothing could be farther from the mind of the Master. For he is only telling how, according to Spinoza's judgment, the rational man should think of things as they are. There has never been a birth of a Universe; there is no 'design'; there is no 'plan' with a beginning and an end. On the infinite scale—which means on the scale of all that is—things are as they always have been and always will be. For the finite changes that attract our interest so much do not affect this eternal sameness any more than a summer ripple affects 'the stillness of the central sea.'

The practical bearing of the Ethics.

But it is precisely on our attitude toward these finite changes, of which our own existence forms a part, that Spinoza's teaching is at once most interesting and practical. For while not drawing upon our 'will to believe,'

he fixes our attention and excites our aspiration by displaying the glory of our spontaneity as parts of the universal divine life. He shows us that, by making our finite life an effort for the preservation of our highest self as a manifestation of God, and by defending this sacred domain against the inroads of passion begotten by inadequate ideas, we may attain a peace which the world of greed and pleasure cannot give and cannot take away.

Conditions of that peace.

In other words, this contemplative knowledge of all things as in God and of God gives the utter restfulness of self-abnegation and of faith. But it is not a self-abnegation without effort, and not a faith without self-control. The heart aching under bereavement, the pure aspirant baffled by failure, the lover of man haunted by the black terrors of human history—all at first seek impossible restoration or unattainable compensation, or logical explanations fitting in with imperfect knowledge. And only when all such consolations fail, as fail they must, save so far as they soothe us with opiates of deceit, then perhaps recurs the harsh but healing question asked of complaining sorrow long ago—'Should it be according to thy mind?' Was this unsearchable maze of infinite movements co-ordinated and balanced to give you pleasure? or is the glory of man its ultimate goal? It has no goal at all. Or if our human craving for purpose cannot be restrained within its proper sphere, but insists on a purpose for the Infinite as well as the finite, then we say that the self-existence of the divine Universe is purpose enough. On the infinite scale it is now, as it always was, and always will be. It is only the finite modes of divine

Attributes that show apparent change, and in them are comprehended all the phases of human experience. Within those limits effort and hope and unselfish ambition have their scope, scintillating with finite manifestations of God. There always has been and there always will be enough of joy in human experience to make life, on the whole, a delight.

Embitterment comes of inadequate ideas.

To embitter our souls about the darker phases of life concerning which, as Spinoza teaches, we have only 'inadequate ideas,' is the reverse of self-abnegation and the abandonment of self-control. It is therefore the betrayal of faith. But it is the supreme virtue and valour of the mind to see all things, whether to us grievous or joyous, as necessary and inevitable phases of one eternal Being. And though it may not be given to all to attain this—at least not for many generations to come—yet those who do attain it and realise their own place in the divine Whole reach, as the Master says, the highest perfection possible to human nature; and therein lies their heaven. I must iterate and reiterate that no fatalism, still less any acquiescence in pessimism, is here taught. Spontaneity, or Will, effort and struggle and hope and fear are all incidental to human nature in this as much as in any other system of ethics. But none of these can break or derange the order of inevitable sequence in finite existence. And when all is done that we can do, when much is left that we cannot do, while we have many things to enjoy and much to suffer, the consciousness that we are parts of the Eternal Life and do nothing in vain, does bring peace. Indeed, to this final rest in things as they are on the infinite scale, many inspired

No fatalism.

words of prophecy or poetry are more applicable than to any trust in a supernatural Person who differs from ourselves only in might and degree of quality rather than in kind. The craving for a God who will do—in the future if not now—just what we want to have done, has often produced him, as it produced the golden calves. But when produced he is so incongruous with the order of Nature and the course of evolution or history, and indeed with everything but just the private service we want from him as men, or even as sectaries or patriots, that faith in him always feels the gnawing of criticism and doubt, rarely attains peace, and never eternal rest.

> 'There's a divinity that shapes our ends,
> Rough-hew them how we will.'

The true divinity that shapes our ends.

This is surely more credible of a God who is all that is, has been, or will be, than of a separate being who first makes a world and then has to mind it and mend it. And the true prophets, inspired of old by the Eternal Life, often uttered words of which the full scope needed the illumination of a larger creed than their traditions allowed. 'The peace of God which passeth all understanding' must certainly be transcendental, and cannot be a mere assurance of a reward after death. Surely the peace which comes of acquiescence in our own place in the Eternal Life seems better to answer the description. Or take the Hebrew prophet's words, 'Thou wilt keep him in perfect peace whose mind is stayed on thee, because he trusteth in thee.' However profoundly and justly our sympathies may be touched by such an approximation to ultimate religion, the conditions of

Noblest expressions of ancient piety may receive a larger interpretation.

entire realisation were wanting in a monotheism which worshipped only the greatest personal being among all others. For that realisation requires not only an impregnable, but a self-evident rest for faith; such a rest can only be found by a merging of all things in a unity of substance and energy ensuring perpetual order in finite things, and perfection beyond all thought in the infinite Whole.

Conclusion of the whole matter.

Now this is just what Spinoza teaches. For we already saw in our study of the First Part of the Ethics that the fact of our present existence necessarily involves eternal being, in and by which we are what we are. The denial of this is really unthinkable, and all apparent denials are only dissents from this or that interpretation of the impregnable fact. But if we have followed this Master in his lessons on the blessedness of referring all things to God and of finding in Him the infinite complement of our fragmentary life, we may dare to claim for faith a rest such as even Isaiah did not know. Nay, the connection between the absolute trust and the 'perfect peace' has a rationality which it could not have in traditional religion. For between trust in dim, incongruous visions of a transfigured tribal deity, and rest in the substance of all that is, there is all the difference separating even the noblest superstition from devout reason.

THE END

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